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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

APPALACHIA ON THE AIRWAVES: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC AND
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION IN THE SOUTHERN MOUNTAINS
Through a series of historical case studies of individual states within the multi-state
region of the Appalachian mountain range, as well as the region as a whole, this dissertation
examines educational television (ETV) operations, both at the network level and that of
individual stations. Though mostly thought of as “public television”—an educational and
noncommercial alternative to mainstream broadcast media—these ETV networks offered,
I argue, something more analogous to present-day understandings of distance education
and the use of instructional media and technology. Station directors, philanthropic
benefactors, and school administrators took different approaches to providing the service
of ETV, but all were motivated by the prospect of ETV as an instrument of educational
equity and a compensatory resource for regions with unequal educational outcomes.
Appalachia as a region has historically experienced under-resourced public schooling
systems and educational opportunities for working adults. Through television programs,
available either in formal classrooms and other schooling spaces, or at home, ETV
networks sought to provide some redress to the struggling region. Educators, working
within the medium of educational television, and in consultation with the teachers they
endeavored to serve, envisioned new technological spaces for interaction and learning,
believing that if it were it to be offered astutely, then students at all walks of life, regardless
of the endowment of their local schools and communities, could receive through ETV, at
little or no cost to them, some of the best resources available in the state and nation to
complete an education.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the philanthropic agency first
established by a steel magnate and known most commonly for building public libraries,
announced a plan to radically redesign a burgeoning educational institution. Since the
Second World War, educators in communities across the nation had experimented with
using television as a learning tool. Broadcast media could reach homes and businesses
hundreds of miles away, and few people in the postwar era doubted the ability of that
technology to both inform and influence the opinions of those who tuned in. Prior to
World War II, educators and commercial interests alike had demonstrated these
capabilities with radio programming. Educational television producers, acting either as
representatives of higher education institutions or as service-minded professionals within
the broadcast industry, had found inventive ways to teach via television and use its power
to reach students and households many miles away. Though it was not used everywhere
for this purpose, the television set had by the mid-1960s emerged in the minds of many as
a legitimate educational tool, either to be used in classrooms themselves, or as a means to
connect children and adults with educators while at home. Skepticism remained as to
whether or not radio and television really provided the same authentic learning
experiences as those offered in in-person environments, but by 1966 it was clear that
these visual educational media would play a significant role in the American education
system.
Like many other interested parties within the sectors of broadcasting and
education, the Carnegie Corporation found that educational television had certain
inefficiencies and faults that needed addressing. Their fifteen-member “Commission on
1

Educational Television,” comprised of university administrators, manufacturing
executives, various political figures, one broadcasting president, one labor union leader,
one concert pianist, and one celebrated novelist, gathered under the Carnegie banner to
determine the extent to which the nation and its communities were relying on
noncommercial and educational television, and to recommend solutions to the federal
government based on their findings. The report of their study was published nationally, in
the landmark book-length 1967 text, Public Television: A Program for Action. This study
would provide much of the basis for the Public Broadcasting Act signed into law by
President Lyndon B. Johnson in that same year. Though educators and media
professionals had at that point been making use of television channels throughout the
United States for noncommercial and educational purposes for decades, the Carnegie
study confirmed the benefits these channels had provided to their communities, and they
imagined new ways to grow and support what the earliest educational stations had
begun.1
Most of the Carnegie Commission’s 12 major recommendations centered on the
creation of a national, centralized, and federally supported system of public television,
where none had ever seriously existed before. Some of these recommendations might
seem quite familiar to a present-day PBS viewer, as most were adopted virtually
wholesale into the subsequent legislation. These included the “Corporation for Public
Television,” a government-chartered organization that would financially support the
development of new programs and facilities at various underfunded and overstretched

1 Public Television: A Program for Action. The Report and Recommendations of the Carnegie
Commission on Educational Television (Bantam Books, 1967).
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stations across the U.S. Another recognizable antecedent was the Commission’s call for
“at least two national production centers,” which would be “free to contract with
independent producers to prepare Public Television [sic] programs for educational
television systems.” Other recommendations made by the Carnegie Commission never
saw the light of day, such as a “manufacturer’s excise tax on television sets (beginning at
2 percent and rising to a ceiling of 5 percent)” to support the new Corporation.2 All in
all, the Commission demanded that the federal government take the lead in the nation’s
noncommercial television operations by providing a robust system of vision and support
for the many educational stations that, to that point, had operated with tenuous finances
and, more or less, in isolation from one another.
Though the Carnegie Commission boldly imagined the new national scheme of
public television and its possibilities, they did not overlook the hard work and skills of
local educators who had found in television a dynamic and powerful tool for learning.
Commercial broadcasters, in their view, were more “obliged for the most part to search
for uniformities within the general public, and to apply [their] skills to satisfy the
uniformities.” Educational broadcasters, by contrast, had concerned themselves with
“matters of local interest,” and operated predominantly at that level. In this localized
service, the Commission found, educational television stations in the United States had
found ways to celebrate “our varying regions, our varying religions and national and
racial groups, our varying needs and social and intellectual interests,” all of which
contributed to “the fabric of American tradition.”3 The Carnegie Commission aimed to

2 Public Television: A Program for Action, 3-9.
3 Public Television: A Program for Action, 14.
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bolster a national framework of educational television for the American public, but they
did not want to lose the ingenious and elemental work of local stations that had given
noncommercial media its acclaimed position.
The imminent challenge of educational television that faced the Commission, in
spite of the good work being done by local stations across the nation, was that access to
this medium and the benefits derived from it had not been given out equitably. The
Commission displayed a clear faith in the desire of all Americans to explore and pursue
educational opportunities where they lived, and to that end, A Program for Action
stressed:
“To all audiences should be brought the best energies, the best resources, the best
talents—to the audience of fifty million, the audience of ten million, the audience
of a few hundred thousand. Until excellence and diversity have been joined, we
do not make the best use of our miraculous instrument.”4
The ambitious program to connect all educational stations and promote sharing of
resources, knowledge, and funds, was premised on the work local stations and producers
had done to that point.
This dissertation highlights the work of some of these local operations, both
before and after the arrival of PBS and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. To date,
much more is known by historians and interested viewers about the national framework
of public television envisioned by the Carnegie Commission, while far less attention has
been paid to the local stations that Carnegie credited with laying that system’s
foundation. Here the focus will be on stations that aimed to serve communities in the
Appalachian region, including some that continue to do so through the present day. In

4 Public Television: A Program for Action, 14.
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various ways, television stations sought to serve Appalachia at the local, state, and
regional level by providing educational resources to schools and interested learners
outside of classrooms. These institutions, and the people that supported them, recognized
the benefits television could provide to both students and teachers within a conventional
school environment, as well as learners at a distance from those environments who
wished to pursue an education, formally or informally. The successes and failures of
these educational television stations together offer valuable insight to succeeding
generations seeking to fairly and justly incorporate media and technology into an
education system.
Appalachia is a region that has historically experienced inequitable funding and
distribution of resources among its schools and educational systems, and while
Appalachia was not the primary focus of all the stations considered in this dissertation, all
responded in some manner to the inequalities present within that region. Though the
Carnegie Commission would have defined most of these educational television
operations as local (i.e., serving only the communities that could be immediately reached
by their transmitter equipment), the creators of each of these case subjects imagined how
television could contribute to regional transformation and improvement in education.
They insisted on the creation of networks, whereby smaller, more rural communities
within Appalachia that had historically faced inequitable support for schools and
education would be directly connected to the same sources of funding, personnel, and
learning materials that had hitherto been held almost exclusively by wealthier, urban
communities.

5

The extant networks whose founders committed themselves to this service operate
at the state level. North Carolina and Kentucky, two states that encompass regions of
varying geography and economic stability, both account for significant portions of the
greater Appalachian mountain range—eastern Kentucky’s ridges in the Cumberland
Plateau, and the Blue Ridge and Great Smoky Mountain expanses in western North
Carolina. Educators in both these states fought to establish networks within the apparatus
of a public education system. The founders of North Carolina’s network (known first as
WUNC-TV, now as PBS-North Carolina) followed the Federal Communications
Commission’s first directive on noncommercial television stations, and built the network
as a component of a consolidated university system. Kentucky Educational Television
(KET) was established as a new state agency, independent of, but in close contact with,
the state’s departments of Public Instruction and Higher Education. Both networks
would display with pride the work they have done in their Appalachian regions, but they
took different routes in beginning that service that bore serious implications for how
Appalachians’ educational needs were met.
Though the circumstances surrounding the construction of networks in Kentucky
and North Carolina differed in complex ways, the crucial factor to consider between the
two states is the order in which each state elected to establish its educational television
service. North Carolina began its state network in the vicinity of Chapel Hill—now
known as the Research Triangle, but then simply the only areas featuring member schools
under the Consolidated University banner. These included the state’s flagship school,
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, the land-grant North Carolina State College
(later University) in Raleigh, and the Woman’s College in Greensboro (later University
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of North Carolina at Greensboro). The state’s Consolidated University was thus confined
to schools in the Piedmont foothills—the wealthier central portion of the state which to
that point had garnered the bulk of industrial development and urban services in North
Carolina. It would take several decades of incremental expansion before North
Carolina’s network would fully reach its less populous and less wealthy peripheral areas,
and only after significant protests from residents not receiving this “state” service.
Kentucky, by contrast, insisted on covering all parts of the state from day one,
even though that meant their network would come at a considerably higher cost. Though
colleges and universities within the Bluegrass State were invited to play a role in
producing and distributing their knowledge through the state television network, they did
not hold the reins of the system, as was the case in North Carolina. Nor were they held
by the state’s Department of Public Instruction, which oversaw public schools,
administration, and facilities. Instead, they operate as an independent state agency which
works among these other interests, but not beneath them. As with North Carolina and
many other states, Kentucky has a grossly uneven distribution of wealth between urban
and rural areas, and the network’s architects knew that the benefits of educational
technology could easily fall along those lines if not planned accordingly. They had the
option to follow the lead of states like North Carolina, and proceed gradually in the
construction of their network, but their ultimate decision was to provide total,
instantaneous coverage. This speaks volumes for those seeking to implement educational
technology across a wide territory.
Other networks considered in this dissertation either failed to get out of the
planning stages, or were completely dismantled after less than a decade of operation.
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They demand our attention, though, because of their even greater ambition to serve an
entire region and address educational inequality on a massive, yet carefully defined scale.
One network, the Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction (1958-1971), is
considered here not because it had any direct consequence on the people of Appalachia,
but because its curious and unorthodox method of transmitting television signals to an
entire region was briefly considered as a system that could be adapted in other regions
like Appalachia—regions that were witnessing tremendous inequality in their educational
opportunities. The offer to adapt an airborne television network in Appalachia coincided
with a plan developed within the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), a powerful
new federal agency chartered to effect regional transformation and improvement in a
variety of ways.
Neither the proposed experimental method of educational television delivery via
airplane, nor the plan submitted to the Appalachian Regional Commission, which relied
primarily on interconnection and cooperation between radio and television stations
already operating within the region, would gain acceptance in Appalachia. The failure to
convince the ARC of educational television’s benefits, this chapter shows, demonstrates
the palpable concern many felt over the potential of television to become the new
authority in education: something that might increasingly dictate and control the actions
of teachers, or worse, replace their labor altogether with a futuristic machine. Opposition
to these networks was expressed primarily with appeals to the virtue of localism in
education. Broadcast media, critics suggested, no matter how beneficent their producers’
intentions might appear, could potentially violate the sacred bonds between teachers and
students that many people associated with their local communities. Even though these
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plans for regional networks in the Midwest and Appalachia emerged alongside the
Carnegie Commission’s similar call for a nationally unified public television network, the
transformations envisioned by the regional networks were more radical than most of the
planners’ peers in education were prepared to accept.
By contrast, the later attempts to offer a region-specific educational television
service across Appalachia considered in this dissertation, were configured and tailored
with far more attention to local needs expressed by teachers and learners within
Appalachia that the network’s producers were seeking to benefit. The chapter on these
later efforts (ca. 1968-1985) covers various experimental network arrangements in
educational television proffered by the Appalachian Regional Commission. The two
major initiatives, the Appalachian Educational Satellite Program and the Appalachian
Community Service Network, made use of new developments in telecommunications
technology to serve the Appalachian region in these more narrowly tailored ways.
Through satellite and cable-access television, network designers could specifically target
smaller audiences and certain demographics and even allow two-way digital
communication between remote locations. Previous critics had noted that conventional
broadcast television did not offer these features as it entered the world of education.
Though the Appalachian Regional Commission’s educational television networks
from the 1970s and 1980s were much more collaborative and attentive to local
communities, they fell victim to several budget cuts. These cuts were felt most acutely
during the first administration of President Ronald Reagan, who cast doubt on the need
for the ARC and government aid to Appalachia in general, and not merely on the
particular programs of any one agency. Many within the ARC protested the networks’
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dismantling, as well as cuts to many other programs targeted by Reagan’s White House.
The programs’ ultimate demise marked the end of an era in which the federal government
made serious effort to redress educational inequality in regions like Appalachia via
learning technology. The Appalachian Community Service Network ultimately
transferred its property and services over to a private corporation and became The
Learning Channel, or TLC. This decision illustrates the value in keeping resources in
educational technology widely available and under the public domain. State networks’
success in this effort has been one of their most celebrated legacies. The networks in
Kentucky and North Carolina have for many decades proven to skeptics the benefits of
their services to the general public.
Studying the concepts of “region” and “aid” with regard to Appalachia can be a
thorny endeavor, especially in the context of the post-World War II era and the
subsequent creation of the Appalachian Regional Commission’s massive bureaucracy.
Historians of the region have deftly illustrated how generations of reformers have, since
at least the 1870s, fanned out through mountain communities and visited upon them new
ideas and structures of “uplift,” “development,” and aid. Often these reformers embarked
on such quests under the aegis of benevolence, philanthropy, and, of course, mass
education and schooling. The successive liberal reform agendas of Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson in the 1960s—alongside which most of the educational television networks
considered in this dissertation emerged—have made historians especially leery. Ronald
D Eller and others have exposed many of the ARC and other Great Society agencies’
technocratic plans as sadly out of touch with economic and social realities within
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Appalachia.5 The “technology” most historians associate with the ARC would likely be
either: the neoliberal business “growth centers” that predominantly benefited elected
officials and capital interests rather than the unemployed and underpaid, or the four-lane
highways that made it that much easier for residents to leave the region with no thought
of return.
Education programs introduced to the Appalachian region in this time period,
despite their profound effect on mountain communities, have not drawn parallel
attention.6 Since the postwar era was an intensely pivotal moment in Americans’
understanding of public education systems, this is a significant oversight. People of color
in these decades were, everyday, challenging oppressive systems of education that had
consigned them to the rank of second-class citizen; they were opposed by wealthier white
people who felt that their own safe position in the status quo should remain unaffected by
fellow citizens’ fight for freedom. Amid much of this strife, the federal government
began deploying beneficent educational aid programs on a massive and totally
unprecedented scale as it sought to help raise people of lesser means up towards equality

5 Accounts of the education program of the Appalachian Regional Commission dwell mostly on the
Vocational Education focus of the ARC and other Great Society-era agencies. See David E. Whisnant,
Modernizing the Mountaineer: People, Power, and Planning in Appalachia (1980; repr., Knoxville, Tenn.:
University of Tennessee Press, 1994); Michael Bradshaw, The Appalachian Regional Commission:
Twenty-Five Years of Government Policy (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1992); Ronald D
Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia since 1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008).
6 There is an extensive body of literature on the history of education in Appalachia in the Progressive Era,
including Deborah Blackwell, “’The Ability to Do Much Larger Work:’ Gender and Reform in Appalachia,
1890-1935,” Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1998; Karen Tice, “School Work and Mother Work: The
Interplay of Maternalism and Cultural Politics in the Educational Narratives of Kentucky Settlement
Workers, 1910-1930,” Journal of Appalachian Studies 4, No. 2 (Fall 1998), 191-224; Jess Stoddart,
Challenge and Change in Appalachia: The Story of Hindman Settlement School (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky), 2002; Melanie Beals Goan, Mary Breckenridge: The Frontier Nursing Service and
Rural Health in Appalachia (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); See also P.
David Searles, A College for Appalachia: Alice Lloyd on Caney Creek (Lexington, Ky.: University Press
of Kentucky, 1995), and Connie Park Rice and Marie Tedesco, eds., Women of the Mountain South:
Identity, Work, and Activism (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2015).

11

and prosperity. Within this framework, educational television producers seeking to
benefit Appalachia and other marginalized regions were not at the forefront of any
movement. But those movements undoubtedly had an influence on them. Like their
colleagues in the Carnegie Commission who hoped to make “the best use of our
miraculous instrument” through excellence and diversity, the people behind these local
and regional networks endeavored to usher in a more equitable society.
More specifically, educational television networks such as these offered a series
of experiments in what today we might call “distance learning” technology. Educators
who first became interested in using television as a delivery platform wrestled with how
best to implement it during the medium’s first two decades. Some felt that educational
programming should appear mostly as a noncommercial alternative for home viewers,
and should only provide options beyond the major network entertainment fare offered by
the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS). Viewers might find such programs edifying and uplifting, but the programs
themselves would not necessarily be translatable to any formal schooling. Others thought
that educational television’s most useful application would be in classrooms, either as a
visual component to a teacher’s lesson, or a mechanism that might allow teachers to
handle rising class sizes resulting from the baby boom. As the work of educational
broadcasters shifted from one focus to the other, they received considerable financial
support and direction from major philanthropic interests such as the Ford Foundation.
That foundation proved to be a key player and benefactor throughout educational
television’s history, as will be evident in the following chapters.
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These early understandings of television’s potential benefits to education centered
on making the programs visible within conventional spaces, meaning homes and
classrooms within reach of a single educational channel in one urban area. The regionmindful educators considered here, however, had their sights set on homes and
classrooms beyond those immediate channels. Thus their efforts have real resonance with
the work of present-day distance educators. In building a regional network, they sought
to reach homes and classrooms that were historically beyond the reach of standard
educational resources. Distance learners in these areas could be individuals who might
have desired a formal or informal education, but who could not for various reasons be
present in a conventional classroom. A distance learner might also be, conceivably, a
student in a conventional classroom, but in a community historically removed from the
tax revenues, wealthy benefactors, proximity to colleges and universities, or any of the
other circumstances that have historically made some schools more successful than
others. Though KET, PBS-North Carolina, and the major Appalachian regional networks
might not fit today’s standard definition of “distance education” services, the networks’
founders certainly saw themselves as such. An expanded definition and understanding of
“distance-ed” may be in order.7
I argue that the educational television networks examined here did, on the whole,
provide a valuable and useful addition to the overall education systems in their purview--

7 See Mona Gleason, “Families Without Schools: Rurality, Correspondence Education, and the Promise of
Schooling in Interwar Western Canada,” History of Education Quarterly 57, no. 3 (August 2017). Gleason,
likewise, treats correspondence courses as an early form of distance education, though her conclusion
section indicates that she would not consider informal home television specifically as a form of distance
education. She does advocate for a more inclusive understanding of what can or cannot be considered
authentic distance education, citing the work of Damien Collins and Tara Coleman, who examine the
relations between school geographies and social inequality. Collins and Coleman, “School Geographies of
Education: Looking Within, and Beyond, School Boundaries,” Geography Compass 2, no. 1 (Jan. 2008).
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and still do so, in some cases. This position puts me at odds with some scholars and
educational thinkers. The field of educational technology has a pronounced and
eminently justifiable skepticism toward exactly the types of educators I study—those
who promise fantastic benefits from emerging technologies. Scholars working in this
field have effectively and skillfully documented numerous instances in which “technoutopian” thinking actually undermined the labor and autonomy of teachers rather than
serving them personally. Historian Larry Cuban looks specifically at unwanted changes
television and other visual media forced upon teachers as they were introduced in
schools. Allison Perlman’s overall work on media advocacy portrays some early
educational broadcasters in a positive light, but she is also acutely aware of how that
medium could be co-opted by private interests and more misanthropic state
administrators. Katie Day Good’s recent work on visual learning materials in the early
twentieth century shows how the content of those media can and did perpetuate
colonialist thinking in the minds of young children that used them in school. And in the
thoroughly-researched web blog Hack Education, Audrey Watters fiercely and succinctly
skewers all manner of malign ed-tech, making it abundantly clear how harmful such new
technologies can be if their promises and effects are not observed closely.8
Despite such scholars’ suspicions, for a number of reasons I hold that the
educational television experiments presented in the following chapters were and are, for
the most part, positive and constructive. Many of the networks’ architects held lofty

8 Larry Cuban, Teachers and Machines: The Classroom Use of Technology since 1920 (New York:
Teachers College Press, 1986); Allison Perlman, Public Interests: Media Advocacy and Struggles Over
U.S. Television (Rutgers University Press, 2016); Katie Day Good, Bring the World to the Child:
Technologies of Global Citizenship in American Education (M.I.T Press, 2020); Audrey Watters,
http://hackeducation.com/.

14

positions in school administration or government offices, but they did not command the
political power of elected officials or major philanthropic organizations. Although they
did depend a great deal on the largesse of some of these powerful figures (e.g. federal
agencies, the Ford Foundation) they held their ground in the face of criticism from those
figures, choosing not to compromise their editorial integrity or their overall service to the
network. They produced visual documentaries and other homegrown educational
programs of the regions in which they operated, helping to inspire wonder and pride
among viewers for the places in which they lived. This approach was especially
important among Appalachian viewers whose communities were so often
mischaracterized by national media. Network architects learned from their peers’
experience how overreliance on educational technology alienated the very teachers they
invited to use that technology in their curriculum. The networks responded with a close
study to find a just and amenable balance between the teacher’s lesson plan and the visual
media that supported it.
Simply put, these educators, working within the medium of educational
television, and in consultation with the teachers they endeavored to serve, envisioned new
technological spaces for interaction and learning. They knew that were it to be offered
astutely, then students at all walks of life, regardless of the endowment of their local
schools and communities, could receive through ETV, at little or no cost to them, some of
the best resources available in the state and nation to complete an education. A true
believer in a system of public education should strive for nothing less.
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A Note on Terms
Oral histories on the subject of the Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television, as well as the Commission’s report Public Television: A Program for Action,
reveal that Carnegie’s formative study proceeded, for the most part, without a crystal
clear understanding of what their new term “public television” meant specifically. That
descriptor for television programs was not one that many people used or had even heard
of at that point—one insider derided it as “a name without a concept.”9 Those
interviewed recalled that the Commission generally wanted, however, to avoid using the
older terms, “educational” and “noncommercial” television, out of a concern that the
older names might not generate the same excitement among a U.S. Senate Subcommittee,
so a newer term was used, and it has stuck fairly well ever since.10
For the most part, this dissertation will favor the term “educational television”
(ETV), as most of the networks considered here had their beginnings prior to the
Carnegie study’s publication. The state network Kentucky Educational Television uses
the older term, though it is a proud PBS member station. “Noncommercial” is also used,
though it denotes a broader category, including some obscure types of television program
that are not discussed whatsoever. The subcategory within educational television that the
Carnegie Commission was most likely trying to avoid discussing was instructional
television (ITV). This refers mostly to educational television intended for use in formal
schooling, most commonly in classrooms themselves.

9 Les Brown, Television and the Business Behind the Box (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971),
319.
10 Jim Robertson, Televisionaries (Charlotte Harbor, Fla.: Tabby House Books, 1993), 238-239.
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“Public television” is used, but mostly in the context of ETV activities after the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, when broadcasters gradually began to replace ETV
with the new term.
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CHAPTER 2. “UNIVERSITIES CAN NO LONGER HAVE TRULY CLOISTERED
HALLS:” WUNC-TV AND THE STATE’S PERIPHERIES
Gordon Gray seemed an odd choice to take on the role of president of the
University of North Carolina, only the second person in that role since the state
consolidated its top public higher education institutions during the Great Depression.
Prior to taking the presidency, Gray had notched a few terms in the state senate, but was
better known for his rapid ascent of the ranks in the U.S. Army, serving as a captain
during the war and as Secretary of the Army under Harry Truman—“better known in the
halls of statesmanship than in the groves of academe,” the New York Times would
observe following his inauguration. His selection as president resembled a few other
high-profile university president hirings in those years—Harold Stassen, boy-wonder
politician from Minnesota taking over the University of Pennsylvania, and Dwight
Eisenhower’s stint as President of Columbia University. If Gray retains any lasting
historical notoriety outside of North Carolina though, it is likely for his role in stripping J.
Robert Oppenheimer of his security clearance for suspected communist affiliations in
1954, a concentrated dose of an anticommunist bent and rhetoric Gray had displayed ever
since his inaugural address in 1950.1
On its face, Gray’s turn at the helm of UNC seems brief and relatively
unremarkable. He oversaw the first steps toward full desegregation of the University,
though his attitude on the subject was one of resignation rather than an active desire to
accommodate and defend the first black students in the state’s medical and law schools.

1 “North Carolina U. Picks Gray as Head,” New York Times, 7 February 1950 (quotation); “Gray is
Installed; Bars Communists,” New York Times, 11 October 1950.

Both Franklin Porter Graham, Gray’s predecessor, and William C. Friday, his successor,
served longer terms and did much more to publicly promote the University as a positive
force for improvement in the state’s society and education system. UNC historian
William D. Snider admits that Gray’s departure in 1955 left a strong impression that “he
may have been overqualified for the presidency,” or at least that “his qualifications lay in
other fields.”2
Yet while Gray’s time in Chapel Hill was brief, his administration is worthy of
recognition for its launch of North Carolina’s educational television network and
eventual PBS affiliate, WUNC-TV. To this project, Gray brought certain expertise. Prior
to his service in the military, he had worked in newspaper publishing in Winston-Salem,
and owned a commercial radio station there. Amid the pointed remarks in his
inauguration address about preserving academic freedom in the face of a creeping
communist threat, Gray’s experience in media and communications suffused his vision
for the role of educators in the new political and technological postwar era. “In a world of
compressed time and shrinking space,” he mused in his address, “it is evident that
universities can no longer have truly cloistered halls…academicians must now
communicate to the free world the meaning of the democratic dream and proof of the
desire to make it a way of life.”3
WUNC-TV was not the first of its kind as a state-sponsored educational television
service. It grew alongside projects in many other states hoping to fulfill the same mission

2 William D. Snider, Light on the Hill: A History of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 246-253.
3 Jeffrey J. Crow, “’The Paradox and the Dilemma:’ Gordon Gray and the J. Robert Oppenheimer Security
Clearance Hearing,” The North Carolina Historical Review 85, No. 2 (April 2008), 164; “Gray is Installed;
Bars Communists,” New York Times, 11 October 1950.
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via television. Historian Allison Perlman has assiduously profiled the efforts of these
educational broadcasters and their allies to secure space for noncommercial media at a
crucial moment (1948-1952) in television’s history. For her, this moment of “media
advocacy,” though misguided at times by a fixation on anticommunist rhetoric and
occasional co-opting by opportunist Jim Crow supporters, was, overall, significant for
securing “space for noncommercial television.” At that point, there was no guarantee that
such a thing would exist. By no means could the Carnegie Commission have debated the
future of public television in the late 1960s had educators not made the case before the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for special channel reservations within
local communities across the nation.4
The collective action of educational broadcasters toward winning this victory is
well-known, thanks to Perlman and many other scholars. But WUNC-TV’s early history
reveals a significant aspect about the particulars in this collective effort. While Gray and
his colleagues touted educational television’s ability to, as Perlman describes, “equalize
access to educational, informational, and cultural resources,” his University’s network
would take a considerable amount of time—decades, even—before that claim became a
reality.5 The remote mountain communities of western North Carolina, and the coastal
plains of the eastern part of the state, would have to wait many years before receiving a
consistent and reliable signal like that received in the more well-off center of the state
where the University’s energies had already been concentrated.

4 Allison Perlman, Public Interests: Media Advocacy and Struggles Over U.S. Television (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2016), 14.
5 Perlman, Public Interests, 44.

20

To a certain extent, this slow progress can be attributed to the initial scheme
devised by the FCC for how ETV would be arrayed across the United States: a plan that
put an emphasis on states’ “educational centers” like Chapel Hill and the Piedmont
region. However, under this arrangement, the peripheral communities were, for a
significant period, deprived of the educational advantages then available only in the
“educational center.” The slow, piecemeal progress toward full network coverage of
North Carolina, combined with the fact that the University was all the while developing
newer and more advanced ETV pedagogy, will shed light on why future networks serving
regions like Appalachia strove for full coverage all at once. For the time being, in this
chapter, we have only to wonder how these peripheral areas felt at being left out, and how
other districts and regions might today feel something similar.

The FCC and a Television “Freeze”
The postwar era led television broadcasting in the United States to a crossroads.
On the one hand, the regulatory agency of the Federal Communications Commission
could permit commercial interests to hold the driver’s seat in determining signal
expansion and program content throughout the nation; a strategy which, in spite of a
spirited movement on the part of a handful of educational innovators, had largely
characterized the growth of radio in the preceding decades. Alternatively, the FCC could
respond to the pleas of educators and other philanthropic interests, and show initiative in
staking a place for communication that endeavored to further nourish the nation’s culture:
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to engineer, in the words of James Day, a “medium dedicated to a purpose loftier than
light entertainment and more enlightening than ads for painkillers and detergent.”6
Defying the prevailing, nineteenth-century liberalist philosophy in American
broadcasting, and withholding channels from the whim of the free market, may seem like
a fairly radical step for the otherwise staid and orderly FCC, yet viewing the agency’s
ultimate decision to do so within the context of national education policy, makes the act
seem much more reasonable. Though not counted among the various “Postwar
Initiatives” in Diane Ravitch’s foundational history of U.S. education in the twentieth
century, The Troubled Crusade, the reservation of channel frequencies across the entire
nation fits right alongside the initiatives Ravitch does observe. For instance, the FCC’s
unilateral action roiled commercial broadcasters at the national and local level who
viewed federal overreach into local decision making with suspicion and contempt,
believing that their inherent motive to serve viewers and the public interest would impel
them to self-regulate their content beyond any need of government meddling. However,
the social and cultural ferment of the postwar years, combined with the baby boom’s
impending demographic burden on educators across the nation, necessitated more radical
and sweeping changes in American education, such as the GI Bill.7
It was not long after the television industry began in earnest in the U.S. that the
FCC found its initial scheme for arranging broadcast channels across cities and states to

6 James Day, The Vanishing Vision: The Inside Story of Public Television (Berkeley, Calif: University of
California Press, 1995), 17.
7 Diane Ravitch, The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945-1980 (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books,
1983), 5-6, 26-28. Other notable opponents to federal support for schools included the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the Daughters of the American Revolution. Ravitch notes that “every time the issue [of
federal funding] was raised, different coalitions formed, depending on how these questions were framed in
potential legislation.”
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be technologically inadequate. Channel interference became common and was twofold:
receivers in one area tuning into a channel 3 would see some of the programs of another
channel 3 of an abutting signal area, even if the two had been deemed initially to be at a
safe distance from one another. Likewise, channels too close in number (3 and 4, 4 and
5) could easily bleed into one another when broadcasting in the same signal area. The
FCC’s ambitious corrective of this era came in the form of a “freeze:” beginning in 1948
all permits for new channel licenses were put on hold, pending a major reevaluation of
the nation’s broadcast landscape. The “TV Freeze” and the two circulars distributed by
the FCC following the eventual thaw in 1952 (given the unglamorous titles “Third Notice
of Proposed Rule Making,” and the “Sixth Report and Order”) are remembered primarily
as the initial beachhead for public television’s evolution, though the FCC was not
motivated at first by any need for an alternative to commercial television. In fact, the
agency would only be apprised of this need by educators two years after the freeze began.
The case for an alternative made before the FCC, delivered in the closing months
of 1950, represents a remarkable cooperative effort from a number of interested
organizations. Drawing from a wealth of experience accumulated from years of
educational radio broadcasting, an ad hoc committee including the American Council on
Education, the National Education Association, the Association of Land-Grant Colleges
and Universities, and the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, testified to
the need for educational, noncommercial TV, and discussed how it should be distributed.
Plaintiffs were committed, in the view of one historian of public television, to an
educational philosophy known as the “Wisconsin Idea:” a holdover from the early La
Follette years in the Badger State. The “Idea” had numerous applications in state
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governance and society, but in the area of education, one of the movement’s earlier
chroniclers observed an “increasing spirit” in Wisconsin, and a demand “that the
university should serve the state and all of its people and that it should be an institution
for all the people, and not merely for the few who could send their sons and daughters to
Madison.” This sine qua non was originally intended for the state’s agricultural
extension office, but it carried over into other university functions, including Wisconsin’s
university radio broadcasting.8 By invoking this progressive philosophy before the FCC,
these educators demonstrated an earnest belief in a public university’s duty to serve all
people within its state’s borders. It was a natural extension of this belief to hold that
colleges and universities ought to perform the same function with television, though on a
national scale.9
Cities or communities which already featured the presence and competition of
three or more commercial broadcast channels would be granted a reservation for an
educational channel (if there was no such station already in operation) to offer, as an
alternative, “the high quality type of programming of an entirely different character from
that available on most commercial stations.” Areas with only one or two established
channels would not receive such a reservation, unless the area fit the FCC’s criteria as
“primarily educational centers,” by which they meant colleges and universities, for the
most part. The Third Notice and the Sixth Report and Order illustrated the FCC’s strong
sympathy for educational institutions. The FCC rightly recognized that those institutions

8 Charles McCarthy, The Wisconsin Idea (New York, N.Y.: The MacMillan Company, 1912), 132
(quotation); Randall Davidson, 9XM Talking: WHA Radio and the Wisconsin Idea (Madison, Wisc.: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 46.
9 Robert J. Blakely, To Serve the Public Interest: Educational Broadcasting in the United States (Syracuse,
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979). 5;
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had also established themselves as skillful producers of educational content in AM and
FM broadcasting in spite of the largely commercialized development of radio.
Furthermore, the FCC was attentive to educators’ need of additional time to apply for
these reserved channels, since the public service model of school administrations moved
at a much slower pace than for-profit businesses, and the need of educational stations for
a revenue stream other than commercial advertising and network affiliation.10
James Day’s The Vanishing Vision, both a well-researched history of public
television and a memoir from an important insider in the medium’s development, looks
back on the Sixth Report and Order with general disdain. Although he and the “public
television fraternity” he represents are grateful for the FCC’s offer of available channels
to noncommercial interests, Day in writing his book was moreover critical of the
decision, feeling that the FCC fell short of truly securing an educational, noncommercial
alternative for the entire nation. By offering the blessing of educational or public
broadcasting to only established educational institutions, the FCC laid the groundwork, in
Day’s view, for a generally “balkanized” landscape of public television in the United
States—that is, a fairly dense array of public stations across the country lacking in
unified, common purpose, and historically reluctant to pursue one. Following the freeze,
the drive to secure and activate the reserved channels “was in every case a local battle
fought by local leaders to overcome purely local problems,” as Day describes, but

10 “Sixth Report and Order,” 17 Fed. Reg. 3905, 3908; 41 FCC 148, 158, April 14, 1952, in Frank J. Kahn,
ed. Documents of American Broadcasting (4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984),184,
186; “Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Appendix A),” 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3079, March 21, 1951, in
Kahn, ed. Documents of American Broadcasting, 181-182.
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victories in securing these channels left the victors with an apparent “heady feeling of
proprietorship,” one that could “slip easily into destructive provincialism.”11
Other proponents of public broadcasting shared James Day’s frustrations around
the unfulfilled dream of a national public television network as robust, concerted, and
energetic as the commercial networks. Yet this pattern can cause one to overlook the
meaning and importance of a successful local or state network, such as those that
operated within or adjacent to the mountainous region of Appalachia, or other rural areas.
The public broadcasters who succeeded in activating channels following the FCC freeze
addressed genuine educational needs in communities they were charged with helping.
That charge might be laid at the feet of an established “educational institution”
recognized by the FCC in the early 1950s (as in the case of the consolidated University of
North Carolina); a new state education authority specifically created to offer a television
service (as with several other states); or with independent operations not beholden to state
or community boundaries, but with a general calling to serve rural and urban populations
alike within a given region. Across this spectrum these “provincial” broadcasters’
successes and failures testify to the importance of smaller operations in public
broadcasting. These actors tackled educational disparities in disadvantaged regions and
across the nation. North Carolina would answer to this calling, but by the nature of its
network being endowed within its University system, it took longer for that service to be
fully realized.

Bringing ETV to North Carolina

11 Day, The Vanishing Vision, 6, 41.
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Gray and his vice president, William D. Carmichael, were among the dozens of
educators who expressed interest in starting a television service in the Sixth Report and
Order era. Though they worked primarily in offices at the university in Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, the position of president of the consolidated University of North Carolina
was less than two decades old when Gray took office. While the consolidation for the
entire state of North Carolina included at that point only the university at Chapel Hill, the
State College in Raleigh (later North Carolina State University), and the Women’s
College at Greensboro (later University of North Carolina at Greensboro), Gray and
Carmichael’s multi-site leadership roles encouraged them to think of the possibilities of a
statewide network, organized and administered under the banner of the consolidated
University.12 Ideas and strategies for how educators could make use of the reserved
channels and possibly create such networks were well circulated by the end of the freeze
in 1952. Gray received a report from E.A. Hungerford of the General Precision
Equipment Corporation, delivered initially to a group of prospective educational
broadcasters at Pennsylvania State College in April. Hungerford primarily detailed the
requisite equipment and facilities needed to begin producing television, stressing that
television, while relatively new and untested in an educational context, would be an
enduring asset to institutions that decided to use it. “In these days when new dormitories
or schoolhouses run up to $4,000,000,” Hungerford observed, “a television station is
really a relatively small educational investment.”13

12 Snider, Light on the Hill, 238, 250.
13 E.A. Hungerford, Jr., “Design Plans for Educational TV Stations,” April 20, 1952. box 3, folder 59.
Office of President of the University of North Carolina (System): Gordon Gray Records, University
Archives, The Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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As it discussed the technological aspects of activating the educational channels,
Hungerford’s report touched on the more pressing issue facing interested educators at this
time: the frequencies of the available channels. While the Sixth Report and Order noted
that the FCC’s purpose with the freeze was to avoid a “haphazard, inefficient or
inequitable distribution” of television licenses, this elided the fact that the FCC had
already allowed an inequitable distribution of channels prior to the freeze. Most of the
licenses granted prior to the freeze had been in the more established and coveted VHF
(Very High Frequency) range of channels. Some communities after the freeze would
receive public broadcasting channels on the VHF range, but most of the new channels
available for licensing were in the newer, largely untested Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
range.
Essentially, the shift towards UHF configuration was undertaken in the interest of
avoiding crossed signals in particular areas. VHF channels had greater range, but a
weaker signal, while UHF signals were limited to line-of-sight transmission. UHF could
easily be interrupted by tall buildings and natural obstructions like hills and mountains,
but offered a stronger signal if the two points could be properly positioned. Part of the
FCC’s concession to the “educational centers” receiving channel assignments was the
guarantee of a VHF channel, meaning that those communities would have greater range
in their educational broadcast. The development of signal repeaters, translators, and
more advanced transmitter equipment would later minimize many of the practical
differences between VHF and UHF. But to the University of North Carolina in 1952,
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when most television sets available to consumers were not even designed to receive UHF
broadcasts, an available VHF channel seemed like a true competitive advantage.14
Gray convened a conference at Chapel Hill in early June of 1952 to discuss the
idea of an educational television (ETV) station or network operated by the three
institutions of what Gray termed the UNC “Family.” Inviting not only the relevant
administrators and faculty from the three institutions in the University, Gray also set
places at the table for local politicians and educators from cities beyond the Research
Triangle area, as well as local business leaders, whose personal and financial support
Gray knew would be critical for getting a noncommercial station up and running.
Advance programs distributed to attendees stated that the conference’s purpose would be
“to acquaint key personnel of the three units of the University with the accumulated
‘facts’ of TV as they relate to education in general and to institutions of higher education
specifically.” Apart from the crash course in ETV, the conference also invited
participants to consider how ETV could “be used to increase interest and to gain further
support for the activities of the University of North Carolina,” either through simply
reaching more of the general population of the state of North Carolina, or by “regularly
drawing a much larger group of North Carolinians into actual participation in the
activities of the University.”15
The conference featured a presentation by FCC Chairman Paul Walker. Prior to
the gathering Gray’s office had “introduced” attendees to the Chairman by sending each a

14 “Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Appendix A),”in Kahn, ed. Documents of American
Broadcasting, 182; Day, The Vanishing Vision, 22.
15 Logan Wilson, “Memorandum to President Gordon Gray,” May 16, 1952. box 3, folder 59. Gordon
Gray Records.
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copy of a speech he had made the previous month. The circulated speech was a
particularly sanguine address Walker had delivered16 to a meeting of the National
Association of Educational Broadcasters. In that speech the FCC Chairman told
educators that with the available television channels, they had “every cause to celebrate.”
They were now the “inheritors of a highly valuable portion of that ethereal public
domain—the radio spectrum.” Walker assured his audience, moreover, that the plan of
the Sixth Report and Order was “calculated to get stations and service into the smaller
towns and rural areas.” Assuaging any prospective licensees about the unfamiliar territory
of UHF channels, Walker noted that he had personally seen that the differences between
the UHF and VHF bands were “not nearly as significant as some had thought.”
Walker was also confident that ETV had the potential to change the education
landscape in states like North Carolina. He recognized TV’s potential as a resource for
adult education: “let skeptics consider,” he argued “how many American adults even now
are seeking education in their spare time. And not by television, but by attending classes
after a hard day’s work. Four million Americans are in such classes now. One million
are taking correspondence school lessons.” And whether or not ETV could provide equal
benefit to both school-age and adult students, Walker expressed his faith in the FCC’s
endowment of educational channels to local institutions, averring that the “educational
stations can assure a community’s democratic control over its educational process,” and
that “a community with such a station need not depend for its educational television
material upon the desires of a commercial network, nor upon the desires of other

16 Paul A. Walker, “Address At the Annual Luncheon Meeting of the National Association of Educational
Broadcasters At the Institute for Education by Radio-Television,” April 18, 1952, box 3, folder 59, Gordon
Gray Records.

30

independent program sources.”17 Regardless of the FCC’s preference for a potential
national noncommercial network, Walker’s remarks indicate that the agency did feel very
strongly about the unique benefits of a local operation.
From the outset of the conference at Chapel Hill, participants were encouraged to
be congenial and receptive, but also thoughtfully critical of the actual need for ETV in
North Carolina: Chancellor Edward Graham of the Women’s College remarked at the
opening session that the conference was to be “a seminar and club smoker—not a rally.”
All the same, the general tone of the sessions was one of optimism and enthusiasm for a
potential station or network in North Carolina, with presentations from Gray and Walker,
but also from the director of the Joint Committee on Educational Television--the primary
lobbying organization behind securing channel reservations--a professor of psychology at
Western Reserve University who researched learning by television, and Arthur S. Adams,
president of the American Council on Education (ACE). In Adams’ presentation, the
ACE president remarked that he had personally been convinced of ETV’s potential when
he witnessed a TV course in comparative literature, “taught by a dynamic teacher,” which
“reached people who had never been interested in literature—and it started a run on the
library for books mentioned in the lecture.”18
One of the most telling moments of the meeting came when UNC president Gray
addressed the conference with what he saw as the underlying choice North Carolina faced
with regard to the available educational channels. Eight such reservations were made

17 Walker, “Address At the Annual Luncheon Meeting of the National Association of Educational
Broadcasters.
18 Walter Spearman, “Summary of the Consolidated University of North Carolina Educational Television
Conference, June 3-4, 1952, box 3, folder 59, Gordon Gray Records.
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across the entire state, including three in the immediate area of the consolidated
University—UHF channels in Greensboro and Raleigh, and one VHF channel in Chapel
Hill. As Gray saw it, the consolidated University’s efforts toward providing ETV to the
whole state would be limited to any or all of those three channels. Communities beyond
the Research Triangle area had reserved channels, but no institution in those areas fell
under the Consolidated University banner at that time. Furthermore, Gray did not feel
that startup funds and public support could be marshaled in those communities as reliably
and quickly as it had in Chapel Hill, and the FCC would not hold the channel reservations
for educational institutions longer than a year. Nevertheless, Gray made his enthusiasm
for reserving of the immediate-area channels and creating a station for the Consolidated
University very clear, advising that such a project would exemplify the duty of the
University to “be the brain, nerve center, the heart and the will and the conscience of the
State.”19
In the time for questions after Gray’s address, one prescient issue was raised by
Mark Lassiter, a trustee of UNC and a native of Snow Hill, North Carolina, a town with a
population of a little more than a thousand in the eastern part of the state. After asking
for a quick clarification of the number of people and homes the proposed station would
cover in the research triangle area, Lassiter offered a fundamental criticism of how Gray
and others had visualized the entire endeavor of ETV in North Carolina to that point:
“Another thing I would like to call your attention to is the center of population.
It’s the center of your educational activities. It’s the center of most everything
you’ve got. I thought education was more or less basically for those further away
from it. I think you ought to go east and west and forget those who have all the

19 Transcript of Gordon Gray’s remarks at June Television Conference, June 3-4, 1952, box 3, folder 59,
Gordon Gray Records, 1.
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educational advantages, who are surrounded by them….If you’re going to specify
it for those who already have unusual advantages, I don’t know where you’re
going to get much advantage out of having it…if you’re going to basically
centralize everything in the central Eastern part of the state, then somebody has to
sell me on the idea right quick, whether it’s advantageous to the state or not.”
Gray offered a terse reply, “That is one of the problems that we have to face.”
Immediately after, another person in the audience asked about the concept and usefulness
of “satellite stations.” In the early 1950s, “satellite,” in the television context referred to
microwave links between television studios that allowed direct relays of programming so
that other stations could carry the same programs without having to receive physical film
copies—a system that would eventually be the basis for many television networks prior
to cable and low-earth orbiting satellite networks. At the North Carolina ETV conference
of 1952, however, Gray gave an equally terse explanation of the idea and dismissed it as
“an academic question at the moment” before cutting off the session so that it could move
on to breakaway discussions.20
One can look with a little sympathy on Gray’s reluctance to truly consider how
ETV could be extended to the fullest extent the FCC had arranged in the state of North
Carolina. Television was still in its infancy, educational television had barely been
conceived, and the idea of a unified public media service owned by a state agency flew in
the face of the radio industry’s customary practices, and the larger politics of media in the
United States to that point. In the early years of WUNC-TV’s operation, Gray and his
successors satisfied some of the calls for larger state coverage by licensing some of the
programs they produced to commercial broadcasters that reached the more rural sections

20 Transcript of Gordon Gray’s remarks at June Television Conference, 5-6.
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of eastern and mountainous western North Carolina. In the early days of television, few
commercial stations had any programming to fill the morning and early-afternoon hours
of the typical school day, so they were happy to carry educational programs during that
time as an easy means of promoting their brand and service. Yet as the broadcast
industry expanded, those time slots quickly gained demand, and the friendly door to ETV
producers slammed shut.
UNC decided to activate only channel 4, in the VHF band, since the UHF
reservations in Greensboro and Raleigh would be largely redundant signal-wise. It would
be nearly a decade before WUNC-TV began the process of acquiring the necessary
licenses and infrastructure to offer their “state” network beyond the Research Triangle
area. On one occasion, in 1953, after planning and fundraising for WUNC-TV was
underway, Gray was contacted by J.D. Messick, President of East Carolina College (later
University) in Greenville, in regards to the coastal areas of the state’s separation from the
proposed signal area for WUNC-TV. In a historically impoverished part of the state,
Messick contended “if one educational channel is to be located in NC I think it should go
to the University, but if there are others I think that East Carolina College is so situated
that it should be considered for the next.” He continued, “I think we should all be
interested in the entire state, instead of just the Piedmont area, or from Raleigh to
Winston [Salem], where five channels would certainly give over coverage, or circles
within circles.” To these remarks, Gray suggested Messick contact state legislators or the
governor’s office, and not his own. “While the University is, of course, eager to
cooperate with any other educational telecasters and all commercial telecasters,” Gray
averred, “I think we have made it plain that we disclaim any interest in having
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responsibility for a television operation other than the one which might be under the
auspices of the University. I believe that we would not feel it our prerogative to
influence the location or construction of other television stations.” Such was the legacy
Gordon Gray ultimately left to WUNC-TV: an earnest supporter of the field of
educational television, and one quick to extol the benefits his institution was offering as
the state network, but just as quick to shrug off his potential role in creating legitimate
statewide coverage as too expensive, and not his “prerogative” anyhow.21
Whether or not Gray seemed duplicitous in his desire for true state-wide
coverage, his genuine talent as a promoter of ETV was on display in the months leading
up to WUNC-TV’s first airdate. He and UNC Chancellor Robert B. House delivered a
series of presentations to deans, directors, and department heads at each of the member
schools in late 1953, outlining the present need for the new medium, the potential it
carried to improve and transform the service performed for the community by the
University, and some of the obstacles still facing television educators in North Carolina.
The Consolidated University administrators knew that the launch of WUNC-TV would
depend upon the cooperation and enthusiasm of many of the rank-and-file teachers and
staff within the system. Gray’s promotional efforts were buoyed by an article published
in the Winston-Salem Journal Sentinel in October, whose author, Chester S. Davis,
beamed in his title that North Carolina was “taking the lead in [the] field of educational
television.” As president of the publishing company that owned the Journal Sentinel,
Gray likely pushed for such an article to be run, though he assured colleagues in letters

21 J.D. Messick to Gordon Gray, March 11, 1953; Gordon Gray to J.D. Messick, March 20, 1953, box 3,
folder 70, Gordon Gray Records.
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that he had “relinquished all day to day supervision and contracts” prior to becoming
UNC President, and was then “simply a stockholder.”22
The newspaper article may have helped in generating interest on behalf of
WUNC-TV, but it also forecasted many of the hurdles that educational television
operators would face in establishing and maintaining their service. For one, the article
noted, ETV had the ability to design courses and educational content with a more
targeted audience (the author gives a hypothetical example of “a program designed to
give doctors a refresher course on some highly technical phase of medicine”), but the
reality was that ETV would generally exist in competition with commercial stations for
viewer interest—as the author elicited, “Dials that click on educational TV can click back
to a commercial program just as quickly.” More importantly though, the article spelled
out the issue of funding. The connections Gray made through his initial conferences on
ETV had yielded enough donations to help pay for equipment and installation, but Gray
and his donors knew that for the experiment to last longer than a year or two, consistent
public support would be needed. “You can’t expect private individuals and foundations
to pay the operating costs,” the article cautioned, “they came into the picture solely for
the purpose of giving the university a chance to prove that educational TV is worthy of
the support of the General Assembly,” and that WUNC-TV at that point could still be
considered a “gamble.”23

22Gordon Gray to Robert Schenkkan, memorandum, 9 November 1953, box 3, folder 62; Chester S. Davis,
“North Carolina Takes the Lead in Field of Educational Television,” Winston-Salem Journal Sentinel, 11
October 1953; Gordon Gray to William Benton, 8 May, 1951 box 3, folder 69, Gordon Gray Records.
23 Davis, “North Carolina Takes the Lead”
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Fortunately for ETV enthusiasts, the North Carolina general assembly was at that
time receptive to the prospects of new media in the state’s education system. Enacted by
the General Assembly in 1949, the North Carolina Communication Study Commission
had been at work evaluating local opinions and positions on radio, film, and television as
possible education aids. Their report, issued in 1953, treated the spread of new
communications media as nothing less than a revolution in the way Americans received
information and functioned in society. Chairman Sam Lattimore strongly emphasized,
“an informed people cannot be politically enslaved,” and as a consequence, “we are an
informed people because our medias of mass communication enable us to keep that way
and to transmit quickly to our fellow citizens our hopes, our fears and wishes.”
Lattimore’s “inescapable” conclusions held that an educational system that did not
incorporate all available tools in modern communication would be “lacking in both depth
and completeness,” and that North Carolina’s present failure to offer statewide the
benefits of these new technological media meant the state was “falling behind in its
meeting of the challenge of remaining free by keeping ourselves educated and
informed.”24
A similar commission had been established by Governor William B. Umstead in
1953, with the more specific purpose of exploring radio and television activities in the
state’s education system. At a public hearing in February with invited speakers from the
Joint Committee on Educational Television (JCET), the primary group that had lobbied
the FCC for ETV reservations, Gray presented his office’s progress toward realizing

24 Sam Lattimore, “A Report to the Governor and General Assembly by the North Carolina
Communication Study Commission,” 6-7, box 3, folder 70, Gordon Gray Records.
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WUNC-TV, reiterating his rationale for limited transmitter offerings by the Consolidated
University at that time, but also giving an assurance that his staff had been assiduously
pursuing startup support from donors across the state and from national foundations. The
majority of the hearing though featured questions from commission members, who
represented communities from all other parts of the state, to the JCET presenters. Like
Mark Lassiter and J.D. Messick, these members generally seemed frustrated in their
questions, knowing that the area around Chapel Hill would likely be an exclusive enclave
for ETV for the foreseeable future. L.W. Jenkins of East Carolina College shared his
superiors’ puzzlement over the apparent situation: “How,” he asked in regards to the
multiple options the consolidated University held in ETV, “does it make good sense to
have an overlapping of stations in one part of the state and exclude another large section
of the state?” Walter Emery and Earle Minderman, of the JCET and the National
Citizens Committee for Educational Television, respectively, could respond only with the
suggestion that those uncovered areas explore their own operations, knowing full well
that the state government was not likely to fund more than one such experiment.25
One committee member from Asheville raised an important and hopeful point in
the hearing, however. Emery and Minderman, seeking to assure the peripheral
representatives that the benefits of ETV would not be entirely lost on their communities,
explained that while no educational broadcast channels were ready to be reserved in those
areas, studios like those on UNC campuses that were producing educational films could

25 “Public Hearing of The State Educational Radio and Television Commission Held in the Senate
Chamber, State Capitol Building, Raleigh, North Carolina, February 12, 1953,” box 3, folder 70, Gordon
Gray Records. James Clark of Elizabethtown articulated the local representatives’ unfortunate position,
asking “If we should come to the position of feeling that we could not ask the state for more than a certain
amount of money, our problem would be, ‘Should we accept one or two or more of these stations and ask
for funds.’ This is going to exclude a great portion of the [available] stations if it is on that basis.”
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share duplications of those recordings with interested local educators. Barry Morris of
Asheville built upon that idea and reported to the committee that he had seen “several
cases where commercial stations have helped promote educational stations.”26 In making
this statement on behalf of the commission’s guest, he spoke to a certain resource ETV
producers made common use of in the early days of television. The reality for many
local commercial stations throughout most of the 1950s was the issue of insufficient
material: though it would be unthinkable by today’s incessant glut of televised content,
stations in the early days found themselves with not enough programming to fill all hours
of the day. Thus many commercial stations, including some in western North Carolina,
were generally agreeable to arrangements where educational programs produced
elsewhere could be aired in the morning hours for local schools’ benefit. These
arrangements faded after the demand for advertisement space grew slowly into those
morning hours, but for upstarts in ETV, these friendly arrangements served for years as a
de facto means of broadcasting educational programming beyond the range of a central
transmitter.
By September of 1953, UNC had its application for channel 4 submitted and
approved. From there it fell to the consolidate University to generate roughly one million
dollars needed to construct studios and prepare a site for the antenna on Terrells
Mountain near Chapel Hill. Publicity generated from positive news coverage of the new
channel, as well as Gray’s connections with former business colleagues, together paid
dividends in the form of generous startup contributions from large private firms in central
North Carolina. A slew of thank-you notes sent by Gray to various “public-spirited

26 “Public Hearing of The State Educational Radio and Television Commission,” Gordon Gray Records.
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citizens” shows strong support from the state’s business community, including the
tobacco fortunes of the Reynolds Foundation, Carolina Steel & Iron, and Wachovia Bank
& Trust of Winston-Salem. Gray’s correspondence during the initial fundraising gives
the impression that the University had surprisingly little trouble in securing startup funds
and the modest $217,000 biennial operating budget. This early ease in birthing WUNCTV appears in stark contrast to the beginnings of other, forthcoming public television
operations in the region.27

UNC Partners with Ford
In spite of the comfortable support Gray and Carmichael found at first for
WUNC-TV within the state, their campaign looked with ambition beyond North Carolina
donors, toward potential support from larger philanthropic agencies. Here they found
success and failure, however. The Carnegie Foundation, an integral agent in the structure
of American higher education, would in the 1960s emerge as a pivotal player in the
development of public television nationally. Carnegie had not adopted this stance in the
1950s, and they dismissed WUNC-TV’s request for support in 1955, citing a general
wariness of how well ETV “fit in with any of their ongoing programs.” By contrast, the
Ford Foundation, itself a fairly new institution, had been making visible and substantial
investments in ETV since the previous decade.
Education historians Mark Garrett Cooper and John Marx observe a certain
ambiguity in Ford philanthropy with regard to its support for television—in many
instances that support was aimed at fostering across the world a robust and engaging

27 “Finances: Consolidated TV Fund, 1952-1954,” box 3, folder 63, Gordon Gray Records.
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educational alternative to commercial television, as well as a useful component in formal
instruction. Yet Cooper and Marx observe that Ford also supported more abstract and
revolutionary imaginings of television and electronic media, most notably a 1953 clinical
study of television teaching conducted by Marshall McLuhan, who would later win
celebrity status for his iconoclastic views on the effects of television and the oft-repeated
expression “the medium is the message.” Any sampling of Ford’s grants and research
projects in the area of television reveal, however, that more development was being
effected by the organization through minor investments among the rank and file of
educational institutions (primary through post-secondary) and less through the highminded, oracular projects of McLuhan.28
The bulk of Ford’s support for ETV in the 1950s appeared under three major
initiatives: the Fund for Adult Education, the Fund for the Advancement of Education,
and National Educational Television (NET). The former, as its name suggests, was
geared more toward continuing education for working adults, or, as its first director
ambitiously described, “that part of the educational process which begins when formal
schooling ends,” for which the Fund would “try to cultivate in adults the desire to
continue education throughout life.” Adult education programs supported by Ford were
aired on NBC as early as 1951, but for most of the decade the Fund supported television
operations of educational institutions and community organizations. The Fund for the
Advancement of Education was at first intended to offer conventional resources and
funding to primary and secondary schools, but eventually it incorporated ETV as an

28 Mark Garett Cooper and John Marx, Media U, 124.
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important tool for improving the nation’s schools.29 NET was a forerunner of sorts to
PBS, producing kinescopes of programs that could be distributed and used by interested
local stations.
WUNC-TV made multiple appeals for Ford support throughout the 1950s. A few
months after the initial ETV conference at Chapel Hill, Gray wrote to Ann Spinney of the
Fund for Adult Education, unsure of exactly how or to what extent FAE could support a
station in such conceptual infancy. That request being denied, Gray applied again in
March, 1955, a few weeks after the station made its first broadcasts, with much more
credit and progress on display, but still emphasizing the lingering doubt as to how
consistent state funding would be. The state budget guaranteed funding for the station
through the end of June of that year, but Gray informed William McPeak of the Ford
Foundation that the station was in a state of suspense. “If the appropriation is not made,”
Gray assured, “then about one million dollars in equipment and studios, in addition to
extensive planning of programs and several months of actual experience in educational
television, will likely be forced to go on a standby basis.”30
A brief report of WUNC-TV’s two years of development was attached to Gray’s
1955 letter. It shows the considerable investment and progress the Consolidated
University had put toward ETV to that point, evident specifically in the diversity of
programs channel 4 had been showing on a regular basis for its first six weeks.
Appealing directly to Ford’s initial ETV goal of adult education, the report asserted:

29 C. Scott Fletcher, “The Program of the Fund for Adult Education,” Adult Education Quarterly 2, no. 2,
(December 1951), 59, 62; Blakely, To Serve the Public Interest, 84-86.
30 Gordon Gray to Ann Spinney, October 10, 1952, box 3, folder 66, Gordon Gray Records; Gordon Gray
to William McPeak, March 4, 1955, box 3, folder 65, Gordon Gray Records.
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“WUNC-TV’s basic axiom is: ‘Daytime is earning time; night-time is learning time,’”
and “whether farmer or factory worker, lawyer, doctor, textile worker or banker, the
average man must earn his living during the day and get his schooling at night.” The
daytime schedule of classroom instruction and programming for “homemaker, child, and
teen-ager,” was briefly acknowledged in the report, but the clear focus was on the
informative and stimulating programs available in the evening.31
Within the descriptions offered to Ford of the first programs WUNC-TV studios
were producing, it is also clear that the station had taken fairly seriously its goal of
drawing from the specialties of each member institution. From the State College in
Raleigh, studios had, congruent with its role as land grant institution, produced series
such as “Today on the Farm,” an agriculture news and education program; “Who
Knows,” a documentary series exploring “the scientific marvels with which we are
surrounded in our daily lives;” and “Picture of Health,” which in its focus on preventive
medicine addressed, in the words of the station, “the most significant weakness now
apparent…in the area of public education,” through “a scientific program, but [one]
intelligible to the layman.”32 Chapel Hill offered up its expertise with such programs as
“Hands Across the Sea,” in which the dean of the law school hosted and narrated “films
dealing with the work of the United Nations in other lands.”
The earlier, now outdated definitions of the University were also evident in the
report, including “Dr. Bernard Boyd and the Bible,” one of WUNC-TV’s most popular
programs in the station’s first decade, which flaunted the Establishment Clause in its

31 “Educational Television at The University of North Carolina,” March 4, 1955, box 3, folder 65, Gordon
Gray Records.
32 “Educational Television at The University of North Carolina,” 1955.
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“illustrations of a faith that the separation of Church and State need not condemn the
State University to sterility in recognizing the religious yearnings of the State’s people.”
Furthermore, the report to Ford included no promotion of the early programs produced by
the Women’s College, which featured such titles as “Diet for a Day,” and, simply
“Posture.”33
Gordon Gray’s fears about a sudden reduction or elimination of state
apportionment for WUNC-TV proved to be unfounded, and from January of 1955 on, the
new network set itself to the task of constantly developing new programming and
improving its early ideas. Gray’s presidency would also end in mid-1955, to be handed
off to William C. Friday. The full breadth of WUNC-TV’s early programming and
production need not be examined here, but one specific endeavor stands out for the part it
would play in encouraging statewide expansion of the ETV service. Known as the “InSchool TV Experiment,” WUNC-TV’s major expansion of classroom instructional
courses, beginning in 1957, represented not only a full acknowledgment of the
University’s progress by the Ford Foundation (which at that time had shifted its internal
ETV focus away from adult education to the conventional classroom), but also for its
intention to endow the entire state with equal educational benefits, and not simply the
broadcast area of channel 4 in Chapel Hill.

The In-School Experiment
Statewide coverage only emerged as an initiative for WUNC-TV and the Ford
Foundation after the first two years of the In-School Experiment, after considerable

33 “Educational Television at The University of North Carolina,” 1955.
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prodding and protest from educators left outside the boundaries of WUNC-TV and its
partnering stations. The initial goal of the experiment, however, as stated in grant
application materials submitted by the University and Ford’s publicity for the project,
was to explore how television could assist teachers and school districts amid the baby
boom. Class sizes were ballooning in the postwar decades, and as Ford’s energy and
resources in ETV research shifted from continuing adult education to improving primary
and secondary levels, ETV grants allocated by the Fund for the Advancement of
Education (TFFAE) went toward alleviating the tensions within school districts with
overstretched resources. It was not lost on WUNC-TV administrators that this crisis
affected rural schools without ETV capability in far eastern and western North Carolina,
but their focus with this first major support from Ford was on the use of ETV in
classrooms generally.
Schools in rural and other peripheral communities across the United States had
been dealt certain educational inequities for many years prior to World War II, but Ford
Foundation reports on that agency’s “National Program in the Use of Television in the
Public Schools” made it clear that the baby boom crisis was, in the decade or so
following the war, an imminent crisis for all schools in the nation. With an estimated
increase of ten million students in the nation’s public schools (roughly a 40% jump in the
school population), TFFAE supported a handful of television projects across the country,
with North Carolina as one of only a handful that experimented with ETV beyond the
boundaries of a single city. However, Ford and its grantees did not view television as
merely a crutch for overburdened teachers and staff. In their response to the baby boom,
which TFAE visualized as “a nation-wide attack on the problems of quantity and
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quality,” WUNC-TV was taking part in “an effort to determine whether television, when
used as a powerful resource in the teaching of very large classes during part of the school
day, can bring about substantial savings in classroom space and teaching positions while
at the same time improving the quality of education.”34
Correspondence between the Vice President of TFFAE, Alvin Eurich and William
Carmichael prior to UNC’s selection as a recipient indicates that while the baby boom
crisis was the pressing concern for the overall investment, the Ford Foundation was still
hopeful that experiments in ETV could ultimately yield significant new dimensions for
state-supported education in places like North Carolina. “What are the implications of
television,” he mused, “for redeployment of our resources in the way schools are
organized—in cost, in space, in time, in method, in number, in personnel, in content?”
Eurich looked favorably, however, on the immediate goals indicated in WUNC-TV’s
grant request. These were: 1) enrichment of teaching at participating schools, so that
North Carolina’s teachers would, via television, “have at their command the rich
resources available in the colleges and universities of the state;” 2) experimenting with
television teaching in much larger sections, with the goal of allowing teachers more time
to “provide guidance, counseling services, remedial help, and research assistance for the
overall improvement” of teaching programs; and 3) “more effective utilization of school
buildings” amid mounting enrollments and overcrowded classrooms.35

34 “The National Program in the Use of Television in the Public Schools: A Report on the Second Year,
1958-59,” The Ford Foundation and The Fund for the Advancement of Education, 2. Jefferson County,
Kentucky, which includes Louisville and several surrounding districts, was another recipient from this
program. Their experiment consisted of a blend of open and closed-circuit transmissions to elementary and
high school classes in a variety of subjects.
35 Alvin Eurich to William D. Carmichael, July 29, 1957, Ford Foundation Records, The Fund for the
Advancement of Education, Series 3, FA #740, box 2, folder 283, 2, Rockefeller Archive Center
(hereinafter RAC) (first quotation); “The North Carolina In-School Television Experiment, 1957-1958:
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The In-School Experiment’s primary offering consisted of four televised subject
courses, produced by teachers in studios at Chapel Hill and at the Women’s College, for
students in grades 8 through 11, with one course for each grade. Participating teachers
and administrators attended several weeklong orientation sessions in Chapel Hill in the
month before Fall semester. High-school juniors and sophomores were treated to
American and World history courses, respectively, while freshmen and eighth graders
studied general science and arithmetic. In keeping with the goal of using ETV to
reimagine the spaces within school buildings, the experimental classes ranged in size
from 90 to 216, and thus had to be held in auditoriums, gymnasiums, and cafeterias,
equipped only with standard 1950s-sized television sets. Remarkably though the results
and learning outcomes of these courses, measured in preliminary tests in September
along with Spring final exams, showed that the television-equipped classes performed
slightly better in three of the four courses than their peers in conventional classrooms
within the same school district.36
WUNC-TV had to acknowledge in its grant report the issue of coverage, noting
that of the 19 school districts who first participated, only a few outside the coverage area
of WUNC-TV were able to participate, and those few were only able to do so because of
an available daytime hour timeslot on commercial channels in the area. Curiously
enough, participating commercial broadcasters were all in the western portion of the
state, and two of those operated in Appalachia: WSOC in Charlotte, WSJS in Winston-

Final Report, July 1, 1958,” Series Ford Foundation Grants, Reel 0180, University of North Carolina
(05900393), microfilm, RAC (all other quotations).
36 “The North Carolina In-School Television Experiment, 1957-1958: Final Report,” RAC. Variance in
test scores was minimal: American history and general science only saw improvements in the first year of
little over one percentage point. Arithmetic scores improved by nearly five percentage points, while world
history scores declined by about two points.
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Salem, WLOS in Asheville, and WCYB in Bristol, Tennessee, near the state line.
Administrators in the University also recognized the certain incidental consequence of
offering their courses over open-circuit television, estimating that, in actuality, over 100
schools and roughly 7,000 students were taking advantage of the broadcast courses,
despite the fact that there were only 55 schools and 3,000 students officially registered
for the courses in the 1957-1958 school year. Furthermore, the grant report noted
“because this program was carried over an open circuit, it is easily possible that
several thousand parents and other citizens viewed the program and had the
chance to learn for the first time what was being taught to their high school
population. Many communications, written and oral, came to the office from
adults all over the state who listened in occasionally or more or less regularly.37
It is hardly surprising that WUNC-TV included a large collection of such
“communications” in their grant re-applications, or that the Ford Foundation would
graciously accept such comments and use them to publicize the positive benefits being
realized through ETV experiments. And some of these comments do actually suggest a
lot of new educational benefits and opportunities being offered in communities across the
region, including not only North Carolinian students, but also some schools in Virginia,
Tennessee, and South Carolina. Local teachers praised the new methods they saw being
used by their in-studio colleagues, students found themselves engrossed by the novelty of
the experience and refreshed by the dual presentation between local and in-studio
teachers, and numerous comments attested to the new fluid boundaries between living
room and schoolroom. A 21-year old student with a learning disability, “having never
been to school but being taught at home and having reached the 11th grade,” reportedly

37 “The North Carolina In-School Television Experiment, 1957-1958: Final Report,” RAC.
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“asked for material and wrote in appreciation of the opportunity,” while another report
mentioned that “requests for [course] material were so numerous at a city library and its
several branches that the librarian asked the studio teacher for a bibliography.”38
Yet the potential benefits that ETV could offer rural school districts, as well as the
sincere hope that the benefits of the In-School Experiment could soon be offered to the
more disadvantaged, peripheral communities in the state, were never far from North
Carolina educators’ minds during the late 1950s. Writing for the North Carolina Parent
Teacher Bulletin, one of the studio science teachers, “Mrs. S.E. Denton,” looked with
favor and optimism at the “designated ‘unofficial’” schools that received the WUNC-TV
courses, celebrating the fact that “these small, oftentimes rural schools” were now
receiving “the same telelessons and instructional materials as the official schools.”
Elsewhere, one of the experiment’s directors, Charles W. Phillips, noted to Ford in a
midterm assessment of the project that the University was often reminded of the
difficulty of negotiating additional broadcast time “beyond the coverage area of Channel
4” with interested commercial broadcasting partners. To that end, Phillips observed that
other station personnel had also been exploring early models and designs of translators,
which decades later would be a standard instrument for carrying television signal beyond
the reach of a central transmitter.39

38 “The North Carolina In-School Television Experiment, 1957-1958: Final Report,” RAC.
39 S.E. Denton, “Science Teacher Tells of Advantages,” North Carolina Parent Teacher Bulletin (19581959), 13, Ford Foundation Records, The Fund for the Advancement of Education, Series 3, FA #740, box
2, folder 287, RAC (first quotation); C.W. Phillips to John J. Scanlon, December 31, 1957, Ford
Foundation Records, The Fund for the Advancement of Education, Series 3, FA #740, box 2, folder 283,
RAC (second quotation).
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Yet in the context of the In-School TV Experiment, even amid the modest and
hopeful successes of the first few years of the program, discontented voices were
beginning to mount against the current offering of WUNC-TV. One household that felt
notably critical of the network’s lack of reach at the time, though it received the
broadcasts crystal clear in its location, was the governor’s mansion, home at that time to
Luther Hodges. Toward the end of the first year of the In-School Experiment, Hodges
wrote to William Friday. In that year and the two preceding it, Hodges felt, “educational
television…has proven itself as an educational service to our people.” Following his
congratulations though, Hodges plainly observed, “WUNC-TV on channel four does not
cover the entire state. The east and west cannot benefit from this service.” To that end,
Hodges expressed his hope that Friday’s upcoming visit to Capitol Hill to testify in a
committee hearing (on the “Magnuson bill”) would be fruitful for the east and west’s
prospects of receiving public television.40

The Magnuson Bill, and Terry Sanford’s North Carolina Fund
Referencing “Magnuson,” Hodges meant Warren Magnuson, the U.S. Senator
from Washington and one of the most prolific legislators of postwar liberalism.
Remembered primarily for contributions to environmental preservation, public works,
and the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Magnuson was also a bastion of support for
public television. In the late1960s he would introduce the formative legislation for the
Public Broadcasting Service and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, but while that

40 Luther Hodges to William Friday, April 21, 1958, box 10, folder 259, University of North Carolina
Television Network Records #40258, University Archives, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
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act gave the U.S. its primary vehicles and cultural standards of educational television, the
infrastructure and reach of public television stations and early networks that were needed
to carry PBS would not have existed without the earlier, less known, Educational
Television Facilities Act of 1962. Though its achievements seem rather modest
compared to PBS—its main provision was merely to offer matching grants for securing
channels and constructing transmitters and studios—the Facilities Act proved to negate
the major issue of startup funding that prevented areas like western North Carolina from
sharing in the benefits of ETV, and it would eventually provide the main impetus for
WUNC-TV’s expansion.41
Though it foundered in House committees several times before its eventual
passage, the Facilities Act’s first introduction in 1958 was nonetheless an opportune time
for several reasons. For one, public stations and early network operations like WUNCTV had proved to be remarkably popular and effective in communities nationwide, but
many educators had also felt that the benefits of the new medium had roughly conformed
to the same distribution of educational resources that existed prior to ETV. A
memorandum given to Magnuson by a representative of the National Association of
Educational Broadcasters admitted that “an obvious argument could be made that the
population of New York or California required a greater allocation of funds [for ETV]
than the smaller population of Rhode Island or Mississippi,” but that action needed to be
taken to bring the country back to the organization’s “original concept that all states must
be treated equally.” The FCC’s original goal following the channel freeze of endowing

41 Shelby Scates, Warren G. Magnuson and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century America (Seattle, Wash.:
University of Washington Press, 1997), 4-6; W. Wayne Alford, “The Educational Television Facilities Act
of 1962,” AV Communication Review 15, no. 1 (Spring, 1967), 77.
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urban areas and “educational centers” with ETV’s benefits had not spurred investment
toward spreading that wealth beyond those original allocations.42
Furthermore, initial postwar projections for the expanse of television offerings in
the 1950s had not come to fruition. In the FCC’s rationale behind the channel freeze,
educators needed to act with all speed to secure the reserved channels, because once the
reservations were lifted and the channels reverted back to open application, the fear was
that commercial interests would gobble up the entire spectrum and leave no possible
opening for educators in the foreseeable future. That fear proved to be unfounded—of
the original 242 channels set aside for noncommercial or educational use in 1952, only a
fourth of those would be in use by the end of the decade.43 Outside of the conversation
around local ETV stations, the Facilities Act also benefitted from the concurrent defense
education bill working its way through Congress. Ostensibly about filling the supposed
gap in science education and development between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
following Sputnik’s orbit, the National Defense Education Act of 1958 served, as
historian Wayne Urban observes, to expand Americans’ interest in federal involvement in
education. The ETV Facilities act certainly benefitted from emerging in the same
congressional session as NDEA, as communication scholar Wayne Alford observed, and
Title VII of the latter act would also offer a grant program for schools to apply for ETV
equipment.44

42 Alford, “The Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962,” 78.
43 Alford, “The Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962,” 77; U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, “The Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962: An Explanation of Public Law 87-447.”
44 Wayne J. Urban, More Than Science and Sputnik: The National Defense Education Act of 1958
(Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 2010); Alford, “The Educational Television Facilities Act
of 1962,” 78. See also Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and
National Defense Education Act of 1958 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1981).
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The intermittent years between the ETV Facilities Act’s first committee hearing
and its eventual implementation in the mid-1960s were also a critical period in the history
of Appalachia, and mid-century liberalism as well. As is often recounted in histories of
the War on Poverty era, the primary election campaign tour of West Virginia by John F.
Kennedy in 1960, captured in television news footage and magazine photography,
initiated a period of intense fascination and concern for poor communities like those seen
in the Mountain State—what anthropologist Allen Batteau would later term as a new
“invention” of Appalachia in the national consciousness. The visual exposé of
Appalachian poverty in Kennedy’s visit was reproduced by other news outlets and
publications numerous times throughout the 1960s. The images had as contemporaries a
large number of popular books diagnosing the apparent paradox between national
prosperity and extreme poverty at the local level, including Galbraith’s The Affluent
Socity (1958), Michael Harrington’s The Other America (1962), and, specifically focused
on Appalachia, Harry Caudill’s Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A Biography of a
Depressed Area (1962). Appalachian areas like western North Carolina assumed center
stage in the publicity for the broad range of antipoverty programs initiated by Kennedy
and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson.45
If the Facilities Act were judged purely on the merits of how it benefitted
Appalachia and underserved areas themselves, the legislation would pale in comparison
to the more ambitious Great Society programs that were to follow in the Johnson

45 Allen Batteau, The Invention of Appalachia (Tucson, Az.: University of Arizona Press, 1990); Ronald D
Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2008);
Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian, eds., The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 19641980 (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2011); Edward Slavishak, Proving Ground: Expertise and
Appalachian Landscapes (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018).
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administration, such as the Appalachian Regional Commission and the Office of
Economic Opportunity. Through the provisions of the Facilities Act, unused television
channels in underserved areas could be put to use for educational broadcasts, but only on
a matching funds-based grant from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
While some areas in western North Carolina may had benefitted to that point from
commercial stations’ cooperation in airing ETV programs, the prospect of those areas
creating a new local ETV services for themselves was simply unfeasible. As historians
James Leloudis and Robert Korstad observe in their study of four counties in 1960s
western North Carolina, school systems in the area allocated nearly half of tax revenues
to schools and still struggled to meet state and national standards, a crisis largely due to
the fact that the U.S. Forest Service (a major landholder in the region) had operated for
decades with no contribution whatsoever to the county’s public funds.46
Arguably, the Facilities Act of 1962 achieved its most fruitful implementation
with cases like North Carolina, where the state government (and in this case, the
University) recognized the value of activating unused ETV channels, and also
interconnecting them to form a state network. William Friday had testified to that extent
in the initial hearings on the bill in 1958, noting that such assistance from the federal
agency would allow the consolidated university to make ETV available to all 100 of
North Carolina’s counties. For the first six years of WUNC-TV’s operation, Friday had

46 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, “The Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962:
An Explanation of Public Law 87-447;” Robert R. Korstad and James L. Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs:
The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America (Chapel Hill,
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 234. Korstad and Leloudis specifically follow the
organization WAMY, which represented four counties in western North Carolina: Watauga, Avery,
Mitchell, and Yancey. For further discussion of the issue of the Forest Service and property tax revenues in
this region, see Kathryn Newfont, Blue Ridge Commons: Environmental Activism and Forest History in
Western North Carolina (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2012), 101-104.
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counted on the friendly cooperation of commercial channels in areas on the state’s
periphery, but a December 1961 report within the state Board of Education (which had
happily accepted the new televised curriculum coming out of the University) found that
this era of cooperation was coming to an abrupt end. In that report, Elmer Garringer,
superintendent of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, noted that one commercial operator in
the city of Charlotte would carry WUNC programs for another three years, but that others
serving western North Carolina had notified him of their intent to withdraw WUNC-TV
programs by the end of the current school year. “We must have, as soon as can be
accomplished, a state-wide network,” Garringer reported in the Board of Education’s
committee hearing. It was not fair or right, he said, “for only a few to be privileged by
using television.”47
It was apparent also that the popularity and enthusiasm surrounding ETV
expansion was not limited to the inner circles of the state’s University or government.
One viewer in Montreat, near Asheville, wrote in September, 1961, to WUNC-TV’s
director, John Young, asking for thoughts on the yet-to-be-passed Magnuson bill, or if
anything had been done to further expand the signal coverage:
“With the schools and colleges opening again, we always have a special feeling of
regret that the whole State is being deprived of the advantages which by their
accidental location, are open only to certain areas. Reading the TV Guide, it is
clear that we are missing some wonderfully fine programs from WUNC—and
there seems to be little we can do about it. Certainly it seems hardly fair to stop
short of the State lines.”48

47 Alford, “The Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962,” 79; “Minutes—Advisory Committee on
Educational Television,” December 13, 1961, box 11, folder 275, University of North Carolina Television
Network Records.
48 John P. Williams to John Young (first quotation), September 28, 1961, box 9, folder 228, University of
North Carolina Television Network Records; A. Hartwell Campbell, “Educational Television….Editorial,”
May 19, 1963, box 9, folder 228, University of North Carolina Television Network Records.
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Similarly frustrated sentiments surfaced in editorials all over the state in the
following months. In May of 1963 a station manager of a commercial broadcaster
serving the eastern NC cities of Greenville and Wilmington made an impassioned plea
for a state network in a Sunday night broadcast, charging that “in the eastern and western
portions of our state, we find that most of the people are deprived of the advantages of
educational television.” The manager went on to reason, “if we can spread throughout the
state the advantages which are being shared presently by some of the people, we will
have a much better chance of raising the standards of education throughout the entire
state.”
Some of the remarks over a lack of ETV coverage were more scathing,
specifically targeting state legislators who might have spoken in opposition to expanding
the network, or those who felt that the time was not right to do so. In an editorial
appearing in May of 1963 in the Asheville Citizen, titled “Solons Would Prolong
Educational Blackout,” the paper excoriated a legislative subcommittee that balked at
providing the necessary matching funds for network expansion. “The fact that the state
now operates an educational TV station—WUNC-TV in Chapel Hill,” the paper asserted,
“means absolutely nothing to the children in the West, the East, and in many other areas
of North Carolina where the signals from Chapel Hill cannot be received.” The fact that,
in actuality, the majority of students in the state could not access WUNC-TV,
“contravenes the whole principle of educational opportunity,” the Citizen reasoned.49 The

49 “Solons Would Prolong Educational Blackout,” The Asheville Citizen, May 18, 1963, May 19, 1963,
box 9, folder 228, University of North Carolina Television Network Records.
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Charlotte Observer added weeks later that educators in their city had, after the two years
of the In-School Experiment, been completely “sold on the medium’s direct benefits to
education,” and saw with all certainty that a “mountains-to-the-sea network” would
improve the state’s educational system. Many other editorials were published to that
effect across the state in the months following the Facilities Act’s passage.50
The pejorative reference to North Carolina’s “solons,” or legislators, showed that
the editorial comments were directed at representatives and senators, but many of the
calls for network expansion were also directed at Governor Terry Sanford, whose
ascendency to the executive office was advanced largely on an educational reform
platform. His book-length reflection on his governorship, But What About the People
(1966), was premised largely on education. His preface assured: “woven inevitably
through this entire story is the thesis that state government must assert broader
responsibilities for education,” and that strengthening this mantle would not only yield
more effective service toward the public by government, but would also make that
service “more viable in the advancement of its democratic purposes.”51 Sanford’s text
had numerous favorable reports on the expansion of WUNC-TV, his personal fondness
for ETV as a new and effective educational tool, and recommendations that other states
and school districts appreciate the value of the medium. His faith in educational
television’s ability to evolve and adapt to new production and teaching strategies meant,
for him, that the medium would be “enhanced constantly by imaginative development.”52

50 “Great Leap Forward in ETV,” Charlotte Observer, June 16, 1963. Other statements include “Will the
State Spurn an Educational Bargain, Asheville Citizen, May 31, 1963, and “What’s In A Word?,” The News
and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 16, 1963.
51 Terry Sanford, But What About The People? (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), xv.
52 Sanford, But What About The People?, 47.
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Taking office in 1961, Sanford appointed his own commission the following year
to investigate the prospects and effectiveness of ETV to that date. The commission
recommended that immediate steps be taken to ensure that the entire state receive
WUNC-TV’s programming, saying that statewide coverage was of “elemental
importance,” and “necessary and proper for achieving the comprehensive educational
results desired through instructional programs for young people and adults.”53 So
convinced of ETV’s benefits was Sanford, that he included it as part of his ambitious
North Carolina Fund, an ambitious antipoverty research and action agency profiled
extensively in Leloudis and Korstad’s book on the era. In that account, Sanford’s North
Carolina Fund, a systematic and innovative response to persistent poverty in the state, is
juxtaposed with the concurrent and more heavily publicized stand by George Wallace to
prevent desegregation in Alabama’s public schools. Thus, while Wallace and many other
southern governors were working to minimize and restrict access to public education,
Sanford, by contrast, used tools like WUNC-TV to promote widespread and greater
access to the state’s educational resources. In a statement on the North Carolina Fund’s
“Long-Range Plan for Communications and Public Relations,” the public information
wing of the organization outlined how television could “awaken, educate, and call to
action” the general public in North Carolina toward antipoverty campaigns.54

53 “Report of the Governor’s Commission on Educational Television,” October 10, 1962, box 11, folder
275, University of North Carolina Television Network Records.
54 Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, 1-3; Billy Barnes, “The North Carolina Fund LongRange Plan for Communication and Public Information,” 3-4, undated, box 10, folder 233, University of
North Carolina Television Network Records. Barnes’s enthusiasm for television’s potential to bolster the
efforts of the North Carolina Fund and build participation registers on a spiritual level. He writes “an
ignored, uninformed, population will let such a program drop with a dull thud.” By contrast though, “an
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It is tempting to read into Governor Sanford’s vision for ETV a certain strain of
paternalism, wherein the yet-unconnected homes and individuals in the far corners of the
state are supposedly lost in some backwards, pre-modern state without public television,
and have only to be connected in order to become functioning, modern North
Carolinians. Leloudis and Korstad observe this line of thinking, and they link the
trajectory of the North Carolina Fund to that of many other War on Poverty-era
initiatives. This common narrative holds that many antipoverty programs were started
under the notion of a culture of poverty amid impoverished communities, and the
assumption that poor people need only accept the tutelage of enlightened state programs
before they can escape the bonds of poverty. After that initial assumption, many
government agents and volunteers sent to work in poor communities steadily realized that
larger injustices were at play, and the top-down reform model steadily morphed into more
radical, grassroots calls for social justice and economic restructuring. Sanford’s hopes
for ETV seem to fit along the former, culture-of-poverty phase: he remarks in But What
About The People generally about the uneducated in North Carolina as an “inventory of
weakness,” for whom the potential of advancement in the state has been “swept away in
wasted lives…like silt in a great river washing out to form a useless marshland.”55 It is
easy to see how a broadcast television network could be viewed within this paternalist
attitude toward the poor and disaffected communities that lacked WUNC-TV signal.
Yet while Sanford and others within state government appeared to have such
convictions in their campaign for a state network, it is worth noting that within WUNC-

conceivably even anxious gradually to take upon themselves the responsibility for their own citizens and
their own local problems,” 3.
55 Korstad and Leloudis, To Right These Wrongs, 5-6; Terry Sanford, But What About The People?, 4.
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TV’s operations, such a strict, top-down application of the network’s benefits was not the
intended model. Evidence of this can be seen in discussion over how to expand the
network, as considerable attention was given to how South Carolinians’ network was
being constructed. Schools in the Palmetto State were at that time looking forward to
being connected via a closed-circuit network, one not dependent on receiving reliable
television signals from adjacent radio transmitters. Rather, schools would be directly
linked to a cable network administered by the department of education that covered the
entire state simultaneously. Closed-caption networks had been implemented in urban
areas and smaller states, and were attractive not only for their greater signal reliability,
but also for the fact that they could be effected without the laborious process of applying
to the FCC for available channels. Commissions studying ETV in North Carolina kept
close watch on how their neighbors to the south were advancing.56
Closed-circuit connectivity failed to gain traction in North Carolina, for the
obvious reason that it would negate the work WUNC-TV had done to that point in the
way of adult education and general cultural programming. The station directors also
objected, however, on the basis that they envisioned a state network that could grant more
autonomy to the individual subregions of the state in programming, and the strictly
centralized control of programming in South Carolina seemed far too inflexible for what
they hoped to do. Voicing his concern to the state Board of Education, John Young,

56 “Report of the Special Subcommittee to Investigate Educational Television in South Carolina, box 11,
folder 275, University of North Carolina Television Network Records; Robert Taggart, “The Promise and
Failure of Educational Television in a Statewide System: Delaware, 1964-1971,” American Educational
History Journal 34, no. 1 (2007), pp. 111-122. The state of Delaware opted for a closed-circuit network,
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legislative criticism over the availability of programming. South Carolina would also change to
conventional broadcast transmitters in later years.

60

station director in Chapel Hill, wrote that “the goal of reaching every school and home in
North Carolina requires a broadcast service, as opposed to a closed circuit system.”
Microwave links between various transmitters would allow for instantaneous sharing of
programs between production centers, and although engineering surveys suggested that a
great deal of transmitter infrastructure was needed to give satisfactory coverage to “areas
of difficult terrain,” the point of emanating broadcast signals from different areas, Young
insisted, was to allow the service to be “modified as desirable.” Furthermore, he assured,
the broadcast system was “so designed that the transmitters in the eastern part of the state,
those in the western part of the state, and those in the central section could be
programmed separately,” and so that “programs from any production center could, when
recorded on magnetic tape or film, be used on the system.” Though production
capabilities in the peripheral areas of the state might not have been ready to produce the
same quantity of programs as the Consolidated University was then creating, Young
made it clear that local areas should be given the authority under a broadcast network,
and not a closed circuit system, to produce and arrange content according to local
needs.57

Finally Expanding
The 1963 North Carolina General Assembly approved capital outlay funds for
new transmitter sites and increased operating funds for WUNC-TV, and although the
complete acquisition and activation of the new sites would take several decades, the state

57 John Young, Memorandum to Board of Education Advisory Committee on Educational Television,
January 25, 1963, box 11, folder 275, University of North Carolina Television Network Records.
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thus made an important commitment towards equal educational opportunity for all
residents. Beginning in 1965, the vicinity of Columbia, NC, a 14-county radius and an
estimated 207,000 residents would be guaranteed receipt of all the ongoing In-School TV
Experiment Courses, as well as several hours a week of teacher inservice educational
programming. By 1968, in western North Carolina, residents in the range of Linville,
Asheville, and Concord, an addition of 30 counties and nearly 1.5 million people, would
also receive these programs, as well as college courses in education, world and U.S.
history, and many other general programs on their state’s culture and public affairs.58
Though grudges against Chapel Hill and the Research Triangle area could linger, owing
to the fact that this area called itself the “state” network range for the first decade of
WUNC-TV’s operation, communities in eastern and western North Carolina could mark
this occasion as an important moment when the state affirmed its duty to provide equal
educational benefits to all schools and homes within its borders.
As with all public broadcasting ventures in the United States though, WUNCTV’s operation from the 1960s onward was never totally smooth sailing. Many of the
same criticisms and suspicions that have surrounded PBS since its inception materialized
within the first few years of the expanded WUNC-TV. When station directors implored
the legislature to purchase and operate its own transmitter and interconnective equipment,
a collection of private telephone companies working in North Carolina, including
Southern Bell and several local companies, lobbied the state to instead contract with their

58 “Educational Television Statewide Expansion: Phase I Progress and Status,” May 23,1968, box 9, folder
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services and rent the necessary equipment. Their dismissal of the idea of a state-owned
network cut to the very core philosophy of the idea of public media in general, phrased in
something like a veiled threat if the state proceeded to buy its own equipment. If the state
“should decide to get into communications on such a scale,” the operators warned, “the
State would then be in direct competition with private industry whether or not it so
intended. We respectfully submit that this kind of competition is not in the best interests
of the State of North Carolina.”59 WUNC-TV was also met with repeated rebukes by
conservative legislators over the supposedly radical content being aired and instructed to
young, impressionable minds. A lawmaker quoted in one of the editorials on the
Facilities Act barked, “I don’t want history being taught by someone from Chapel Hill,”
and later in the decade many North Carolinians spoke out in favor of South Carolina’s
network when it publicly removed from its schedule a program produced by the Ford
Foundation on race relations in the South, since the program was deemed too
provocative.60
Still, the case of North Carolina’s network and the steps taken to expand its range
are a testament to the importance of recognizing the need to attend to local and peripheral
areas’ education systems. In the next chapter, one minor player from the early years of
WUNC-TV’s development would address these concerns full-on, with a novel method of
delivery and program development. This new system would emphasize total and

59 “Communications for North Carolina,” 41, box 11, folder 263, University of North Carolina Television
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immediate coverage, in a six-state region rather than the confines of one individual state.
In doing so, it would turn heads not only for being the most ambitious project in ETV,
but also as one of the most astounding and peculiar experiments in television history.
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CHAPTER 3. “MAXIMUM LEARNING CONDITIONS:” EDUCATIONAL
TELEVISION VIA AIRPLANE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF AN APPALACHIAN
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
In March of 1953, two years before WUNC-TV would go live for the first time,
then-UNC President Gordon Gray exchanged a few letters with one particularly eager
and sympathetic supporter of educational television. John E. Ivey, Jr. was then serving as
director of the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB), a nonprofit interstate agency
designed to share and coordinate resources between higher education institutions in
sixteen states across the southern U.S., North Carolina included. Citing the recent
establishment of the Ford Foundation’s Educational Television and Radio Center at Ann
Arbor, Michigan, which would produce kinescoped programs and distribute them to all
ETV facilities receiving Ford support, Ivey proposed to Gray the need for such an
exchange program specifically designed for the South. An agreement between the Board
and the universities within the states represented by the Board was necessary, he
believed, to produce “programs which would best fit the needs of the region and the
nation, and which would be of superior quality.” Ivey’s overture to Gray did not go into
detail on what regionally-specific elements of ETV were lacking, but it was clear that he
shared in UNC’s belief that regional networks were necessary as television media
proliferated.1
Gray’s response expressed interest but moreover a noncommittal stance, since the
ability of WUNC-TV to produce programs for sharing in such a regional program was

1 John E. Ivey, Jr. to Gordon Gray, March 16, 1953, box 3, folder 62, Gordon Gray Records. The Southern
Regional Education Board, founded in 1948, was primarily focused on improving the overall quality of
higher education in the South and addressing shortages of certain professions in that area. For more on its
earliest activities under Ivey, see George F. Gant, “The Southern Regional Education Program,” Public
Administration Review 12, no. 2 (Spring, 1952), pp. 106-111.

hardly assured at that point. To Ivey, Gray replied “with confidence that the University
of North Carolina is interested in participating in any joint program of educational
television with Southern universities, or universities anywhere,” but he later confided to
R.B. House, UNC Chancellor, that “we should go slow with respect to this project,
especially since we don’t know where we stand ourselves,” and that future replies to Ivey
should be favorable, but noncommittal.2
In the career of John Ivey though, thinking in terms of region and regional
transformation was a common thread. A UNC alumnus himself, Ivey had earned a
doctorate in sociology from Chapel Hill, and taught courses there from 1941-1948, both
in sociology, and city and regional planning. For a brief stint during that period, he
served as “Specialist in Education Evaluation” for the Tennessee Valley Authority, taking
part in that herculean and holistic effort to transform an impoverished part of the southern
mountains into a fully functioning and modern economy. After his time at UNC he spent
two years as Executive Vice President at NYU. He not only served as the first director of
the Southern Regional Education Board, but he actually helped to found it, along with a
national institute for exchanging learning resources.3 SREB would eventually
incorporate television programs and other digital learning sources into its programs, but
Ivey’s role in the history of educational television is far more ambitious. The inclination
he expressed to Gray for region-specific broadcasting would lead him to create shortly

2 Gordon Gray to John Ivey, March 22, 1953; Gray to R.B. House, March 29, 1953, box 3, folder 62,
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3 “Biographical Data on Dr. John E. Ivey, Jr., President: Learning Resources Institute,” Reel 0207, Grants
O-R, FA 732F, Purdue Research Foundation (06000035), Ford Foundation Records, Rockefeller Archive
Center.
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thereafter one of the most sweeping, monumental, and—to present day observers—
peculiar undertakings in the history of television.
The Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction (MPATI) adapted an
idea first introduced by the Westinghouse Corporation for commercial broadcasting to
ETV. Rather than simply coordinating the exchange of ETV programs among
participating local stations, Ivey initiated instead a program where programs could be
broadcast directly to interested schools over a six-state region, circumventing the need for
established stations and transmitters in local areas within those states. As for how it
worked, the name says it all: a decommissioned military aircraft would take off daily
from an airfield near West Lafayette, Indiana, and Purdue University, extend an
“umbilical” transmitter antenna from the underside of the plane mid-flight, and broadcast
classroom instructional programs throughout the day as the plane flew in arranged
patterns over the six states.
The MPATI system was briefly considered as an option by which educational
television and other noncommercial broadcast programs could be distributed to the
Appalachian region. Ivey hoped from the beginning that his system would catch on in
popularity and recognition, and consequently be replicated in other disadvantaged
regions—and he was not alone in that thinking. Like WUNC-TV, Ivey’s airborne
television system relied on key support from the Ford Foundation, only the funding
records show that MPATI received far more support from Ford than North Carolina did,
indeed more than any single state or station had received to that point. Along with its
curious similarity to another Cold War-era institution, the Strategic Air Command, as
well as for the agency’s thorough articulation for exactly where and how educational
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television should be applied to benefit rural areas, MPATI represents better than any
other historical era a moment of apparent, palpable need for region-specific public
broadcasting.
In spite of the support behind MPATI and its wide recognition, the planes were
only in operation for less than a decade. Its shuttering in 1971 was due to many reasons:
one being that the fantastical method of delivery by which it operated was soon eclipsed
by the development and higher fidelity of cable access networks and satellite technology.
More importantly though, Ivey’s program faltered after it initiated a discourse among
educational and public broadcasters as to how public television should be administered.
Outside of the technological possibility of delivering educational broadcasts without the
laborious and expensive process of securing a local channel permit and building local
production facilities, the question emerged as to whether or not this was the ideal method.
Ivey withstood legal challenges to his authoritative claims over public television in the
areas the airplane covered, but plaintiffs in that suit, the National Association of
Educational Broadcasters (NAEB), argued adamantly that local channels and production
studios had the better insight as to what kind of programming was needed in particular
communities. In a slightly ironic twist, the members of NAEB appealed to localism,
much in the same way that local school districts and communities challenged them as
they offered programming in their own broadcast areas.
Furthermore, the general conversation around educational television in the United
States continued to change. Though the Ford Foundation had in the late 1950s shifted its
support away from general interest programs and continuing education in the home
toward classroom applications and instructional television, the luster surrounding the idea
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of TV-equipped classrooms began to dim in the mid-1960s. MPATI, which had staked
its position so firmly on the side of classroom instruction, was increasingly swept aside in
favor of a growing appreciation for the idea of truly “public” television. Other historians
have dwelled on the historical curiosity of MPATI and its meaning, even going so far as
to uncover how Ford considered applying this model of ETV in other regions.4 Still yet
to be fully appreciated though is the meticulous regional planning MPATI’s directors
oversaw for this experiment, and the alternative but no less radical plans proposed for
other struggling regions. One such place in this latter category, was Appalachia. Thus,
while the planes never flew over North Carolina or Appalachia, their role in the region’s
history is undeniable.
The MPATI system, in spite of its short life span and curious appearance, has not
gone unnoticed by historians interested in television and education. Allison Perlman,
author of Public Interests: Media Advocacy and Struggles Over US Television (2018),
chronicles the history of the program in an earlier article in Critical Studies in Media
Communication. In her examination of how Ivey and others involved in the MPATI used
their system to “counter entrenched understandings of the object of television” by the use
of mobile airborne transmitters, Perlman also observes how the program’s approval was
so dependent on the notion of a needy region—in this case, the Midwest.5 Perlman
expertly establishes and illustrates this connection (most notably in the contemporary she
quotes for his analogy of the MPATI as “educational crop-dusting”), but the success of

4 Allison Perlman, “Television Up in the Air: The Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,
1959-1971,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 25 (No. 5).
5 Perlman, “Television Up in the Air,” 493.
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the MPATI as a region-specific endeavor deserves further consideration in two particular
areas.6
For the first, Perlman’s observation that MPATI founders “intended for it to
serve as a model for other regional educational systems in the United States” is accurate,
but Perlman does not explore how this prototype was meant to be replicated in other
regions.7 Ford’s substantial investment in the program indicates their earnest attempt to
improve education systems across the Midwest (a cause they had dedicated themselves to
well before television and radio), but the organization also encouraged Ivey and his
colleagues to develop their system with the goal of fully transforming ETV and
educational aid writ large.
Further investigation into Ford’s ETV activities during this period reveals how the
medium of television was increasingly perceived as an instrument of economic and social
development in impoverished areas worldwide, particularly in third world nations.
During this same period, Appalachia was also gaining recognition for its apparent
similarities to third world environments, and it received aid through the Appalachian
Regional Development Act (and the agency it created, the Appalachian Regional
Commission) in a sort of domestic Marshall Plan redux.8 The committee tasked with
planning ETV’s role in the mountains under the ARC’s aegis did not consider the MPATI

6 J.J. Scanlon, “Classroom TV Enters a New Era,” Saturday Review, May 20, 1961, 51. Quoted in Perlman,
“Television Up in the Air,” 485.
7 Perlman, “Television Up in the Air,” 489.
8 Ronald D Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky,
2008), 177. Eller likens the Appalachian Regional Commission to the Marshall Plan for its strategies of
immense capital investment and infrastructure, technocratic regional development, and its direction by “a
cadre of confident young bureaucrats and professional planners.”
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as a serious option, but specifying where the MPATI fell short of ARC’s expectations is
an instructive narrative for the broad issue of educational reform in Appalachia.
Perlman also addresses the concept of a distressed Midwest region in the
MPATI’s history in her explanation of the airplane experiment’s failure. In her view,
praise is due to the MPATI for its confrontation and defiance against “localism,” and its
demise is lamentable because it could not overcome the entrenched interests of local
school districts and the NAEB’s preference for localized ETV operations over
coordinated, interstate networks.9 It was a tragedy that the region did not fully realize
what benefits it could potentially reap from a centralized service like the MPATI, and
that subsequent development of public television fell short of the glory envisioned by
John Ivey and his colleagues.
Perlman’s point is not without merit, but coming down so squarely on one side of
the spectrum between local and centralized planning in education obscures the more
moderate balances educators strike on a daily basis. The NAEB’s claims that local station
operators or state networks could better serve disadvantaged areas cannot easily be placed
in the same category as provincial, conservative school administrators.

Stratovision: First in Flying Television Antennae
The technology and equipment involved in MPATI was first introduced a decade
prior to the educational program as “Stratovision.” The idea of broadcasting television
via airplane rather than fixed transmitter installations was developed by the
Westinghouse Electric Corporation in the final months of the Second World War. In spite

9 Perlman, “Television Up in the Air,” 490.
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of how peculiar the functional model of television via airplane may seem to present
observers, historian James C. Foust in his study of Stratovision notes that this method
once held the full faith and enthusiasm of the FCC and commercial broadcasters for very
practical reasons. Chief among these were the issues of interconnection and
simulcasting, or the networks’ ability to carry the same program simultaneously at all
affiliated stations across the nation. As WUNC-TV faced the problem in the mid-1960s
of how to share programs across multiple transmitter locations, so did commercial
networks grappling with how to connect their many affiliated stations in the late 1940s.
WUNC-TV chose, at considerable cost, to build microwave links between each
transmitter location in North Carolina. Commercial networks had the same option of
building microwave links for their nationwide reach, but along with the FCC, they
initially considered Stratovision as a much cheaper alternative.10
Through late 1948, Westinghouse conducted three dozen flight tests of the
Stratovision relay program, and by and large the company found the idea to be much
more successful than many had expected. Test flight patterns centered on Pittsburgh,
with the plane relaying the Steel City’s local broadcasts during the day and signals from a
Baltimore station during the evening. One of the more publicized tests was hosted by a
country club in Zanesville, Ohio, where viewers with only standard home television
equipment located 130 miles from Pittsburgh and nearly 300 miles from Baltimore, were
able to pick up, a quality signal of the Baltimore station’s coverage of the Republican
National Convention. Program sponsors assured the event’s attendees that “anyone with

10 James C. Foust, “The ‘Atomic Bomb’ of Broadcasting: Westinghouse’s ‘Stratovision’ Experiment,
1944-1949,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 55, No. 4 (2011), 514-515.
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a television set within 250 miles of Pittsburgh could have tuned in.”11 Other high-profile
demonstrations included prize fights and one game in the 1948 World Series.
Foust notes that in spite of the considerable buzz Stratovision was generating
following its tests, Westinghouse engineers were met with mixed reactions after making
their case to the FCC. One thing for certain was the practical use of an airplane system to
reach the millions of households that were then out of reach of the handful of operating
stations at that time. Walter Evans, Westinghouse Vice President, made this point his
primary argument in the Commission hearings. He contended that the “most attractive
feature” of Stratovision was “that it is the only way that we know of, or have heard
advanced so far, that anyone other than in metropolitan or suburban areas are going to get
television.” To Evans’s knowledge, Stratovision was “the only way that we know of that
farmers in the rural communities, and those in the smaller towns, are going to get
television service in the foreseeable future.” Evans did not undersell the portentousness
of his company’s creation, and he made the case that the new concept could
fundamentally alter the landscape of airwaves in the United States.12
Commissioners recognized the benefits airborne television could offer rural areas,
but they were unwilling to entertain the system’s potential challenge to the accepted logic
of radio and television licenses. Moreover they were concerned that granting a
Stratovision plane license to retransmit broadcasts hundreds of miles away could lead to
signal interference with ground-based stations already licensed to operate in that area, or

11 Foust, “The ‘Atomic Bomb’ of Broadcasting,” 520; “Plane Telecasts Session: Stratovision Takes It 300
Miles From Ground Station,” New York Times, June 24, 1948 (quotation).
12 “Utilization of Frequencies In The Band 475 to 890 Megacycles For Television Broadcasting,” (1948),
Box 266-286, Docket 8976, FCC Docketed Case Files, NARA II, quoted in Foust, “The ‘Atomic Bomb’ of
Broadcasting,” 519.
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at least undermine the autonomy of the latter’s programming. The Commission denied
Westinghouse’s applications to carry the commercial broadcasts of any station, but
approved the viability of Stratovision as a legitimate means of special projects in
television broadcasting, should any such later endeavor be developed. The
Commission’s report affirmed the primacy of local ground-based stations in their
approval process, and even though Stratovision would, in their view, “be a most useful
instrument in providing service to the sparsely settled rural areas of the country,” the
demand for the airplanes’ service in those rural areas had come from the metropolitan
areas, and not the rural residents themselves.13
Stratovision was barred from carrying commercial broadcasts, but they would
eagerly sign on to the noncommercial, educational project being developed years later in
West Lafayette, Indiana, by the Purdue Research Foundation. By the time Westinghouse
entered into a contract with MPATI and Purdue, nearly a decade after the FCC’s
decision, Stratovision was merely a patented system; if Purdue wanted to use Stratovision
to conduct its ETV experiment, the university would have to provide two aircraft for
Westinghouse to modify and equip with umbilical antennae and other onboard hardware.
Westinghouse’s proposal to Purdue, submitted in December of 1959, shows a clear desire
to act efficiently and expediently. Should the aircraft be submitted to Westinghouse’s
Maryland facility by January of 1960, the modifications and broadcasting capability

13 “FCC Studies Stratovision: Hears Pro and Con on Television Plane Relays in Pittsburgh Area,” New
York Times, July 27, 1948; Federal Communication Commission, Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(March 21, 1951), quoted in Foust, “The ‘Atomic Bomb’ of Broadcasting,” 521.
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would be ready in time for a July test flight and full operation beginning with the 1960
fall semester.14

Developing MPATI
As seen in the history of WUNC-TV, the Ford Foundation’s investments into
ETV shifted increasingly in the 1950s toward instructional television and away from
general audience programming. MPATI can thus be considered a high watermark for
instructional television, as grant applications and correspondence between Purdue,
MPATI, and the Ford Foundation reveal an enormous investment in the early 1960s,
followed by a complete abandonment of the project by the end of the decade. It is also
clear from communication within these various organizations that while the plight of
rural Midwestern schools spurred the interest and sympathy of the various organizations
and investors, MPATI was conceived as merely a prototype for similarly ambitious
television projects in other disadvantaged regions. In this regard, the noncommercial,
philanthropic interests behind MPATI were similar to the commercial interests that first
explored Stratovision: both envisioned airplanes ushering in a new era of
telecommunications and connectivity between rural and metropolitan areas.
Much like the regions of North Carolina beyond Chapel Hill and the Consolidated
University, the educators who first convened on the idea of an airborne television service
in the Midwest were concerned that the benefits of rapidly-developing instructional
television programs would bypass many rural and struggling urban schools. In their

14 “Proposal For Airborne Educational Television: Presented to Midwest Council on Airborne Educational
Television,” 1-3, Reel 0207, Grants O-R, FA732F, Purdue Research Foundation, Ford Foundation Records.

75

initial funding request to Henry T. Heald of the Ford Foundation, the early members of
the Midwest Council on Airborne Educational Television cited three major obstacles to
providing instructional television to schools. Similar to WUNC-TV’s critics, they
observed that though ETV stations operated in the Midwest’s urban centers, “a large
majority of school children, particularly in small towns and rural areas where educational
help is needed most, are beyond the reach of these ETV stations.” They also cited the
closed-circuit networks some areas had constructed to reach schools outside a station’s
reach, but to the collective interests of a new Midwestern consortium of educators, this
method would be too expensive to implement throughout the large area they oversaw.15
The third obstacle noted in this appeal to Heald of the Ford Foundation shows the
beginning of MPATI’s divergence from local ETV broadcasters. The Midwest council
made the novel argument that even if the disadvantaged schools across the region were to
receive the broadcasts of the existing ETV stations, the programming of those stations
was inadequate to the task of aiding those schools. “A single open-circuit channel,” they
remarked, “cannot serve a very significant portion of the whole curriculum or grade
spectrum,” limited, as such channels were, to “a maximum of 12 half-hour units of
instruction in a six-hour school day, enough for only one half-hour per day at each grade
level.” Here they noted a unique advantage of Stratovision: the airplanes were capable of
broadcasting six channels simultaneously.16 Thus they set their sights on how MPATI
could serve every grade level, including some college courses, at a given time every day
of the week.

15 Clarence Foust to Henry T. Heald, August 21, 1959, p. 4, Reel 0205, Grants O-R, FA732F, Purdue
Research Foundation, Ford Foundation Records.
16 Clarence Foust to Henry T. Heald, August 21, 1959, p. 4-7.
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Initial correspondence between the Midwest Council on Airborne Television and
Henry T. Heald of the Ford Foundation also revealed an interesting and new perspective
from the former on schools the airplanes would reach during the day. Not only would the
instructional broadcasts serve as a helpful resource to schools that lacked the resources
and advantages of urban and other wealthier districts—it would also improve the qualities
of the teachers working in the disadvantaged schools. Frederick Hovde, President of the
Purdue Research Foundation said the tentative educational program was “designed to
bring courses of the highest possible quality to the schools and colleges in the area
served.” This would include courses that smaller and disadvantaged schools could not
offer otherwise, but he also stressed that MPATI would “offer courses which are
customarily offered in all schools, but whose quality is generally in need of substantial
improvement.”17 Educational broadcasters had for years attested to the benefits ETV
would provide to schools that were lacking in wealth and resources, especially in light of
the burdens schools had to bear as a result of the baby boom generation. MPATI though
took this concern a step further by assigning some of the blame for poorer performance in
schools on the teachers themselves.
The slight towards teachers in the rural Midwest and in struggling urban schools
in the region is subtle, but it reflects some of the dissent between local interests and the
central authority of MPATI that would accumulate mutually over the course of the 1960s.
Evidently this condescension toward local teachers and administrators was present in
other investments Ford was making into ETV in that decade. Henry Heald’s address to a

17 Frederick L. Hovde to Henry T. Heald, October 31, 1959, p. 4-5, Reel 0205, Grants O-R, FA732F,
Purdue Research Foundation, Ford Foundation Records
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national parent-teacher association conference in New York City in early 1960 conveyed
his enthusiasm for ETV and other technological improvements in U.S. education, but his
remarks were laced with similar jabs at schools near the conference site. An “educational
revolution is beginning to sweep the United States,” Heald remarked: one where
“traditional academic walls are beginning to break down between the university campus
and the school classroom, and between academic fields.” There was, however, a “loss of
perspective” to this revolution, and he identified struggling New York City schools as
“one of the most dismal examples.” He lamented further: “there is no mystery about why
India and Africa lack first-class educational systems. But it is discouraging that New
York—so richly endowed with human and material resources—is educationally
undeveloped.”18
Much of the planning within MPATI development thus revolved around teacher
inservice training, with the intent that teachers in struggling Midwestern schools could be
better acclimated to the technological revolution underway. Furthermore, if teachers and
schools in the Midwest showed marked improvement through the use of MPATI courses,
then those courses and new airborne networks could easily be pitched and implemented
in other regions. In John Ivey’s press release for his other educational agency, the
Learning Resources Institute, he notes that “while the technical aspects of the airborne
project are tremendously important, the educational and public administration efforts
which must accompany such a project are just as vital.” The combination of a corps of
teachers continuously improving their skills through studying and implementing

18 “President Henry T. Heald Address to Annual Conference Luncheon of the United Parents Association,”
January 9, 1960, folder 165, box 6, FA 1322, series 1, Ford Foundation Records.
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television courses, along with the interstate cooperation needed to sustain a project like
MPATI, was the ideal achievement for Ivey. Doing so, in his view would open up the
possibility of “adapting the airborne television technique of the Midwestern experiment
for underdeveloped countries which are seeking ways to break through the ‘illiteracy
barrier.’”19 Replication was key for Ivey and other members of the MPATI council: the
plight of schools in the Midwest was the prime motivating factor, but they had to
demonstrate MPATI’s benefits and sustainability to the schools themselves, their
colleagues, and Ford Foundation directors looking to develop similar experiments in
other areas.
In Spring of 1960, MPATI conducted a nationwide “audition” for teachers
interested in providing courses for the program. Over 300 teachers submitted kinescope
recordings and 88 were eventually chosen as participants, as “the nation’s most
outstanding teachers,” by MPATI’s standards. Very clearly the Council meant for its
initial demonstrations to feature Midwestern teachers, since 13 of the 16 teachers who
would produce courses for the trial run were from schools in the region. Nearly all of the
initial teachers had experience in producing ETV programs. The selection panel was
chaired by a veteran producer of an early NBC educational program, so it is also likely
that standards for the “audition” included some measure of on-air personality and
performance. The first courses selected also displayed a wide variety in subjects and

19 “Press Release From Learning Resources Institute,” December 21, 1959, p. 6, Reel 0207, Grants O-R,
FA732F, Purdue Research Foundation, Ford Foundation Records.
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teaching level: a mix of elementary through university instruction, and subjects ranging
from mathematics and history to drama, foreign languages, and elementary music.20
The initial demonstration courses for MPATI, transmitted by the aircraft, would
not begin until the Spring Semester of 1961, but the summer of 1960 saw a number of
workshops hosted by the agency for teachers in schools that planned to incorporate
MPATI courses in the curriculum. The nineteen host sites for these workshops—all
institutions of higher education—demonstrate that MPATI had attracted a very
distinguished company of supporters to serve as “resource institutions.” Area educators
could attend workshops at a number of adjacent schools, including Purdue, Notre Dame,
Northwestern University, DePaul, Ohio State University, the University of Wisconsin,
and many others. Institutions serving as hosts designed the workshops “to acquaint
Midwest school systems with the potentialities of using television in the classroom, to
describe and discuss the airborne program, and to outline needs for receiving equipment,”
all with an attentive eye toward “the local needs and interests” of the adjacent schools.
The press release announcing the workshops though, reiterated the same subtle
indictment of the participating schools, noting that “the primary objective of the
workshops, as well as that of the airborne project itself, is to help improve the quality of
instruction in the classroom.”21

20 “Press Release From Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,” July 5, 1960, Reel 0207,
Grants O-R, FA732F, Purdue Research Foundation, Ford Foundation Records.
21 “Press Release From Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,” June 27, 1960, Reel 0207,
Grants O-R, FA732F, Purdue Research Foundation, Ford Foundation Records.
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Figure 1: Estimated Reach of MPATI Signal
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Proponents of MPATI (or of ETV in general) seldom gave any specific or exact
diagnoses for where schools or teachers were falling behind. In MPATI’s “Manual for
Area Coordinators and Area Committees,” circulated in October of 1960, some specific
setbacks were noted, such as a lack of foreign language course offerings in many of the
participating states, and also the considerable portion of mathematics and science
teachers’ college degrees that were based in subjects other than the ones they were
currently teaching. For the most part though, MPATI highlighted the impending baby
boom generation as the greatest threat to education systems in the Midwest. A troubling
figure given by the manual held that “if all the graduates of our [midwestern] liberal arts
colleges were to enter the teaching profession in 1970, we would still not have enough
qualified teachers to take care of the demand for teachers in the elementary and
secondary schools.”22 Under-resourced schools in the urban and rural Midwest may have
felt this crisis more acutely than their more well-off neighbors, but MPATI stressed that
the entire nation was facing this problem.
A case can also be made that MPATI, in spite of its lack of specificity in
identifying problems, benefitted from the wave of enthusiasm for educational reform that
followed the test of the Soviet Union satellite, Sputnik. Many historians of American
education consider the late 1950s and early 1960s as a prolific moment for investments
into educational reform, citing a general fear that American schools were not producing
graduates as imaginative and technologically savvy as their Soviet counterparts. The

22 “Manual for Area Coordinators and Area Committees,” October, 1960, 1-2, folder 755, box 71, FA
1395, series 4, Ford Foundation Records.
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visionary tone employed by Ivey and other MPATI boosters certainly fits along the
“missionary zeal” Diane Ravitch associates with the post-Sputnik era in The Troubled
Crusade: American Education, 1945-1980, where “on all educational fronts, innovation
was the watchword,” and “new technology, it was believed, had made the traditional,
egg-crate school obsolete.”23 MPATI, as an extension of Purdue University’s Research
Foundation, also exemplifies John Thelin’s description of this era in higher education, as
the four million dollars Ford gave to initiate MPATI was but one token in what Thelin
calls the grant “bonanza” of the 1950s, especially since it aimed at such conspicuous
efforts in scientific and technological innovation.24
Assurances for how MPATI could redress the struggles of disadvantaged schools
also figure in the discourse of the era’s key educational figureheads. During the
“educational crisis” following Sputnik, the name on the lips of every reformer was James
B. Conant, former president of Harvard University and author of a number of critical
studies on United States education. The most popular of these, The American High
School Today (published 1959) gave a range of recommendations for local schools,
including “small high schools” (a category Conant largely applies to small schools in
rural areas), and large city high schools situated in primarily working-class
communities.

23 Diane Ravitch, The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945-1980 (New York: Basic Books,
1983), 232-233. For more recent treatments of the era, see Wayne J. Urban, More Than Science And
Sputnik: The National Defense Education Act of 1958 (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press,
2010), and Thomas D. Fallace, In the Shadow of Authoritarianism: American Education in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Teachers College Press, 2019).
24 John R. Thelin, History of American Higher Education, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2019), 277-279.
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In both of these cases, Conant argued, schools in the U.S suffered from a dearth of
course offerings. Urban, working class schools, affected as they were by a sudden shift
toward suburbanization and a longer shift toward vocational school, were not able to
offer the same “comprehensive” education as schools in wealthier and suburban districts,
and were thus, according to The American High School Today, stunting the
socioeconomic prospects of their students.25 The plight of the “small high schools” was
much more dire, however, in Conant’s view. Curricular options for schools with
graduating classes of 100 or fewer made for, in his evaluation, an instructional program
“neither sufficiently broad nor sufficiently challenging,” and such a school, he said, “uses
uneconomically the time of administrators, teachers, and specialists, the shortage of
whom is a serious national problem.” The answer to Conant was consolidation, or
“reorganization:” get rid of small schools and find a way to bring a sufficient amount of
students together from far-flung rural areas.26
In light of Conant’s recommendations, MPATI’s offerings seem tailored to school
systems looking to implement these changes. One of the first promotional bulletins sent
to schools, titled “A Regional Exploration in Education,” did not attempt to mask the fact
that it was offering its services at a fee. It did, however, insist that compared with the
drastic investment many schools needed to expand course offerings, deal with
increasingly large class sizes, and continually train and aid teachers, MPATI’s new and
unconventional model could help with all these burdens at a much lower relative

25 James Bryant Conant, The American High School Today: A First Report to Interested Citizens (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 90-91.
26 Conant, The American High School Today, 77-80.
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cost. Both at-risk categories outlined by Conant could benefit: working class and lowerincome schools in urban areas, and smaller schools in rural areas could add to their
curriculum without major revenue increases or personnel additions. Most notably, the
latter could do so without broaching the laborious and often bitter process of
consolidation, and MPATI acknowledged that over a third of the students in its proposed
broadcast area were “in school systems of less than 2,000 pupils” and “for the most
part...too small to provide a satisfactory education under present conditions.”27
In developing courses to carry over a six-state region, MPATI proceeded with
great sensitivity in its status as a centralized ETV authority. In communications with the
Ford Foundation, Ivey and his colleagues made it clear that their service offered needed
improvements to teachers and schools in the Midwest, but they were also quick to point
out that their services would not stifle the autonomy and potential creativity of teachers in
local areas within the broader Midwest. Amid the discourse and uncertainty in U.S.
education following Sputnik, MPATI acknowledged the need for better knowledge
transfer from university faculty and distinguished primary and secondary teachers
throughout the nation, but they insisted on local schools’ ability to communicate
observations and course ideas back to MPATI planners through area resource
committees.
The manual for these area committees made it clear: “community representation
and participation in the execution and management of the Midwest Program on Airborne
Television Instruction are of key importance to the success of the project.” Area resource

27 “Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction: A Regional Exploration in Education,” 1960, 810, folder 765, box 71, FA 1395, series 4, Ford Foundation Records.
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committees, located mainly in colleges and universities, were to be directed by an officer
appointed by MPATI who would gather reports and recommendations to the central
committee. Area coordinators were expected to ensure a good representation in their area
committees of teachers and administrators from local schools, but they were also
encouraged to consider other community representatives, such as “state educational
associations, parent-teacher groups, legislators, educational television stations, adult
education, chambers of commerce, civic groups, service clubs, and other community
organizations.”28 The kinds of participants, the manual noted, would vary between the
different subregions, but directions for composing the area committees showed clearly
MPATI’s desire to effect a regional transformation, one that all members of the local
communities should observe.
Still, Ivey and his colleagues were careful not to present MPATI courses as an
imposition on schools that might have been skeptical, or were unable to secure
membership in the MPATI program. Nor did they think that the MPATI courses should
be the exclusive benefit of the schools that formally subscribed to them. Area
coordinators were informed that “participation of schools in MPATI is voluntary and the
extent of participation optional,” and that any participating school “may use as many or
as few classrooms of the telecasts as it wishes and may equip as many or as few
classrooms for television as it chooses.” Printed materials that went along with MPATI
courses were licensed for use in the schools that paid for them, but aside from the fact
that MPATI broadcast channels were in the UHF bandwidth range, there were no specific
technical modifications necessary to receive a Stratovision signal--MPATI freely

28 “Manual for Area Coordinators and Area Committees,” 30, Ford Foundation Records.
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acknowledged that schools and homes could and likely would use them without
paying. “There is no reason,” the area committee manual cautioned, “why any school
may not proceed independently to equip itself and make use of the telecasts without
dealing with [MPATI].” In this sense, area staff members were expected to act as
salesmen, making the case to schools that the full benefits of ETV would go to
subscribers, since those schools had the area committees’ resources of “consultation,
printed materials, and other assistance.”29 MPATI had received a generous investment
from the Ford Foundation, but the agency’s survival depended on maintaining the
attractiveness of the courses as well as these auxiliary subscriber benefits.
These auxiliary materials reveal that MPATI was not content to merely suggest
that teachers have a television set in classrooms that they could use at their discretion-they believed that instructional television would revolutionize the order and function of
the American classroom. The guidebook distributed to participating schools, Using
Television in the Classroom (1961) offered extensive recommendations for how teachers
could arrange their classroom environments for an optimal learning “climate” with
television as a resource, and it also considered thoughtfully the question of how best to
process the material offered in telecasts among typical American schoolchildren. For
one, participating teachers would have to be conscious of how classroom spaces were set
up, in order to effectively utilize television to scientifically ensure “maximum learning
conditions.”30 More broadly, teachers working with MPATI telecasts were encouraged to
think of the “studio teachers” in the programs as colleagues or partners. “Under such

29 “Manual for Area Coordinators and Area Committees,” 35, Ford Foundation Records.
30 Mary Howard Smith, ed., Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction: Using Television in the
Classroom (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), 53
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circumstances,” the guidebook assured, “the studio instructor and classroom instructor
can help each other be as effective as possible--probably more effective than either would
be alone.” The indirect, but regular communication between participating schools and
local resource centers would be the foundation for this partnership, allowing “a splendid
opportunity for cross-fertilization of ideas and for becoming familiar with different points
of view and different approaches.”31
The extent to which MPATI detailed how classrooms should be arranged in order
to optimize learning is impressive. Of course, the television sets schools needed to install
in order to use televised lessons (“21 to 24 inches in size are usually
recommended...mounted high enough for good viewing”) were expected to have highquality, uninterrupted signal reception, but overall recommendations were more
comprehensive. According to the guidebook, students should be seated “no nearer than 8
feet from the screen, no farther than 21 feet from a 21-inch screen,” in sound-dampened
rooms with good lighting, but not so bright as to leave a glare on the television during
broadcasts. The guidebook also stressed that however useful a tool MPATI programs
would be to the classroom teacher, they should also be supplemented with plenty of more
conventional classroom equipment, including reference books, maps, globes, and charts,
and other audio-visual aids for learners. Such accoutrements were expensive and likely
cost-prohibitive for a number of schools in MPATI’s territory, but the guidebook stressed
that they were needed in order to fully “reinforce and expand the television part of the
lesson.” MPATI planners were not ignorant of schools that could not afford all of the

31 Smith, ed., Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction: Using Television in the Classroom,
23.
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recommended auxiliary classroom resources, but they reasoned that “a scarcity of these
aids will emphasize the teacher’s need to make optimum use of the telecasts, since the
studio teacher will utilize many of them in his presentation.”32
Ivey’s report to James Armsey, education director of the Ford Foundation,
displayed a clear optimism for the willingness of schools to buy into the program: over
8,000 teachers were expected to take part in the area workshops in the summer of
1961. Tensions over funding and financing suffused nearly all communications between
MPATI and Ford over the course of the decade. It was eminently clear that though Ford
had made a generous grant of over seven million dollars for the experimental period of
1959-1962, they fully expected MPATI to be self-sufficient by 1964.33
Ford’s rationale on the matter dates back to an internal memo from 1957, titled
“The Economics of Educational Television,” which did not minimize television’s
potential as a transformative medium, but made clear that Ford did not intend to be the
primary benefactor for ETV. Signs of success for ETV, in the memo’s perspective,
would not only include a clear ability to communicate and instill information in viewers,
but would also be seen in an acceptance by other possible “foundations” of financial
support. Ford would not abandon its support entirely, but it expected that ETV would
have to attract support from other sources “for risk capital to undertake new and
experimental educational television ventures,” like MPATI, “which have promise of
broadening and deepening its benevolent influence on our American culture and society.”

32 Smith, ed., Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction: Using Television in the Classroom,
53-61.
33 John Ivey to James E. Armsey, June 13, 1961, p. 2, Reel 0205, Grants O-R, FA732F, Purdue Research
Foundation, Ford Foundation Records.
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MPATI participants and administrators may have received in the early stages of the
program some remarkable advances in educational resources, but their benefactors
impressed upon them and all others in the “educational television movement” the need to
“extricate” from an “over-riding dependence--in terms of day-to-day operating funds--on
philanthropic support.”34

Ford Investment in Other Nation’s ETV
MPATI’s aspirations toward regional transformation were not unique among Ford
Foundation ETV projects, and here it is worth examining the global scope of Ford’s
investment into the new educational medium. In addition to grants and technical
assistance to nearly every ETV station working across the United States, Ford also
supported dozens of other nations eager to use television to overcome their educational
deficiencies. Nothing so spectacular as Stratovision was used in other nations, but
reports of ETV projects from abroad regularly focused on television’s benefits for the
whole country, rather than individual cities or provinces. This indicates that Ford felt in
these cases that broadcasts could engender a large improvement across multiple local
school systems.
Investment by Ford into ETV overseas lasted well into the 1970s, but the
contemporary operations to MPATI have many of the same characteristics. General
programming, with the aim of reaching both school-age children and adults, was viewed
as an ideal eventual goal, but the emphasis was certainly on classroom instructional

34 “The Economics of Educational Television” Internal Memorandum, 1957, Virtual Vault Report
No.010504, Rockefeller Archive Center.
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aid. Such was the case for Ford’s investment into ETV in the United Arab Republic
(UAR), the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria. A report to Ford on the growth of
television in the UAR noted that broadcast availability was expanding swiftly in both
states: matching, in the observer’s view “the speed and scope [of] the early spread and
acceptance of TV in the United States.”35 Offerings from Egyptian and Syrian stations
were at the time mostly “entertainment-based,” but the report noted a respectable and
growing commitment by the UAR Ministry of State to educational programming. ETV
programs ran for an average of two hours per day, and came in four categories: literacy
training (including foreign language), technical training, agricultural training, and “school
use (cultural enrichment).” However favorably the report’s authors looked on these
general broadcasts, though, they insisted that the UAR would have to formally
incorporate ETV into its Ministry of Education, and conceive of ETV first through the
classroom environment. Until that agency was firmly in control of UAR’s ETV
operations “with clear responsibility and authority,” the authors averred, “ETV in the
UAR cannot really be ‘educational’ in the sense of systematic, sequential, televised
instruction.”36
The Ford Foundation construed its role in other nations’ ETV services as that of a
consulting firm and not a benefactor, even though the technical expertise and equipment
were the ultimate prize sought by nations who applied for their services. As in the case
of MPATI, the terms of any agreement between the Ford Foundation and developing
countries held that beneficiaries must demonstrate self sufficiency and the potential for

35 “Educational Television in The United Arab Republic” internal memorandum, August 2, 1961, p. 1,
Virtual Vault Report No.008314, Rockefeller Archive Center.
36 “Educational Television in The United Arab Republic,” 8.
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growth. The UAR certainly demonstrated the latter. “Because of the flat terrain and
favorable atmospheric conditions,” the Ford representatives noted, transmitters already in
operation in the UAR had the potential to reach 70 percent of the population, and after a
few years of receiver importation and production were projected to reach 500,000 homes
and schools.37 Likewise, Ford looked favorably on the ETV pilot project underway in
Colombia, which, after a trial run of six months in the school district of the capital,
Bogotá, and surrounding area, was prepared to begin expanding into 1,500 additional
primary schools in the surrounding rural areas.38
Ford’s involvement in Colombian ETV was much more befitting their intended
role as consultants, as they were only brought into assess what the Colombian
Government had to that point demonstrated in the way of ETV, and broker an
arrangement between Colombia and their prospective benefactors, the Peace Corps and
the United States Agency for International Development. In this arrangement, the Ford
Foundation hefted its considerable reputation as a developer of educational television,
offering unyielding criticism of where the fledgling Colombian ETV broadcasts
succeeded and failed. They did not dismiss the Latin American nation entirely out of
hand, but strongly suggested to their U.S. Government colleagues that a number of
“crucial” problems needed be addressed before aid was extended. These issues bear a
striking similarity to the problems John Ivey and the MPATI board envisioned and so
stringently sought to avoid. Colombian ETV, in Ford’s view, suffered from “a seeming
multiplicity of purposes,” and “a lack of any specific evaluation procedures” for how

37 “Educational Television in The United Arab Republic,” 3.
38 Clifton Mitchell, “Educational Television in Colombia” internal memorandum, March, 1963, p. 4,
Virtual Vault Report No.008314, Rockefeller Archive Center.
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effective their educational broadcasts would be long term. There was also an apparent
“ambiguity as to who or what body shall assume authority and responsibility,” as the
impetus for an ETV program had come moreover from the state communications
administration, and did not establish a clear partnership with the schools and teachers
they were meaning to serve. Most damning of all though, was the report’s observation of
“a lack of adequate and clear plans for continuation after U.S. funds are expended and
agency support is withdrawn.”39 This fate would overtake MPATI and many other ETV
ventures, and its mention with regard to Colombia gave a clear red flag to any
prospective philanthropic agency.
India’s foray into ETV began years before these other nations, and like stations in
the United States, saw substantial NGO investment, both from the Ford Foundation and
UNESCO. The newly independent Indian government initially requested help in
acquiring a small supply of television receivers, but consultation with James Armsey of
the Ford Foundation led to a much more ambitious project. The first objective
recommended by Ford was to specifically provide, by 1961, televised lectures and
demonstrations for all secondary-level science classes in Delhi. This would require far
more than television equipment--the municipal government of Delhi had yet to even
provide electricity to all schools.40 Power for lights as well as the equipment and supplies
needed for fully functional science classroom laboratories would be incredibly expensive,
and it would likely take years before any semblance of uniformity across a school system

39 Mitchell, “Educational Television in Colombia,” intro, p. 9.
40 “Educational Television in India” internal memorandum, February, 24, 1966, p. 42, Virtual Vault
Report No.008314, Rockefeller Archive Center.
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in a city like Delhi. Television, it was believed, could quickly shore up some of the
disparities while larger capital improvements were underway.
Reports filed with the Ford Foundation on the ETV activities of different nations
vary somewhat in their thoroughness. The observation on the use of ETV in classrooms
in Niger, for instance, produced a report of only a few pages, with brief, straightforward
statements on what television-capable classrooms looked like, and how well they
appeared to be improving the learning of the students. “The children seemed lively and
interested,” the report remarked. “They talked back to the television teacher or the
television demonstrator while the program was in progress,” and were similarly “lively
and talkative after the television program was over.” Pressing technical issues were
noted, along with some apparent shortcomings in the educational programs produced in
Niger, but overall “the impression gained was that the television education was working
well and was particularly suitable to a country such as Niger.” By contrast, the report on
ETV in India is a tome, with hundreds of pages devoted to the specific applications of
ETV in that nation, as well as broad, philosophical analysis of how ETV could effect
positive change in developing countries.
India’s experiment in ETV, as the 1966 report made clear, was purposed more
toward improving the quality of teachers, many of whom were coming into the classroom
with training inadequate to the standards set by local school directors in Delhi. That,
along with the rising populations of students in Delhi’s schools, were the main concern,
and the report did not project how ETV’s use in a city might compare to rural areas. The
author of Ford’s report noted that the successes and failures of ETV in Delhi would
“prove useful...when the time comes for its expansion to Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and
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other cities.”41 Unlike the visions MPATI proffered of an uplifted and transformed
Midwest region, Ford’s contemporaneous prospects for ETV in India were limited to the
metropolitan centers.

Making the Pitch
MPATI bore the same scrutiny given to these developing nations by the Ford
Foundation, and thus they doggedly pursued the two general goals seen in the reports on
ETV in the developing world: financial self-sufficiency and close consultation with
educational authorities at state and local levels throughout the Midwest. Their credentials
in the latter were well established through the workshops for participating teachers and
input from higher education institutions and school districts. And while the initial
investment by Ford gave MPATI a comfortable starting point as it established its own
nonprofit status apart from the Purdue Research Foundation, Ivey and Brownell knew
that if the system didn’t firmly catch on in two or three years, their grand experiment
would be shuttered. MPATI’s ledger dated July 1, 1962 showed the considerable asset of
over 5 million dollars from the Ford Foundation and other contributors, but expenditures
would claim that amount in a few years’ time. The cost of the planes stood out
particularly—over $550,000 every six months would go to maintenance of the aircraft
and licensing fees to the Westinghouse Corporation for use of the Stratovision patent.
The trial semesters had earned MPATI a decent amount of revenue through subscriptions

41 “Educational Television in India,” 18.

95

and sale of taped programs and other learning materials, but it was clear that the
organization would have to consistently expand their service in order to stay afloat.42
MPATI’s progress in the 62-63 school year can be seen in their status report to
Ford in May of 1963. Though the statement is forthright in the areas where the service
had fallen short, overall it assured the Ford Foundation that “the original concerns
regarding the establishment of the system have been alleviated.”43 Their success is most
evidently felt in the reliability of their technical equipment. A number of schools had
reception difficulties, largely due to the fact that receivers at many schools did not have
UHF capability, or staff on site did not know how to access MPATI’s programs or other
broadcasts in the upper channels. Large cities also proved to be problematic for
reception, as taller buildings blocked signal transmission and had to be equipped with
new repeater devices called “translators” to accommodate for the interruption. Still, with
quick fixes for these transmission difficulties, MPATI was confident that signals could be
received consistently in areas 210 miles from the plane’s daily flight pattern in central
Indiana. Furthermore, the report noted, the intensive focus on producing high quality
programs in consultation with the schools they were serving had raised MPATI’s profile
nationwide, and the central office was also distributing taped versions of their courses to
schools in 15 cities outside the Midwest for an additional 4,000 schools reached.

42 “Airborne Television Instruction Fund (A Fund of Purdue Research Foundation) Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Fund Balance, June 30, 1962” Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to N, Reel 0230, Midwest
Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September 11, 1966, Ford
Foundation Records.
43 “A Report to The Ford Foundation on the Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc.,
May, 1963,”p. 1, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to N, Reel 0230, Midwest Program on Airborne
Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September 11, 1966, Ford Foundation Records.
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The critical area for MPATI was membership. Though the agency freely
acknowledged that all schools in the broadcast area could receive their programs without
paying, they would still have to convince school districts and higher-ed institutions of the
benefits of MPATI’s interstate network. “The 1,200 schools and colleges attracted into
membership by these services,” the 1963 report observed, “are still a relatively small
portion of the 15,000 schools and colleges” across the Midwest. “It is recognized,” the
report continued, “that this number must multiply several times over before the
organization can achieve self-sufficiency.” Ivey and Brownell did not imagine that the
majority of schools in the region would become members, but they issued the reasonable
goal that with a rate increase of 25 percent gradually over three years, along with 4,400
new member schools over that same period, MPATI could, by the end of the 1967 school
year, operate self-sufficiently.44
The chief strategy for expanding membership ranks, in MPATI’s view, was to
expand course offerings. Data collected from member schools through the first year of
operation were considered by a scheduling committee at MPATI headquarters, in order to
orchestrate a course schedule that would be most useful to all member schools (12).45
With the two UHF channels initially allocated, MPATI had produced a wide array of
courses to fit this daily schedule, ranging from high school history and literature courses,
to elementary-level music and foreign language courses, to junior-high science and civics

44 A Report to The Ford Foundation on the Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc.,
May, 1963,”p. 7.
45“MPATI’S Educational Program: Supplementing ‘A Report to The Ford Foundation on the Midwest
Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., June, 1963,’” p. 12, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to
N, Reel 0230, Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September
11, 1966, Ford Foundation Records.
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courses. However broad the offerings may have been, program directors were not
content to limit themselves to a two-channel system, since this engendered dizzying leaps
between different subject matters and grade-level specifications across thirty-minute
segments. Thus the goal for MPATI during these critical mid-1960s membership drives
was to expand from two to six broadcast channels. An internal memo regarding the sixchannel goal emphasized this crucial need, noting a substantial number of schools that
had expressed favor toward the first two “experimental” years of the program, but had
otherwise “delayed membership in the program until a wider range of materials is
available.”46
As was the case facing educational broadcasters nationwide in 1952, MPATI’s
goal of expanding their platform depended on a favorable ruling from the FCC. Local
ETV stations had sprung up across the country in the intervening years, and had MPATI
offered conventional, individual applications for channels in their area, they likely would
have been granted those stations without much resistance. Their omnibus six-channel
application, submitted in January, 1963, however, raised eyebrows at the Commission,
and would ultimately require more than the expected deliberation period of one year.47
Still, Ivey and his legal counsel felt confident going into the hearings for a number of
reasons. The National Bureau of Standards, the federal government’s chief agency for
consumer and commercial technology, filed a comment in their case affirming airborne
television as the best use of available channels in the Midwest, and over a thousand

46 “Revised Plans for Developing Six-Channel Broadcast Equipment,” p. 1, Series Ford Foundation
Grants—L to N, Reel 0230, Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12,
1962 – September 11, 1966, Ford Foundation Records.
47 “Revised Plans for Developing Six-Channel Broadcast Equipment,” p. 10.
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endorsements from schools and educators in the region were received in support of the
six-channel reservation.48

Challenge to MPATI
The most outspoken opponents to MPATI’s expansion were representatives of the
National Association of Educational Broadcasters, and their testimony before the FCC
against MPATI represents the most ironic and unfortunate aspect of the latter agency’s
brief history. Hardly a decade after the NAEB had stood before the FCC as newcomers
arguing against established interests in commercial television broadcasting, they now
acted as the establishment in noncommercial broadcasting, rejecting the rise of another
new player following in their footsteps. The criticisms leveled at MPATI were not
without merit: for all the airborne project’s ambitions toward regional organization and
improvement, they had yet to clearly demonstrate that their new medium would gain
enough traction and support from the entire Midwest. Furthermore, MPATI’s insistence
on broadcasting exclusively in-class instructional programs was increasingly in doubt as
the most effective use of noncommercial television airwaves.
Robert J. Blakely’s early history of educational broadcasting, To Serve the Public
Interest (1979) notes that the rift between strictly instructional TV and less formal massinterest educational programs had been building in the years before MPATI took off.
The strong enthusiasm for ITV, Blakely observes, derived mainly from the uncertainty

48 “Revised Plans for Developing Six-Channel Broadcast Equipment,” p. 10; “Reply Comments Submitted
by the Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., before the Federal Communications
Commission in the Matter of Amendment of Part 3 of the Commission’s Rules Governing TV Broadcast
Stations to Authorize the Use of Airborne Television Transmitters,” Series XII FA # 633, Box 19,
Education and Research Division Program Files, Ford Foundation Records.
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surrounding Sputnik and the postwar “educational crisis” narrative, as well as a “sheer
mass” of “skillful publicity” on the part of ITV proponents like MPATI, Hagerstown
School District, and the South Carolina network.49 Blakely’s perspective is not only that
of a historian: he served as assistant director of the Ford Foundation’s Fund for the
Advancement of Education through 1961. Amid the praise poured out on television’s
potential to radically transform classroom performance, many educational broadcasters
demurred. ITV, they felt, was a worthwhile endeavor within educational television, but
to privilege it at the expense of general ETV programming, which could be viewed and
appreciated by audiences of all ages and educational attainment, belied the fundamental
purpose of educational and noncommercial broadcasting.
Contrary to the daytime-only, school specific programming supported by MPATI,
educational broadcasters at other stations across the country favored the idea of ETV as a
side-along, primetime alternative to popular commercial programming. Colleagues
throughout educational broadcasting tossed around the idea of ETV as a “fourth network”
to the commercial giants of NBC, CBS, and ABC, and although they did not seriously
believe that they could come anywhere close to the ratings of commercial broadcasters,
the idea persisted as an aspirational goal.50 A study released by Stanford University in
1963, The People Look at Educational Television: A Report of Nine Representative ETV
Stations, confirmed that for most viewers, ETV functioned essentially as a “fourth

49 Blakely, To Serve the Public Interest, 138, 141.
50 Blakely, To Serve the Public Interest, 143. Referring to noncommercial television as the “fourth
network” owes mainly to the Ford Foundation’s National Educational Television and Radio Center
(NETRC), which produced a large amount of programs for distribution to local stations. John F. White,
president of the center, was the most outspoken for a fourth network, and advocated for the Ford
Foundation to produce enough programming to rival the commercial networks, but he was not granted
sufficient funds to meet that goal.
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network,” one that could offer more interesting and stimulating programs in the
primetime evening hours. In a survey of 52 ETV stations nationwide and profiles wellestablished stations in nine U.S. cities, the study found that in-school or instructional
programs were common across the ETV landscape nationwide, the majority of virtually
all stations’ programming was intended for mass viewing. Of the nine profiled areas,
only Pittsburgh devoted more time to instructional programs than general interest—58%
of its weekly schedule, compared to a 37% national average. By this measurement,
MPATI’s 100%-instructional stance made the airborne operation seem particularly out of
touch.51
The study also found that ETV viewers nationwide were generally a small but
dedicated subset, often with white collar employment and higher education. The report’s
section “Who is in the audience?” cross-referenced these findings with other indicators of
literacy, finding that frequent ETV viewers were also more likely to attend concerts,
lectures, civic meetings and discussion groups, and also to receive information via print
sources in addition to television. The authors were quick to point out though, that the
trend among ETV viewers toward higher social status was just that: the educational
programs were not exclusively seen by “eggheads” or the “snobbish” as critics usually
charged—they maintained a small but loyal “blue-collar” following as well. Though the
study’s authors offered the stark conclusion that ETV’s ambition “to be the device by
which the less educated members of society can make up for missed opportunities” had
“not so far proved to be,” they remained hopeful that ETV, if it made further attempts to

51 Wilbur Schramm, Jack Lytle, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The People Look at Educational Television: A
Report of Nine Representative ETV Stations (Palo Alto, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1963), 37.
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reach and entice less educated people, could still achieve that goal. So long as ETV
retained its reputation as a haven for people with higher education, employment, and
cultural distinction, the authors reasoned, “people who do have all or most of these
characteristics will probably find their way to educational television unassisted.” But, the
authors indicated with a clear, patronizing note, “those who do not have all or most of
these characteristics must often be helped to find the way.”52
These conclusions of The People Look at Educational Television—that ETV
reached a far greater number of people with general interest programs in the evening, and
that more work was needed to reach and aid working class households and lifestyles—
suffused the report filed by the National Association of Educational Broadcasters against
MPATI. On its face, the challenge to MPATI was based primarily on the technical
aspects of the proposed six-channel application: an omnibus application for specific
channels across six midwestern states entailed the risk of signal interference and would
admittedly require a change to FCC rules regarding channel reservations. The NAEB
stressed, however, that these technical considerations amounted to a larger philosophical
challenge to the accepted wisdom of improving education in the Midwest. Though they
deemed MPATI’s course production and regional collaboration system worthy of praise,
NAEB charged that further channel reservations for the airborne project posed a certain
“technical problem,” one “directly related to a number of important utilization
considerations both in the schools and among potential home viewers.”53

52 Schramm, Lytle, and de Sola Pool, The People Look at Educational Television, 88-90.
53 “Report of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters on the Proposed Expansion of the
Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,” p. 5, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to N, Reel
0230, Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September 11,
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The NAEB would not directly criticize instructional television as a whole—after
all, many stations in their ranks offered classroom programming during the day as well—
but they charged that MPATI’s effort to improve educational prospects in the region were
empty as long as no programs were made available in the evening and signal from the
airplane could not easily be received on all home television sets. “If airborne television is
to make a comprehensive and significant contribution to meeting educational needs,” the
report stressed, “it must be of a quality and stability that will make out-of-school, offcampus and general home reception possible for any program at any time” as well as the
local, land-based stations the NAEB represented. Limiting reception and use of programs
so squarely to school buildings made MPATI merely, in the NAEB’s view, a “point-topoint” communication service, something anathema to the FCC’s general philosophy of
broadcast media. Furthermore, the NAEB observed that some MPATI subscriber schools
could not serve the specific needs of their students if they could not access the broadcasts
on their home sets. Distance education, or “off-campus instruction,” were
“innovations…occurring constantly in great depth” in NAEB’s estimation, and by
excluding them, MPATI limited schools like the Chicago City Junior College, who
“could not serve its large enrollment if the [MPATI] signal could not be received
adequately on home television receivers.”54
Considerations for where and how ETV broadcasts should be viewed in order to
maximize educational improvement were the more reasonable of NAEB’s challenges to
the airborne program. Another, less reasonable tack used to discredit MPATI, however,

54 Report of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters on the Proposed Expansion of the
Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,” p. 7-8.
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was one also used at roughly the same time by staunch conservatives in opposition to
racial integration in schools, busing, and district consolidation. “There is no question,”
the NAEB warned, “that a six-channel TV service controlled from a single point and
distributed over a six-state area leaves little room for any local control, except to use or
not use the materials which are transmitted.”55 Their point here carefully sidesteps the
reality that it would have taken many years to guarantee ETV transmissions for the entire
area MPATI covered if each local area within those six states had to secure a groundbased educational channel for themselves. But this point made by the NAEB was both
hypocritical and ironic. The established educational broadcasters praised MPATI on one
hand, for their muscular system of attending to local issues within the large area they
covered, and allowing those issues to reach the ears of the central administrators; on the
other hand they stoked conspiratorial fears that midwestern schools would be in the grip
of an inattentive centralized authority. Historian Campbell Scribner has detailed the
prevalence of an impassioned defense of local control of schools, emphasizing that it
extended well beyond the assumed intolerant South, and into school districts all across
the nation.56 The irony in the NAEB’s position was that their own members were often
accused by local communities of essentially the same crime when local stations ran
programs with messages about Black history and integration.
Altogether, the NAEB informed the FCC that the airborne television experimental
service was a laudable one, but it had not been as successful as originally thought, and

55 Report of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters on the Proposed Expansion of the
Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,” p. 12.
56 Campbell F. Scribner, The Fight for Local Control: Schools, Suburbs, and American Democracy
(Ithaca, Ny.: Cornell University Press, 2016), 4-5.
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further accommodation to it could set a radical new precedent that the federal
bureaucracy was not able to administer. In contrast to MPATI’s reports to their Ford
Foundation benefactors, which emphasized a modest but diligent drive for new member
schools, NAEB took the more pessimistic outlook that “there remain nearly 90% of
schools in the area which do not participate in the programs, and there is no indication at
the moment that these schools will automatically become participants if the airborne
service is expanded.” Reporting on the FCC proceedings, the Louisville Courier-Journal
signaled that in spite of the bubbling demand for new ETV operations around the nation,
the FCC was largely uneasy about MPATI’s potential monopolizing of the region. The
future of the “wild-blue-yonder” MPATI program, the Courier-Journal quipped, was “up
in the air.”57

The Appalachia Plan
Here it is worth noting that, roughly concurrent to the FCC’s deliberation on the
future of MPATI, another ambitious, region-specific, administrative program was being
introduced to the American public by the NAEB but through the newly minted
Appalachian Regional Commission. The ARC, created in 1965, was the culmination of
two decades worth of antipoverty and economic development ideology, spurred by a
broad fascination with the mountain region’s apparent poverty and underdevelopment.
Though most of the Commission’s high profile initiatives focused on physical

57 Report of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters on the Proposed Expansion of the
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infrastructure and transportation development, improving education was no less a
significant factor in the ARC’s formative legislation. Historian Glen Taul notes that in
one of the centerpiece documents behind ARC’s creation, the Eastern Kentucky Regional
Planning Commission’s “Program 60,” education was viewed as an essential component
of any civic drive to boost the region’s overall socioeconomic status. “Integrating
development into educational programs and projects,” was one of the “major thrusts” of
Program 60, Taul writes. Doing so would produce the needed “accessibility and
flexibility in responding to the needed skills of the region’s economy.” The most widely
known education programs offered by the ARC were vocational training centers and
courses, but there has been a rich, varied tradition of ARC education programs beyond
workforce training ever since the agency began.58
From the start, the Appalachian Regional Commission was willing to entertain
new and innovative programs for improving schools, as well as unconventional means of
implementing them. The common diagnosis for poor schools in the mountain region was
a property tax base inadequate to support schools. The low tax bases could be attributed
to any number of factors: from the morass of different states’ systems of assessment and
property valuation, as detailed in the extensive landmark study, Who Owns Appalachia?:
Landownership and Its Impact (1983); or the corrupt and recalcitrant county school
administrators Ronald Eller discusses in his history Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since
1945 (2008).59 Though the ARC fielded a number of innovative strategies for improving

58 Glen Edward Taul, “Poverty, Development, and Government in Appalachia: Origins of the Appalachian
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59 The Appalachian Land Ownership Task Force, Who Owns Appalachia: Landownership and Its Impact
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Since 1945 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 244.

106

education, they often chose not to address these more structural issues head-on,
preferring, Taul notes, roundabout approaches, such as “advocating a state sales tax and
more efficient administration and organization of school systems and by seeking federal
aid.”60 Within this ad hoc approach to Appalachia’s educational shortcomings came an
ambitious proposal for ETV in the region, tentatively titled “Appalachian Regional
Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational Development.”
The proposed system, prepared for the ARC by the National Association of
Educational Broadcasters and drafted by the Kentucky Authority for Educational
Television, framed its necessity in several obvious Appalachian stereotypes. “In several
meaningful ways,” the NAEB politely stated, “Appalachia is a closed society:”
“Practically all migration is outward. This lack of movement from the outside
means that new ideas have little immediate impact on the local culture. Such a
lack of competition of ideas in these societies is a strong deterrent to cultural
growth and development. Education of the people of all ages is suggested as the
answer to cultural and factual deprivation in the region.”61
The image of an isolated Appalachia has been shown by a number of historians to
be an especially serviceable rhetorical device. David Hsiung and many others illustrate
how these exaggerated claims about the Appalachian region led to mismanagement of aid
projects and ultimately cause further injustice, while more recently Edward Slavishak has
profiled how individuals and aid organizations capitalize on the specific notion of an
isolated Appalachian “proving ground.” The figures profiled by Edward Slavishak,
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including recreations entrepreneurs and social science researchers, reinforce the notion of
Appalachia’s isolation in order to bolster their own credibility and expertise. In the same
way, the NAEB’s proposal prefaced their case for a regional communications system by
arguing that “to be helped, Appalachia must first be reached.” They did not elaborate on
how exactly Appalachia was isolated from a mainstream American culture, but it was a
fact assumed by many Americans, and the NAEB posed that they were uniquely qualified
to help breach that isolation.62
The NAEB’s proposal for an Appalachian Communications system presented a
remarkably ambitious case for educational development and justice however, in spite of
its use of a tired Appalachian stereotype. What’s more, the drafters of the proposal
seemed aware that the bulk of the ARC’s program funding would go to infrastructure and
business-related projects, and this they deemed insufficient to the task of fully developing
Appalachia. “The people of Appalachia will have to be reached by more than roads,” the
report reasoned, “if the roads themselves are to serve their ultimate purpose.” A robust
communications system, the NAEB argued, would give Appalachians “the benefit of the
best educational opportunities for their children, and the best and most up-to-date training
for their children’s teachers.” Public broadcast media offered these benefits to school
systems, teachers, and pupils, in the NAEB’s view, but through a constant flow of
educational programming running simultaneously alongside commercial broadcasters, the
proposed Appalachian communications network would also reach Appalachian residents

62 David C. Hsiung, “Stereotypes,” in Richard A. Straw and Tyler Blethen, eds., High Mountains Rising:
Appalachia in Time and Place (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 103; Edward Slavishak,
Proving Ground: Expertise and Appalachian Landscapes (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2018), 3, 115.
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of all ages and walks of life. “Some will need to develop latent talents through education,
while others will want to flesh out basic skills with re-education,” the NAEB observed,
but to “assure the kind of participation the [ARC] program envisions, there will have to
be a steady and massive stream of communication.” Providing the necessary aid and
economic development envisioned by the ARC, the NAEB argued, could not be done
without such a network.63
Educational broadcasters here were referring to roughly the same sorts of ETV
programs they had been producing for the past two decades, but in their pitch to the ARC
for a new “communications system,” they were clearly developing new regional and
national aspirations for noncommercial media, much as MPATI and Westinghouse had
done previously. The NAEB’s plan for coverage in an Appalachian network differed
from MPATI in two significant ways: interconnection of all public media sources then in
operation, and activation of unused channel space in all parts of the Appalachian region.
The interconnection plan took its inspiration from the general structure of the ARC,
wherein governors and legislators from the 11-state region would collaborate in forming
strategies and coordinate the best possible use of new funds and programs for the region.
Likewise, the NAEB acknowledged that Appalachia was being served already in many
areas by dedicated local stations, but that these could expand their service to the region if
they shared locally produced programs and developed new programs in concert.
Educational television stations would likely serve as the flagship for the Appalachian
communications system, but the NAEB insisted that educational radio stations also be

63 “Appalachian Regional Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational
Development,” 3-4.
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involved, since these were not merely archaic predecessors to television: their medium
had its own virtues and uses independent of television, and could be operated much
cheaper than the latter.64
More ambitiously, the NAEB proposed that the ARC not only interconnect
existing stations, but also activate unclaimed channels in the Appalachian region, ensure
that every community in the region, no matter how rural or removed from an urban
center, would have access to this new resource. Herein lies the most crucial difference
between the models of the NAEB and MPATI. Where MPATI and Westinghouse
offered air transmitters as an alternative to ground-based stations, with the rationale being
that the costs of activating channels in all peripheral areas of regions like the Midwest
were prohibitive, the NAEB impressed upon the ARC that funds were now available that
could overcome that very burden. Provisions in the ARC’s formative legislation would be
necessary, but not sufficient to create new stations, but a host of other federal programs
that had been initiated in the past five years could contribute funds that would make the
startup cost almost negligible. The ETV Facilities Act of 1962 had helped North
Carolina and other states expand their own operations toward full state coverage, and the
NAEB were confident that it would be just as vital in an Appalachian network.
Furthermore, various subsections of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(1965), the National Defense Education Act (1957), the Vocational Education Act
(1963), Manpower Development and Training Act, and the Nurse Training Act (both

64 “Appalachian Regional Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational
Development,” 6. The general course of producing radio programs was obviously cheaper than producing
television, but one other cost saving measure alluded to in the proposal was that many television
transmitters were being installed on existing radio transmitter towers. If the ARC elected to activate
unused channels for new ETV stations, the NAEB contended, establishing those stations would be much
cheaper and more collegial if they shared space with radio producers.
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1964) were earmarked toward audiovisual media facilities. With these funding sources,
the ARC could activate new stations and also offer numerous options for people in the
region to access and use network programs. The goal laid out by the NAEB was clear and
emphatic: to offer “at least two channels of instant communication to practically every
home and school, and any number of public meeting places, throughout the entire
Appalachian region.” 65
The most outstanding difference between the proposed Appalachian network and
MPATI though, was the insistence on program variety, rather than a singular focus on
classroom instructional aid. The NAEB did include ITV as part of their proposal,
affirming the ability of educational programs to “stimulate accelerated growth in
elementary and secondary education by bringing rich resources into the classroom which
could be brought into the schools in no other way.” Moreover the proposal touted ETV
for its potential to reach and educate people at all ages and degrees of educational
attainment. A number of stations around the country had seen success in programs
produced for preschool children, for instance, and the NAEB saw “special significance”
in an Appalachian network’s ability to “help the pre-school child by exposing him to
experiences he will encounter in school books but not in his own environment.”
Elsewhere they remarked that ETV would serve working class Appalachians by offering
them training and professional development opportunities at home, and they listed such

65 “Appalachian Regional Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational
Development,” 4 (quotation), 7.
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courses then in production by stations in other parts of the U.S., including “Typing,”
“Small Business Management,” and “Basic Electricity.” 66
Other program ideas pitched in the proposal were in line with the NAEB’s larger
argument that economic development without education and “human development
programs” such as what they outlined for their communications network, would be
incomplete. An Appalachian noncommercial radio and television network, they argued,
could expand communications on public affairs and engender a sort of “Town Meeting of
the Air” space for interested viewers. The ARC, along with other contemporary federal
programs in the War on Poverty era, was hard at work in promoting economic and social
development in Appalachia, and the NAEB’s plan would provide partnership
opportunities to local citizens, such as the “how-tos of setting up a Community Action
Program,” or the “role of a Local Development Organization as outlined in the
Appalachian Regional Development Act.”67 This way, Appalachians could lend a hand
and have a say in the massive undertaking going on in their region.
The NAEB’s proposal undeniably banked on a number of stereotypical
assumptions about Appalachia’s isolation, and was given to a clearly patronizing tone,
such as when it stressed that “the people of Appalachia will need to be prodded,
reminded, stimulated, and restimulated” by educational media.” What’s more, the
NAEB’s end goals of “motivate[ing] the communities of Appalachia to want more and

66 Appalachian Regional Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational
Development,” 8-9.
67 Appalachian Regional Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational
Development,” 11-12. The proposed “Town Meeting of the Air” function actually required some use of
closed-circuit systems. The NAEB posed that some homes or other sites could be equipped as
communication points and allow participants to discuss pressing issues with other community members,
both in their group location and with all other connected groups. The “meeting on the air” idea would be
rehashed in later ARC communications proposals. (See Chapter 4)
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better educational resources than they have,” and “making the people of Appalachia see
the desirability spending more money on education,” glossed over the historic campaigns
from within the region to secure a more equitable education system.
But the critical point within the NAEB’s idea for an Appalachian communications
system was the audacity of its proposed benefit. The document’s conclusion stated
simply and emphatically:
“the educational services of the Appalachian Regional Communications Network
should seek to provide the people of Appalachia with all the educational
advantages and educational stimulation which is common to the rest of the
country, insofar as it is possible for these media to do this.”68
This sentiment was not far removed from what MPATI was then seeking to offer the
Midwest—only the breadth of programming and delivery method distinguished the two
systems. Both, unfortunately, would be denied their opportunity to effect this
transformation.

Grounded
All told, the FCC deliberations on MPATI’s application for four additional UHF
channels lasted for over two years, only to end with a denial. The two channels then
being used by the airplanes during school hours would still operate, but MPATI staff
knew that without the promise of expanded curricular options, their service would likely
not be able to draw in enough new members to be self-sustaining. Polling data gathered
by MPATI toward the end of their operation show that schools who had signed on as
members were wholly invested, limiting their access to instructional television

68 Appalachian Regional Communications System: A Plan to Open Appalachia to Educational
Development,” 9.
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exclusively to MPATI. Some did so out of faith in the MPATI method, others simply
had no other option. Spirited appeals were made to the FCC by MPATI members and the
organization’s officials in light of the impending decision. Mildred Meredith, a Special
Education teacher assigned to the Central State Hospital by member-institution
Indianapolis Public Schools, wrote to the chairmen of both the FCC and the Ford
Foundation, pleading for the continuation of MPATI.
To William Henry, the FCC Chairman, Meredith admitted that the technical
considerations of their decision were immaterial in her view when compared to the larger
human impact. “My immediate concern,” she emphasized, “is on the receiving end, the
viewing, the consequences, the practical applications of making easily available more and
more education to more and more of our human resources in the world.” The resources
MPATI was making available to her students and others throughout the Midwest should
not have been, in her view, “for the elite alone, but for the disadvantaged, the
handicapped, the mentally and physically ill, the juvenile delinquent, “ and, in her more
broad definition, “the learner in all walks of life where the diversity of interests and
abilities have opportunity to be utilized in the enrichment of our way of life in our form
of democracy.”69 The same idea was present in Meredith’s statement to Henry Heald of
the Ford Foundation: “perhaps the unique thing about Airborne Television is that it is
accessible—equally accessible not only to public and parochial schools, but also to
hospitals, prisons, and other institutions which carry on educational programs.” To this
passionate defender of MPATI, it was clear how for all its inadequacies, MPATI had

69 Mildred Meredith to William Henry, March 26, 1964, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to N, Reel
0230, Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September 11,
1966, Ford Foundation Records.
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reached these “all too often neglected groups,” who otherwise would have likely been
ignored in the Midwest region.70
For its part, MPATI suggested to the FCC and Ford a number of alternative
means of keeping their service viable. Responding to the concerns brought to the
Commission by the NAEB, MPATI proposed in 1964 a compromise wherein the four
additional channels could be split between MPATI’s in-school programming during the
day and programs produced by other local noncommercial broadcasters during the nonschool hours. For those at Ford who were monitoring the steady progress of satellite
television development, John Ivey posed in November of 1966 that Airborne Television’s
service was actually very similar to the envisioned satellite system, and that a partnership
between MPATI and a satellite system would yield “potentials of considerable
magnitude.” In a meeting one year later between Ford and MPATI staff, the immediate
issue of dwindling membership revenues was met with a suggestion that the six state
governments in the MPATI flightpath enter into a joint-funded educational compact, so
that member dues would not have to be scrounged solely from the budgets of individual
school districts.71 None of these pleas served to prevent MPATI’s imminent demise.
Internal memos shared within the Ford Foundation after the FCC’s decision show
that MPATI, once the exciting, visionary new tool in educational media and technology,
had now become more of an albatross in the Foundation’s view. A scathing memo by

70 Mildred Meredith to William Henry, March 26, 1964.
71 Genshaw, “A History of the Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction,” 120; Ben A.
Bohnhorst to Howard R. Dressner, November 17, 1966, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to N, Reel
0230, Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September 11,
1966, Ford Foundation Records.
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Fred Crossland, Program Officer in the Division of Education and Research, was attached
to MPATI’s funding report in August of 1965. Crossland let loose his disdain for
classroom-specific broadcasts, arguing “the bloom is off TV instruction.” “Five years
ago,” he mused, “there was something glamorous about a DC-6 dropping pearls of
wisdom from on high and students glued to TV sets,” but now “youngsters are a lot more
sophisticated and blasé about the electronic and space age.” Recalling the “centralizedcontrol” criticism the NAEB had hurled at MPATI years earlier, Crossland charged: “I
have no idea how good the existing 28 [MPATI] courses are, but I am worried about the
tyranny they might impose.” Generally, Crossland’s memo looked past the positive
change MPATI had attempted and straight at the bottom line. Theirs was the classic
“permanent pensioner argument” in his view. Perhaps the airborne channels were
creating some positive change in the Midwest, but since they were neither profitable nor
self-sustaining, letting them continue would be, in the Foundation’s view, a waste of
Ford’s time and resources.72
The Spring semester of 1968 would see the last flight of the MPATI transmitter
planes. In the preceding Fall, the Ford Foundation was unsympathetic to one of the final
pleas from MPATI, in which General Manager Ben Bohnhorst presented data to
emphasize that 75% of member schools in the program, comprising roughly 13 million
students, relied solely on MPATI for their instructional television components. There
may have been some growing discontent or skepticism with regard to MPATI among
these schools by this point, but Ford’s hard cutoff for funding meant these schools would

72 Fred E. Crossland to Frank Bowles, August 6, 1965, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to N, Reel 0230,
Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September 11, 1966,
Ford Foundation Records.
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have to scramble to shift their supply of instructional material. Bohnhorst also noted that
“nearly 1,000 schools enrolling nearly 375,000 students are in effect out of range of any
other current ITV service.” MPATI continued to operate through 1970 as a distributor of
educational films, in spite of fact that the “Airborne” in their name was functionally
null. Ford Foundation by that point had reduced its support for film producers, in favor
of consolidating their money and energy toward their own production companies Public
Broadcast Laboratory and National Educational Television. By mid-1971 MPATI was
dissolved, its assets donated to the Great Plains National Instructional Library, another
educational film organization housed at the University of Nebraska.73
In Appalachia, the National Association for Education Broadcasters’ plan for a
“mass communication network” of educational television and radio services, also
foundered in the mid 1960s. In August 1966, ARC Executive Director Ralph Widner
sent to the region’s state representatives the Commission’s report on the NAEB proposal.
Boyd Fellows, the report’s author, had attended all meetings of the NAEB committee
tasked with creating the Appalachian network, compiled extensive data on television
ownership and channel availability throughout the region, and conferred with influential
figures in educational broadcasting located outside the region. Fellows spoke very highly
of educational television and its potential to offer meaningful service to communities in
Appalachia through the Commission, but he ultimately concluded that the ARC “should
not consider establishment of an interconnected network” in the region.74

73 Ben A. Bohnhorst to Howard Dressner, October 25 and 31, 1967, Series Ford Foundation Grants—L to
N, Reel 0230, Midwest Program on Airborne Television Instruction, Inc., September 12, 1962 – September
11, 1966, Ford Foundation Records; Genshaw, “A History of the Midwest Program on Airborne Television
Instruction,” 104-105.
74 Boyd W. Fellows, “Educational Broadcasting as a Tool for Appalachian
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Fellows’ reasoning is particularly ironic, in light of the localist arguments
employed by NAEB to discredit MPATI during the latter’s drive to expand. His report is
tragic, however, for the number of misconceptions it held about what the proposed
Appalachian system intended to do. The NAEB did not propose that the interconnected
network in Appalachia would impose a uniform programming schedule across the entire
region, as MPATI did, but Fellows described the proposed Appalachia plan as though
that were the case. Appalachians may have needed, in Fellows’ view, a “steady diet of
meat and potatoes [educational] programming,” but the question of what should be
shown and at what time in each area “requires a local judgment.”75 He understood very
well that the various stations merely had an interest in sharing programs amongst each
other via microwave links, and not dictating what other stations should show, but his
recommendation denied the usefulness of such a system. Overlooking the fundamental
regional ideology of the ARC, Fellows assumed that a program produced in one
mountain state would not be truly applicable in another mountain state and thus not
worthy of sharing. With no evidence or investigation, Fellows simply reasoned “for
example, Pennsylvania State history programs would not be as valuable in eastern

Development: A Report to the Appalachian Regional Commission,” June 30, 1966,
22, box 612, folder 1, Papers of the Appalachian Regional Commission,
University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. The bulk of Fellows’ report affirms a number
of the claims NAEB made about educational programs and their production at existing stations. Echoing
the findings of The People Look at Educational Television, he observes generally that too much of the
programming on educational stations was tailored for certain types of viewers—students in classrooms and
home viewers of particular social and educational attainment. Crediting the NAEB’s construal of their
proposed system as one of “mass communication,” instead of simply television, Fellows found the fact
“that most educational broadcasters do not think of their stations as mass communication media,” to be
their “fundamental fault.” What was even worse, he noted, was how many of these programs were even
further out of touch with the “basic educational needs” of rural, working class communities across
Appalachia.
75 Fellows, “Educational Broadcasting as a Tool for Appalachian Development,” 8 (first quotation), 2
(second quotation).
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Kentucky as they would be in Pennsylvania,” and thus the interconnected system deemed
unnecessary.76
The most upsetting oversight in the recommendation against an Appalachiaspecific network is Fellows’ omission (or simple ignorance) of the NAEB’s proposal to
activate all available channels in the region and provide service to all areas in the
mountains. The tone in the report is hopeful, particularly in the exhaustive data compiled
on operational ETV stations in the region and the surprisingly high percentage of
television ownership in Appalachia, where counties with the lowest estimated rate of TV
households still boasted rates of over 50 percent. But the maps included in the report of
ETV stations operating in the region, intended to show that most of Appalachia is already
reached by at least one station, still plainly show large areas where no signal was
available.77 Large portions of central Appalachia (eastern Kentucky, southwestern
Virginia, and West Virginia), bereft of major metropolitan centers, as of 1965 had no
such educational resources. But even the smaller swaths of Appalachia that were just
beyond the reach of a signal spoke for this oversight. Historically these peripheral areas
of the Appalachian Mountains had been excluded from available educational resources,
and the Fellows report showed that, in the case of ETV, this inequity would continue.

Conclusion
The demise of these two regional experiments in educational media was
overshadowed by perhaps the most triumphant moment in the history of educational or

76 Fellows, “Educational Broadcasting as a Tool for Appalachian Development,” 10.
77 Fellows, “Educational Broadcasting as a Tool for Appalachian Development,” Appendix, pp. 1-34.
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noncommercial television: the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. Spurred by the
influential publication by the Carnegie Corporation’s Commission on Educational
Television, Public Television: A Program for Action, the Act provided for the structure of
the U.S. public television service which has survived to the present day: not the brightest
star in the Great Society constellation, but an influential one nonetheless. Though the
legislation would result in the creation of public media’s most recognizable player—
PBS—the direct creation of the Act was the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),
a government-supported funding mechanism for existing noncommercial stations and
groups seeking to establish new stations. The struggles of MPATI, the proposal for an
Appalachia-specific network, and the struggles of many other stations illustrated Lyndon
Johnson’s messaging for the legislation: “practically all noncommercial stations,” he
stressed, “have serious shortages of the facilities, equipment, money, and staff which they
need to present programs of high quality.”78 The CPB would not, of course, put
educational stations on a permanently safe footing funding-wise, but it became their
major benefactor, easing the tense struggle for the support of philanthropies like the Ford
Foundation and the host of other government programs that previously supported ETV.
Public Television: A Program for Action, the de facto manifesto of public
broadcasting, reiterated more specifically some of the virtues and hard-learned lessons of
MPATI and the NAEB. The Carnegie-funded commission that authored it, including
Terry Sanford of North Carolina and James B. Conant of Harvard, recognized for one
that the national attitude toward the instructional television model favored by systems

78 Lyndon B. Johnson, “President Johnson’s Message to Congress,” in Frank J. Kahn, ed., Documents of
American Broadcasting, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 252.
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like MPATI, while approving, was generally “ambivalent.” Too often, they felt, stations
had limited themselves to “ancillary” classroom programming for their educational
offering, not fully realizing the full potential of television media to educate an interested
public. In this way, they mirrored the decision made by the NAEB to refer to their
proposed network as a “mass communications” system, not an educational television
network. The Carnegie Commission insisted on their preferred term “public” rather than
“educational” because the latter, they felt, lacked the full perspective on what the public
could gain from televised media. The proposal heralded:
“this is a proposal not for small adjustments or patchwork changes, but for a
comprehensive system that will ultimately bring Public Television to all the
people of the United States: a system that in its totality will become a new and
fundamental institution in American culture.”79
The creation of a new fundamental institution may not have reached the heights
Lyndon Johnson and the Carnegie Commission foresaw, but their strong belief in the
medium permanently shifted the conversation. “Public” supplanted “educational” as the
normative term, signifying that all people living in the nation deserved access to the
resource, rather than depending on established educational and philanthropic institutions
to provide it.

79 Public Television: A Report for Action. The Report and Recommendations of The Carnegie Commission
on Educational Television. 2nd ed. (New York: Bantam, 1967), 3-4.
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CHAPTER 4. “THOSE WHO NEED IT MOST ARE OFTEN THE LAST TO GET IT:”
BUILDING AN EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION NETWORK IN KENTUCKY
This chapter turns to the case of Kentucky Educational Television (KET). As with
the previous chapters, it will focus on the conditions surrounding the network’s inception,
the difficulties faced in creating the network, and the services it was built to provide for
the communities in its purview. The most significant aspect of KET’s history as opposed
to other state-level networks, was the insistence of its founders on total statewide
coverage and equitable reception in every community of Kentucky. The Bluegrass State
entered into the realm of state-level broadcast television relatively late compared to other
state networks, but this afforded KET the advantage of surveying the field and reflecting
on educational television’s true successes and missteps. If the observer at the Ford
Foundation of ETV projects like MPATI was right in saying that “the bloom was off”
educational television, and the early enthusiasm for the medium had faded by the mid1960s, then KET had the benefit of taking a more reasoned and holistic perspective on
how ETV could genuinely meet the educational needs of Kentuckians. KET’s founders
had plenty of time to study this issue—indeed more than they initially intended to have—
since coordinating the structure of the network, wrangling of favorable legislators from a
diverse political spectrum, and the drive for local support, took nearly a decade.
The process of raising support for an ETV network, especially when scrutiny of
the medium had steadily mounted, signifies another important aspect of KET’s history.
In a state like Kentucky, where the inequalities and malfeasances of the state’s education
system had been a perennial issue before legislators, governors, and all of the
commonwealth’s citizens, the question of how to pay for an ETV network and who
would oversee it, was a contentious matter. General support for the notion of a statewide

ETV network in Kentucky could be relied upon, but in a state experiencing vast
economic inequality, even the seemingly insignificant budget for such a project sparked
controversy amid intensely tight-fisted debates over school building improvement funds,
teacher salaries, and property tax revenues. North Carolina, which did not intend from
the beginning to provide ETV to the entire state, vested control of its network with the
consolidated state university system: an uncontroversial decision at the time, but one that
ultimately tied control of the network to higher education professionals. Kentucky, taking
stock of the systems in place in other states, opted to house its network in a separate
department within the state government, independent of the state’s colleges and
universities, but dedicated to remaining collegial and receptive to their expertise. More
significantly though, KET’s founders insisted on being separate from the state’s
conventional departments of public instruction—its state and district superintendents and
teacher association. At the network’s founding, this decision drew suspicion from the
traditional powers within the state’s education system, and required KET’s early
advocates to demonstrate their good faith in taking even a minute slice of the state’s
education budget.
This chapter also makes the case that KET’s genesis, like that of WUNC-TV,
bears a special connection to the Appalachian region. O. Leonard Press, the person often
credited as the founder of KET, recalled his inspiration for creating a statewide network
as the result of witnessing poverty and educational inequality in the mountains of eastern
Kentucky. No explicit mention of Appalachia can be found in the state’s charter for the
network, but the mountains were clearly on the minds of the people who advocated for
the network and spoke on its behalf. These appeals are often littered with references to
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the difficulty of getting television signal and valuable educational programs to all the
“hills and hollows” of Kentucky. Indeed the difficulty of guaranteeing signal to all parts
of eastern Kentucky was a major challenge in the creation of KET, for the simple fact
that the sharp terrain of hills and mountains in that region did obstruct signals from
transmitter towers. More ETV transmitter installations were necessary to overcome these
barriers, but KET’s founders were inspired by the fact that previous generations of
educators had attempted to overcome the geographic and technical barriers facing
Kentuckians in peripheral areas. They felt they had been granted a revolutionary new
tool in this endeavor, and while they never considered themselves experts in its use, they
shared the conviction that ETV had to be held in common by all people in the state.

Beginnings at the University of Kentucky
As an educational agency, KET operates independently of higher education
institutions in the state, but the University of Kentucky in Lexington was responsible for
gathering many of the network’s early advocates and founders. This was done under the
Department of Radio, Television, and Film, an outgrowth of its predecessor, the
Department of Radio Arts. The culture in this newly minted department could only be
described as makeshift: teachers with professional experience in broadcasting and studio
production but little in the way of graduate degrees or academic credentials. Leonard
Press and his colleagues drew on the experience of the university’s investment in
educational radio, however, to visualize the ways an educational television network could
benefit the state of Kentucky, and not simply the immediate urban communities of
Lexington and Louisville.
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Born in 1922 to a family of eastern European immigrants in Massachusetts,
Leonard Press had developed an interest in radio communications from a very young age.
Following the United States’ entry into World War II, Press opted to join the Army
Signal Corps and gained rapidly a basic understanding of the mechanics of electronic
communication. He later admitted to having a poor aptitude for these technical aspects,
at least until he was asked to help tutor some of his fellow company men who were even
further behind him in understanding. After the war, Press completed his undergraduate
degree at Boston University, where he combined his new technical skills in radio with his
love of writing, hoping to begin a career in producing programs for radio broadcast or
perhaps the rapidly developing television industry.1
The nascent and energetic young television industry in the United States afforded
Press several high-level university positions, in spite of the fact that he had no graduate
degree in what he would eventually be teaching. He was hired by Boston University
directly after graduation to produce publicity programs for the university. This was his
first experience in producing “telecourses,” which he conceptualized as a sharing or a
“showcase” of excellent faculty teaching subjects more naturally suited to visual media,
such as anthropology and art history. These were carried over a commercial network in
Boston, and by 1952 they had given Press enough name recognition to be recruited as
part of the faculty at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, a town Press and his wife
Lillian, had never heard of before relocating.2

1 O. Leonard Press, oral history conducted 1998 by Terry Birdwhistell, 1998oh033_kh26, History of KET
Oral History Project, Louis B. Nunn Center for Oral History, University of Kentucky Libraries; O. Leonard
Press, The KET Story: A Personal Account (Lexington, Ky.: The Clark Group, 2008), 3.
2 Press, The KET Story, 7.
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In the Radio-Television-Films department, Press had found a small but energetic
cohort of young teachers and professionals. Teaching alongside him were Elizabeth Ellis
Taylor, a professor of radio/television performance and stagecraft and daughter to
wealthy western Kentucky socialites and philanthropists; and Ronald Stewart, a recent
U.S. Air Force discharge from the eastern Kentucky coal town of Jenkins, who had an
uncanny talent for engineering the technical equipment used in radio and television.
Taylor recalled in a later interview that the RTF department was not seen as a particularly
reputable or intellectually rigorous program by colleagues in other more established
academic fields, but she took great pride in her work.3 She, Press, and other teachers and
students in the program avidly followed and studied the work of television operations at
other schools, as well as the developing production techniques displayed by the major
commercial networks. On shoestring budgets, Press produced telecourses for UK
students in a variety of subjects that the school used from 1959 to 1965. Press would
later refer to the middle and late 1950s at UK as a “period of incubation” for the idea
shared by himself and his colleagues for a statewide ETV service.4

3 Elizabeth Taylor, oral history conducted 1976 by Jerry Paul Perry, 1981 OH 086, Kentucky Educational
Television Oral History Project, William H. Berge Oral History Center, Eastern Kentucky University
Libraries.
4 Press, The KET Story, 21.
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Figure 2: Early Television Camera Training under Press

Figure 3: Title for Early UK "Telecourse"5
The Listening Centers

5 “Radio Today class doing simulated TV show,” and “Television billboard for WLEX-TV, UK, and
Cultural Anthropology class (taught by Douglas W. Schwartz),” UK Radio Photographic Collection,
University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. In advance of receiving actual cameras, Press
would have students practice with improvised substitutes to get a feel for space and positioning. The
second image notes that the course would be available on channel 18, the local NBC affiliate, which
granted UK the use of their morning hours for telecourses.
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In addition to the familiar and supportive atmosphere Press found in his RTF
cohort, he also developed a deep appreciation for the work of his predecessors at the
University and the extension-service model of land grant institutions. An experiment in
radio undertaken by UK two decades prior to his arrival was especially interesting to him,
and he would later claim it as a key inspiration for the television service he helped
provide to the state. In the 1930s and 40s the University of Kentucky, along with the
state’s preeminent radio station, WHAS in Louisville, and a number of local Kiwanis
clubs, recognized a disparity in radio ownership between eastern Kentucky and nearby
urban areas and worked to rectify it.6 Elmer G. Sulzer, originally a music professor at
UK and later the University’s radio studies director, coordinated a program whereby
radio sets were distributed to common areas throughout eastern Kentucky for free and
public listening. These “listening centers” would host informal gatherings throughout the
day with the goal of sharing information and educational programming produced by UK
faculty and staff with community members who could not otherwise access the
University’s resources.
Some of the motives behind the listening center project expressed by WHAS and
the Louisville Courier Journal were questionable for their clearly patronizing
articulation. So too were the evident stereotypes Sulzer and his colleagues held with
regard to the people his program was helping. Sulzer stressed that the centers be informal
and publicly accessible—general stores, school gymnasiums, and volunteers’ homes were

6 Terry Birdwhistell, “WHAS Radio and the Development of Broadcasting in Kentucky, 1922-1942,”
(1981), Library Faculty and Staff Publications, University of Kentucky Libraries. WHAS radio is a clear
channel station and is granted a more powerful signal than most radio stations, though in the years of its
early operation many other radio stations broadcasted with similarly high power. Communities as far as
Breathitt County, Kentucky (in eastern Kentucky, over 150 miles away) were able to receive transmissions
from Louisville.
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typical sites—but they were moreover intended to be controlled, programmatic
environments for participants. Center directors, each handpicked by Sulzer as
“invariably a man of intelligence and a leader in his community,” would locally promote
the station’s benefits, record participant activity, and ensure that radio dials were set to
university-approved programs at certain times. In writing about the centers for an
academic volume on the use of radio in educational settings, Sulzer included such center
director reports as “radio helps to enlarge the restricted mental horizons of these people.
Most of them have no idea of modern ways of living and farming. To a large extent, the
outside world is a foreign country to them.”7 Those involved in the listening center
program may have acted out of a desire to improve educational opportunities in
underserved areas, but at times their enthusiasm for the new medium translated into
condescension for the people they meant to help.
Whatever misgivings the program directors may have had about listening center
participants, the program achieved remarkable success and popularity in the 1930s and
40s, and during World War II especially. By 1938, the fifth year of the program, Sulzer
reported to a radio journal that 26 centers were operating in eastern Kentucky, with “over
100 applications on file” requesting new centers. In 1943, the University’s student
newspaper, the Kentucky Kernel, reported the number of centers at 78, noting that
participating townships and counties could ensure that “no one will have to travel more

7 Elmer G. Sulzer, “The Listening-Center Plan in Kentucky,” in Josephine H. MacLatchy, ed., Education
on the Air (No. 5, 1934), 148-149. One notable center director was Alice Lloyd, who hosted a center for
Pippa Passes and Knott County at the Caney Creek Community Center. Lloyd remains a renowned figure
today in higher and continuing education, and the Caney Creek Center would eventually be named after
her. Her service was not without its own share of detractors, and her reports on listening center activities
were similarly problematic. For more on Alice Lloyd and Caney Creek, see P. David Searles, A College
for Appalachia: Alice Lloyd on Caney Creek (University Press of Kentucky, 1995).
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than three miles to reach them.”8 Center directors also reported that while participants
had the option of listening to popular commercial broadcasts at certain times, the
educational segments produced by the University were also received favorably. Many of
the educational programs were straightforward lectures delivered by faculty, but Sulzer
aimed to incorporate topics that local Kentuckians would find applicable, or perhaps even
entertaining. Thus, over several visits to the center, listeners might have heard political
scientist J.B. Shannon explain the benefits and drawbacks of the Tennessee Valley
Authority and its applicability in eastern Kentucky waterways, or perhaps a music and
folk theater variety hour produced by John Jacob Niles, UK’s nationally celebrated
musicologist of Appalachian folk ballads and songs.9
Sulzer discontinued the listening center program in 1948, observing that the prices
of radio sets and the difficulty in acquiring them in eastern Kentucky had leveled off to
an agreeable rate for most consumers. But the memory of this Appalachian program, its
popularity and essential philosophy, were what inspired Leonard Press to campaign for a
statewide network of educational television. He learned of the centers while researching
for a radio program on Appalachian folk music, observing firsthand how useful the
centers had been when he visited Lotts Creek Community School near Hazard, to record
music for that program. He and Lillian became close friends with Alice Slone, the
school’s founder and director, and later recalled that “in my many visits over the next few

8 Elmer G. Sulzer, “The Story of Kentucky’s Famed ‘Mountain Listening Centers,’” Rural Radio (April
1938), Box 9, Kevin Parks Early Country Music Research Collection, Berea College Special Collections
Library; “More Centers for Listening Now On Tap,” Kentucky Kernel, July 2, 1943, accessed via
University of Kentucky Special Collections website, exploreuk.uky.edu.
9 J.B. Shannon, “Kentucky in National and Regional Planning,” Lecture Series Transcript, March 1-April
12, 1937, Folder 15, Box 9, WHAS Radio Scripts Collection, University of Kentucky Special Collections
Library; John Jacob Niles, “Salute to the Hills,” Script No. 1, June 1, 1938, Folder 1, Box 10, WHAS Radio
Scripts Collection, University of Kentucky Special Collections Library.
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years, I was exposed to the intractable limitations of schooling in the mountains.” Of
these, the most evident to him were “the difficulty of finding and holding qualified
teachers, of getting children to school and in keeping them there, and of raising money to
support the schools the state could not or would not.” A full-fledged public network of
educational television, in his view, “could, like the old radio listening centers, deliver the
best educational resources in the state and nation, and indeed, in the world—not only to
eastern Kentucky but to all schools in the commonwealth.”10

Early Appeals
The initial inspiration for Kentucky’s network may have been based on a general
program where viewers of all ages and educational backgrounds could find something of
value and interest, but classroom-specific instructional TV was in vogue during the
network’s formative years, and this paradigm held sway with many of KET’s earliest
advocates. Prior to KET’s activation, much of the northern half of Kentucky fell in range
of the MPATI broadcasts, but the state’s first ETV operation came in its largest city.
Jefferson County Public Schools, which oversees most of the Louisville metropolitan
area, reserved one educational channel following the FCC’s channel freeze and was a
recipient of Ford Foundation support. The district’s superintendent, Richard Van Hoose,
would later join Press and the other early advocates for a statewide network.
Van Hoose recalled a rousing speech by Frieda Hennock—ETV’s fiercest
proponent among the FCC commissioners in the early 1950s—as his moment of
inspiration for the new medium in Kentucky. Reserving the channel and budgeting for

10 Press, The KET Story, 13.
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technical equipment took several years of wrangling among city and school board
officials, but Van Hoose had assurances from Alexander J. Stoddard, Ford’s educational
adviser, that Jefferson County would receive high-quality ETV programming. Jefferson
County’s educational network went live in 1958, and as with many other early ETV
stations, the first programs were produced with support and consultation from colleagues
in the area’s commercial television industry. The NBC affiliate donated studio space and
production assistance prior to the completion of Jefferson County’s local network. Van
Hoose regularly extolled the benefits of ETV in the school district’s newsletter, Your
Jefferson County Schools, writing that with each passing year, ETV development
proceeded “with better organization and planning along with better teaching.” It was still
new and by no means perfect, Van Hoose cautioned, but he was certain that ETV was
“highly effective” and was “ushering in a new era of electronics in education.”11
A goal for ETV commonly invoked by Van Hoose and Stoddard throughout the
creation of Jefferson County’s network was the “redeployment of teachers.” Like the “InSchool TV Experiment” then also underway in North Carolina’s network, Jefferson
County drew from Ford Foundation funds on the premise that local schoolteachers were
overworked due to ballooning class sizes. Ford-supported TV instruction in both North
Carolina and Jefferson County focused on reimagining classroom space by using TV
instruction in larger rooms with more students, but Jefferson County’s program also
focused on the notion of “team-teaching,” or coordination in curricular development,

11 Richard Van Hoose to Robert H. Hillenmeyer, March 14, 1986, letter reprinted in Press, The KET Story,
16; Richard Van Hoose, oral history conducted 1975 by Jerry Paul Perry, 2003 OH 086, Kentucky
Educational Television Oral History Project; Richard Van Hoose, “Faith in Educational Television Has
Paid Off,” Your Jefferson County Schools 3 (no. 3, November 1959), 2, folder titled “Correspondence
1960” box 2, Kentucky Educational Television (KET) Records, 1960-1976, Eastern Kentucky University
Special Collections and Archives (hereinafter KET Records 1960-1976).
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between the studio and classroom teachers. Looking collectively at Jefferson County,
WUNC-TV, and all other grant recipients from the Fund for the Advancement of
Education, one Ford publication concluded that “the use of television in teaching large
classes has enabled [schools] to serve more students with the able teachers already on
their staffs” and also to “get along with fewer new teachers than they otherwise might
need.”12 Such findings would make ETV very attractive to school boards and
superintendents burdened by increasing class sizes and strained budgets.

Figure 4: Experimental Television Course in Jefferson County, Kentucky

12 “Teaching by Television: A Report from the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Advancement of
Education,” (New York: 1959), 13.
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The Jefferson County Superintendent’s office was certainly aware of teachers’
suspicions that ETV would eventually automate or nullify the role of an in-person
instructor. Like the efforts MPATI made toward coordination between “studio teachers”
and their in-person colleagues, the county school newsletter stressed that the televised
lesson plans had been developed “cooperatively” between representatives from various
schools, program producers, and the teachers who would appear in the broadcasts. In
addressing the long-term effects of this arrangement, however, Van Hoose’s newsletter
offered a rather ambiguous response that likely did little to assuage his employee’s fears.
One column began with the issue plainly stated: “Does educational television mean a
change in the role of the classroom teacher?” To this, the columnist replied “perhaps.”
Moreover, newsletter columns stressed that fears of television sets replacing the personal
and nourishing contact between a classroom teacher were unfounded. Above all the
television lectures were meant to ease the labor of classroom teachers, give them more
time to interact with students and plan meaningful assignments, and cope with the influx
of young baby boomers.13
Advocates for the statewide network essentially argued along these same lines.
The cohort of Van Hoose, Press, and other interested businessmen and UK faculty scored
their first major convert in Governor Bert Combs. Born in Clay County, in eastern
Kentucky, Combs is often credited as a transformational figure in Kentucky politics,
carrying the state’s Democratic party from the older New Deal-era liberalism into a more

13 “2 Teachers—One In The Studio, One In A Classroom—Are A Team,” Your Jefferson County Schools
3 (no. 3, November 1959), 3, folder titled “Correspondence 1960” box 2, KET Records 1960-1976; “Both
The Studio And Classroom Teacher Have Responsibilities,” and “Exchange of Ideas Spreads,” Your
Jefferson County Schools 4 (no. 3, December 1960), 2, folder titled “Correspondence 1960” box 2, KET
Records 1960-1976.
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progressive program. Combs had an acute focus on the state’s struggling education
system, and the 3 percent sales tax he secured for the state (the first of its kind) went
largely into funds for education improvements. These included a 115 percent increase in
the state’s overall education budget, pay raises of around 20 percent for Kentucky’s
teachers, and an ambitious school building and consolidation campaign.14 Combs would
later recall of his first meeting with Press, Stewart, and Taylor on the topic of a statewide
ETV network that he was more than a little skeptical about the whole idea. “I had a lot of
problems at the time,” Combs told attendees of an anniversary celebration for KET
twenty years later, “especially concerning education.” “The last thing I needed,” he said,
reflecting on the many serious issues affecting the state’s schools, “was some fella who
wanted to talk about educational television.”15 Numerous influential interests had
affected governors’ decisions about Kentucky education for decades, and despite the
growing popularity of ETV nationwide, it still faced an uphill battle in the state as the
sixties began.
Conventional wisdom in the improvement of state education held that initiatives
like consolidation, building construction, pupil transportation, and teacher tenure were
the more prudent solution for struggling schools, particularly in the sparsely populated
districts of eastern Kentucky. This was the opinion of a study submitted to Combs by the
professional management consulting firm Booz, Allen, and Hamilton in 1961. Historian
Tracy Steffes has observed how the strategies of consolidation and new school plants
held considerable sway in rural education reform from the early twentieth century

14 John Ed Pearce, “Foreword” in Robinson, George W., ed. The Public Papers of Governor Bert T.
Combs: 1959-1963 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1979), xx-xxi.
15 Bert T. Combs, address to KET Advisory Committee, reprinted in Press, The KET Story, 29.
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onward.16 Elsewhere in 1960, a legislative committee chaired by Representative Harry
Caudill of Whitesburg, who served in the legislature just prior to becoming a nationally
celebrated historian and journalist of the Appalachian region, conducted a similar study
of the state’s education system. In a characteristically Caudill-esque polemic, the
committee’s report called for sweeping changes to the administrative structure of school
districts and county oversight, singling out the endemic corruption and
“maladministration” of funds in the eastern Kentucky county of Carter as emblematic of
the state’s inefficiencies. Caudill would later profile the “near indigent” state of rural
schools in Kentucky leading up to 1960 in Watches of the Night (1976).17
Press recalls Combs’s skepticism about the necessity of an ETV network at the
start of their first meeting, but he found that the Governor became a quick convert to the
idea. Combs had seen the progress made by Richard Van Hoose and Jefferson County in
their ETV operations, and Press notes that Combs was “more than receptive to the
possibility of extending the educational benefits Louisville seemed to be reaping with
ETV to the rest of the state, and especially to his own Eastern Kentucky.”18 The
“education governor” Combs would extol the benefits of ETV and Kentucky’s need for a
network in public addresses throughout his term, often mentioning it explicitly as a vital
tool for improving the state’s education system. Speaking to the Kentucky Development

16 Booz, Allen & Hamilton, “Program and Evaluation Study of Selected Aspects of Kentucky School
Education,” abridged edition (October 1961); Tracy L. Steffes, “Solving the ‘Rural School Problem’: New
State Aid, Standards, and Supervision of Local Schools, 1900-1933,” History of Education Quarterly 48,
No. 2 (May, 2008), 181-220.
17 “Report of Special Committee to Investigate Education to the House of Representatives of the Kentucky
General Assembly,” (Frankfort, KY: Legislative Research Council, March 10, 1960), 4, box 89, folder
1443, John D. Whisman Papers, University of Kentucky Special Collections Library; Harry M. Caudill,
Watches of the Night, reprint (Ashland, Ky.: Jesse Stuart Foundation, 2010), 205.
18 Press, The KET Story, 29.
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Council, he listed the need to “mobilize and use the resources of television” right
alongside the need for “well-trained, well-paid” teachers in his drive to “make it possible
for every child in Kentucky to attend school in a modern classroom.” In an address to the
state legislature on the issue of district reapportionment, Combs praised his colleagues for
their support of ETV, affirming that “the educational television program authorized by
this assembly will soon supplement classroom instruction and give more modern
educational methods to our boys and girls.”19 Kentucky’s constitution at the time
prohibited governors from seeking consecutive terms, but Combs remained an adamant
supporter of a Kentucky ETV network well after his time in office had expired.
Kentucky’s first major step toward a state network came in the form of a research
group commissioned by the legislature in 1960 to determine how Kentuckians could best
incorporate ETV into its education system with regards to feasibility and access. The
resulting report called for coverage as ambitious as what Combs, Press, and Van Hoose
had each envisioned for the network, and the document was widely circulated as a
manifesto of sorts for the campaign to obtain that wide-ranging network. Edward Schten,
an education and political science scholar working in the Wisconsin extension service,
was tabbed to author the report. Schten’s finished work avoided the high-flown
enthusiasm and boosterism that had characterized discourse around ETV in the previous
decade, preferring concise and straightforward statements on how Kentucky could
reasonably use ETV based on the trials and tribulations witnessed by ETV practitioners
in other areas around Kentucky and its neighbors.

19 “Kentucky Development Council,” and “Extraordinary Session of The Kentucky General Assembly,” in
Robinson, ed. The Public Papers of Governor Bert T. Combs, 437 (first quotation), 63 (second quotation).
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Schten observed three urban-based ETV operations that served Kentucky schools
by 1960: Jefferson County, Kentucky; Cincinnati, OH (and by extension, the Northern
Kentucky cities of Covington and Newport); and Evansville, Indiana, along the Ohio
River near western Kentucky. Other cities and schools in Kentucky used ETV programs
that originated in stations in adjacent states, but Schten selected these three for how their
respective strengths could be adapted to a network in Kentucky. Praise was lavished on
Jefferson County for its “redeployment of teachers” model, though Schten preferred to
think of the idea as “television as a teacher aide.” Teachers in the county interviewed by
Schten had apparently taken to the new arrangement, as they had found more time to
spend interacting with students than they had previously, even as enrollments and class
sizes rose. Similarly favorable community and school support was reported in the
Evansville system, known officially as the Southwestern Indiana Educational Television
Council, which included Daviess County (KY) School District as one of its members.
The network was appreciated for its apparent contributions to increased test scores among
participating students, but it served also as a model of cooperative effort initiated by the
school districts in the area rather than a centralized authority in Evansville or
Indianapolis. The Cincinnati area was especially favorable to its station, WCET, since
they had been one of the first established noncommercial television stations in the nation.
They thus had the most experience in what types of programs served the area most
effectively, and respondents truly considered WCET a community institution since it
broadcast programs for both school and home viewing.20

20 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3” (Frankfort, Ky.: Legislative Research
Commission, 1961), 20-26.
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For all the evidence of ETV’s positive benefits in Kentucky’s cities by 1960,
however, Schten posed Nebraska’s ETV network as the most applicable model for
Kentucky’s consideration, because the Cornhusker State was so dominated by sparsely
popular rural areas and farmland.21 The more serious need Schten observed in Kentucky
was the disparity between urban and rural school performance, and since the majority of
school districts in Kentucky were in more rural areas, the state’s ETV system should
primarily be conceived as a means of improving education in those areas. A large portion
of the report offered a litany of the issues facing under-resourced schools in rural parts of
Kentucky, each of which Schten felt could be directly improved with the introduction of
an ETV network. He maintained the same philosophy of localism seen in the previous
chapter among members of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters: where
in spite of the broad reach of television programs, some attention was still very necessary
toward local program specialization. In Schten’s view, the “concentration of population,
availability of resources adaptable to television instruction, and relatively unified
administration of schools” in urban areas tended to make “adjustments to televised
instruction easier in Cincinnati than in an area of dispersed population and fragmented
school administration.” Furthermore, he felt, not all rural areas in Kentucky needed the
same types of instruction. Scores on standardized tests in the state were sorted by regions
designated as “mountain,” or others that were simply “rural,” and Schten observed of this
divide: “what interests persons in Harlan County may not interest people in Hart
County.”22

21 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 28.
22 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 24, 33.
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Kentucky’s rural areas, mountain or otherwise, may not have been as sparsely
populated as those of Nebraska—40 percent of Kentucky’s high schools had fewer than
150 pupils, while over 70 percent of Nebraska’s had that level of enrollment—but Schten
nonetheless envisioned numerous ways ETV could aid Kentucky’s rural districts. For
instance, compared to the increased enrollments in Louisville and the need there for
“redeployment of teachers,” rural counties and “mountain” counties especially, struggled
with hiring and keeping qualified teachers and permanent outmigration of the families of
those teachers’ pupils. Schten found that below-average teacher salaries were more
common in rural districts, and while those districts had plenty of teachers with above
average qualifications, rural districts did bear a disproportionately high number of the
state’s teachers with below-average qualifications.23 An ETV service, Schten reasoned,
would not only offer teachers in rural areas the same labor-saving benefits as Jefferson
County teachers had seen, as well as the same space for collaboration and collegiality, but
it would also offer an in-service training network that put teachers and administrators of
all types of district on an equal footing.24
Ill-equipped teachers and steadily declining tax revenues due to outmigration of
families from rural districts translated, in Schten’s view, to a diminished educational
experience for students who remained in those schools and graduated from them. He
cited poor test scores to illustrate this process, but moreover he framed the issue as an
indictment of the state for not adequately providing for its pupils, rather than disparaging
the rural students themselves. “No evidence exists,” he insisted, to say that “Kentucky

23 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 12-13.
24 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 18.
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students are any less intelligent or capable of learning than students in other areas.” It was
plain to him that “rural and small-town Kentucky students need help in gaining
educational opportunity equal to their urban counterparts,” and ETV would be an
effective means of “bring[ing] to them things that they could not otherwise see or know.”
Schten’s thinking on ETV belied a clear strain of technocratic utopianism, much like that
observed by historian Katie Day Good in her study of visual educational media in the
early twentieth century, and could easily be lumped in with contemporary fanciful visions
of classrooms as part of the “global village.” Yet for all the gleaming possibilities the
report Schten attributed to a potential Kentucky ETV network, he maintained a sober
focus on the fact that schools in the commonwealth were inherently unequal, and that
television offered a chance to, at least partially, correct the course of the state’s education
policy.25
There remained, however, the question of how to deliver educational television to
rural Kentuckians, a question that bore directly on how much the state would have to pay
for a network, but more specifically on the cost of providing ETV to every school and
home in the state. Other states’ networks had claimed that their programs could be
accessed statewide, but Kentucky’s advocates were not convinced that these methods
would adequately address the needs of their state. Their vision of statewide access
presented considerable problems, based on demographic and geographic conditions in the
state, and in eastern Kentucky specifically, as Schten noted in his commission report.
South Carolina’s closed-circuit system loomed large in the industry, since every school in

25 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 16: Katie Day Good, Bring the World to
the Child: Technologies of Global Citizenship in American Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 2020), 198.
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the state was included in the cable-network design and could receive multiple channels of
educational programming simultaneously. It had, however, marks against it for the sheer
expenditure the legislature had committed to the project, and for the fact that production
was so centralized with little mechanisms for input from local schools. Other states like
Alabama and Florida had open-circuit television broadcasts available throughout most of
their territory, but Schten observed difficulties among them with distributing programs
produced in one part of the state with another. Florida relied on “bicycling,” or the hand
delivery of tapes and films between different stations. Alabama used microwave links (as
WUNC-TV would later use as well) but had frustrated local districts by the imposed
course schedules schools would have to follow in order to use the network.26
Schten and other advocates for a Kentucky network insisted on an open-circuit
broadcast network, knowing that this option would present costs greater than any state
had ever committed in providing ETV. The main difficulty was the persistent divide
between VHF and UHF capabilities in the channels then available to Kentucky. In the
case of WUNC-TV examined earlier, where the FCC’s redistribution of channel
arrangements yielded the Consolidated University a highly sought-after VHF channel,
that network could confidently carry their signal to a large amount of the state with only
one transmitter. Kentucky had almost no VHF channels in operation, commercial or
otherwise, and no chance of being granted any for an educational network. The state had
many unclaimed UHF frequencies available, but these had a shorter reach than VHF
stations and, as Schten pointed out, “the terrain in the area of desired coverage influences
cost significantly.” Central and western Kentucky would require a sizable amount of

26 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 32-33.
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transmitter equipment, but it was abundantly clear that configuring a system where all of
the mountains of eastern Kentucky received signal would come at great cost, since
“hilliness frequently results in the inaccessibility of desirable transmitter sites and can
raise construction costs considerably.” In no wise could Kentucky legislators who
received the report think of an ETV network as a “money-saver,” since it would clearly
involve a capital investment.27

Implementation
Tight as Kentucky’s coffers may have been in education funding, the advocates
for Kentucky’s network had reason for optimism as they witnessed a favorable rollout of
the plan following Schten’s report. The Legislative Research Commission presented its
findings in Frankfort in 1961. Combs heralded the ETV plan late that year in his biennial
budget address for 1962-1964, and in early ’62 the authorization proceeded fairly
smoothly in the legislature. Press recalled in his memoir two notable obstacles to passage
of the ETV legislation. While the “imprimatur” of Combs’ approval gave the bill a
speedy hearing in the state House of Representatives, the state Senate process was held
up briefly by the opposition of Senator Nick Johnson, a Republican of Harlan County. In
discussing the bill, the Senator produced statistics of all school facilities in Kentucky that
were still operating with outdoor privies and without indoor plumbing, to which he
questioned (reasonably) whether the state had its priorities for school improvement in
order. “Educational television,” he argued before the Senate, “should be forgotten until
adequate indoor plumbing facilities area available in all parts of the state.” Johnson’s

27 “Educational Television for Kentucky: Research Report No. 3,” 34.
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concern about the dignity of basic school amenities may have been genuine and justified,
but since his public opposition was grounded on the image of toilets, his stance earned
him little more than a few chuckles from the Frankfort press while the bill proceeded
unscathed to the Governor’s desk.28
The more significant obstacle the ETV legislation cleared was the established
education bureaucracy within state government. Press recounts in his memoir a tense
meeting between him, Combs, and the stalwart figure of postwar Kentucky politics,
Wendell P. Butler, who had managed to overcome the constitutional prohibition on
successive terms in office by alternating between Superintendent of Public Instruction
and Commissioner of Agriculture for over a decade. Provisions for the ETV bill
specified that the network would operate independently of Public Instruction, but Combs
nonetheless asked Butler (then Superintendent) if he could redirect 50 thousand dollars of
education funds to help start the network. Butler and Combs came from different wings
of the hotly contested Kentucky Democratic Party, but in spite of all electoral
machinations, Butler himself had scraped and campaigned all the previous decade for
expanded education funding, and begrudgingly agreed. He would later be granted a seat
in the inaugural Kentucky Authority for Educational Television, the overseeing
committee for network operations, where he and his successors would continue to
negotiate the ties between ETV and the state’s public schools.29

28 Press, The KET Story, 40-41; “Gov. Combs Okays Educational TV Network,” Kentucky Kernel,
February 23, 1962.
29 William E. Ellis, A History of Education in Kentucky (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky,
2011), 248; Press, The KET Story, 40.
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One major difficulty the state authority group encountered was the selection,
purchase, and development of transmitter sites for the proposed network. What seemed a
fairly routine process for commercial television license operators, or educational
broadcasters working in urban, well-populated areas, was fairly arduous for Kentucky
ETV proponents. Specific channels had been reserved by the FCC for general regions of
the state, but to achieve statewide coverage the Authority had to identify transmitter sites
that would yield the best possible range of transmission for sparsely populated and
geographically diverse areas. Much of this work fell to Press’s colleague Ronald
Stewart, the professor of communications technology at the University of Kentucky.
As a native of the mountains of eastern Kentucky, Stewart was intimately familiar
with the ways terrain could inhibit clear transmission of radio signals. In the time that he
could spare while teaching a full course load at the university, he traveled throughout the
state and almost single-handedly mapped out precise locations for the transmitters, work
he would later describe as “a labor of love.” Reflecting in a later interview on the
assurances he received from the FCC while mapping out the sites that Kentucky’s UHF
frequencies were functionally equal to VHF in terms of range and signal strength, Stewart
would describe this opinion as “bullshit.” Communities throughout Kentucky, he was
sure, would find once the network was activated that the theoretical signal range the FCC
predicted would not reliably reach their home sets.30 Such areas—mountainous ones in
particular—would likely require a number of signal repeater devices or additional

30 Ronald Stewart, oral history conducted 1976 by Jerry Paul Perry, 1981 OH 085, Kentucky Educational
Television Oral History Project, Eastern Kentucky University Special Collections Library.

145

channel reservations entirely: an expense Schten had not fully accounted for in his report
to the legislature.
Nonetheless, the Authority received from Stewart detailed plans for where and
how network components needed to be placed, and they faced the task of presenting to
lawmakers in late 1962 an even higher cost estimate than had been previously approved.
Roy Owsley, an insurance company owner from Louisville and friend to Combs,
presented a report to the Governor that frankly detailed the additional expenses. All told,
Owsley’s report showed that the network would require an additional two million dollars
over what Schten had estimated, about a 33 percent increase from the initial estimate.
Owsley softened this blow by offering some alternatives the state could pursue, namely a
program of phasing in transmitter installations as the state was able to pay for them. This
option was essentially the same route taken by North Carolina’s network. Kentucky
could provide a few cities with ETV stations—potentially a sample of cities that would
provide basic services to the eastern, central, and western portions of the state—and add
new operations gradually.
Owsley was magnanimous with regard to the state’s budget concerns, but he
strongly emphasized the Authority’s position that the network should be made available
to all schools and homes from day one. “Kentucky is in a position of leadership in this
matter,” the report stressed: “no other state has so comprehensive a plan nor one so well
coordinated from the beginning.” Furthermore, “acceptance of educational television
throughout the Commonwealth,” the Authority noted, “depends on its availability
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throughout the Commonwealth.”31 The report also noted that numerous sources of federal
assistance to the state could reduce the expense, including the Educational Television
Facilities Act of that year, designed to aid states in this very endeavor.
The necessity the Owsley report posited--widespread availability of ETV from the
outset to ensure its acceptance--would grow into a mantra for the Authority in the coming
years, but likely a much more serious one than they had originally expected. The
bonhomie Press and his colleagues had found within the Combs administration, and the
assurances by Combs that all branches of the state government were proceeding full
steam toward an ETV network, would both give way to a more tenuous situation with the
next governor. 1963 saw Press, Stewart, and other members of the Authority finagling
through bureaucratic hoops to secure transmitter sites, FCC channel applications, and as
much federal matching funds as Kentucky could possibly receive. That year was also
Kentucky’s gubernatorial election year, and Democrats would retain the office but hand it
off to Edward T. “Ned” Breathitt. Press recalls a feeling of optimism derived from the
campaign, as Breathitt stated that he was favorable to the ETV project and would
continue it.32 He would find, however, that those campaign endorsements from Breathitt
were largely empty promises.
Historian William Ellis writes of Breathitt’s campaign that it was largely oriented
around the novel sales tax Combs had introduced in his administration. Breathitt
supported it, but had a tenuous position in doing so, since both his Democratic primary
challenger, A.B. “Happy” Chandler, and his Republican opponent, Louis B. Nunn, felt

31 “Owsley Report,” May 1, 1962, 8-12, folder titled “Correspondence May-August 1962” box 2, KET
Records 1960-1976.
32 Press, The KET Story, 61.
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the sales tax should be nixed. As Governor, Breathitt highlighted many of the same
educational crises and needs as Combs had done, but he tended to view education as a
component of the larger goal of economic development, and thus he felt that a more
business-like shrewdness and tighter budgets could be applied to education funding. In
his inaugural address he reported that the new state tax revenues had “made possible
unusual progress,” but that the new resources gained from the new tax structure could
only be used “in accordance with priorities…which promise the greater dividends in
human and economic process.”33 Breathitt would later be lauded for his work in
dismantling Kentucky’s segregation codes, but Ellis observes that at the same time the
governor’s education budget caused “rancor” at the state house, due primarily to
teachers’ accusation of insufficient expansion of their benefits. Amid these debates, ETV
simply didn’t seem as urgent an issue to the new administration.34
The ETV program in Kentucky was not halted entirely, however. More cynical
observers of Kentucky politics would recall similar instances of outgoing governors
launching ambitious projects, only to leave the burden of funding to their successors.35
Breathitt also felt simply that activating the network within the first year of his term was
hasty. Press’s memoir included an Associated Press report on the delay, which found that
“Breathitt said he likes the program, but it’s one that can be delayed since many school

33 Ellis, A History of Education in Kentucky, 298; “Inaugural Address,” in Harrell, Kenneth, E. ed. The
Public Papers of Governor Edward T. Breathitt: 1963-1967 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of
Kentucky, 1984), 7.
34 Ellis, A History of Education in Kentucky,298.
35 Edward Prichard, oral history conducted 1980 by Jerry Paul Perry, 1981 OH 080, Kentucky Educational
Television Oral History Project. Prichard, a wily but astute figure in Kentucky and national Democratic
politics, had this cynical view of Combs leaving the bill to Breathitt, and observed that such had been the
game among Kentucky governors and other officeholders for generations.
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districts are not yet prepared yet to use TV instruction in classrooms.” This was a bitter
pill to swallow for the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television, since they knew
that a handful of ETV networks had operated in Kentucky communities for years, and
that the experience of these schools was integral to the ETV authorization already passed
by the legislature. What would have been particularly galling for the Authority, however,
was the nonchalant impression Breathitt’s quote in the article gave: “since the program
hasn’t started, it can be phased in over a longer period of time.”36 All the entreaties that
Press, Owsley, and Van Hoose had made to Combs in the previous years about the need
for immediate and full coverage for the network to be at all useful seemed to have been
wasted.
Undeterred, the Authority resolved in their annual report of 1963-1964 to address
these areas where they felt Breathitt was mistaken. They also set their eyes on 1966, the
next meeting of Kentucky’s biennial legislature, as the point where they could make an
airtight case to lawmakers and Kentucky’s general population, regardless of the favor of
the governor one way or the other, that the state had a definite need for educational
television. “While there is no question,” the annual report noted, that “the additional time
provided by this delay can be used to good advantage in explaining the program and
utilization, it also poses the problem of maintaining momentum.” Denied its first chance
at activation, the Authority knew that lawmakers could easily justify putting it off again
two years later, and so they committed themselves to assiduously convincing
Kentuckians of the benefits of ETV. “This means proceeding on several fronts with an
information and orientation program,” the report reasoned:

36 Press, The KET Story, 62.
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It means working with and through influence leaders, lay and professional. It
means reaching and explaining the program to as many citizens as possible and
then enlisting their aid as individuals and through such organizations as they
might be associated with.37
Thus 1964 and 1965 were the crucial years in which Press and his colleagues in the
Authority hustled to gain support for the suspended network. Press recalls those years as
“personally energizing…I traveled the state, talked with community leaders, legislators,
school administrators, teachers, civic clubs and whoever else would listen.” Speaking
tours would be an effective strategy, but there were many other means at the Authority
would put to use.
One such resource was Bill Ladd, television critic for the Louisville Courier
Journal. In between standard critical takes on major networks’ specials and regular
programming, Ladd gave ample praise in his column for national developments in ETV,
as well as updates on ETV stations in Kentucky and adjacent states. His advocacy for
ETV in the state’s most circulated newspaper earned him seats in both the Kentucky
Authority for Educational Television and the advisory committee for MPATI. He used
his insider knowledge from both to extol the benefits of ETV to Kentuckians broadly
while the rest of the Authority endeavored on the ground to build support for the network.
When word came that Governor Breathitt’s first budget had eliminated startup funds for
the network, Ladd wrote with pithy cynicism in his “TV Almanac” column that “those of
us who regard school television as a tremendous educational tool were disappointed,
although hardly surprised.” The scope of the state’s proposed network, Ladd admitted,
was daunting (“more ambitious than any other,” in his estimation) but he felt readers

37 “Annual Report of the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television, 1963-1964,” box 10, KET
Records 1960-1976.
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should not lose faith in what “the great equalizer” of ETV could still accomplish for
Kentucky’s education system. Press would later praise Ladd in his memoir for “beating
the drum for ETV with spirited regularity.”38
Ladd insisted in his columns on the necessity of immediate statewide coverage
rather than gradual implementation—“the original plan is the right one,” he assured, “and
it is not all bad that there is a delay.”39 He affirmed his Authority colleagues’ mantra that
“those who need it most are often the last to get it,” and devoted space to highlighting the
benefits of ETV around the state and region. This reporting had congruent work done by
members of the Authority in the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television
Newsletter, a “more or less quarterly” account of progress on raising funds and support
for the network, as well as editorials demonstrating what ETV was then already
accomplishing in Kentucky.
The Appalachian underpinnings in the network’s rationale were again on display
in the Authority’s newsletter articles on the present use of ETV in Kentucky’s schools,
with such headlines in consecutive issues reading “Harlan County Schools Using ETV,”
and “TV Modern Math Serving Eastern Kentucky.” In Harlan’s school system, it was
reported, over half the students in the county were observed using at least one ETV
program regularly throughout the week, mostly from the University of Tennessee-

38 Bill Ladd, “TV Almanac: ETV Fund Loss Is Disappointing; Plan Right,” Louisville Courier-Journal,
Feb. 10, 1964; Press, The KET Story, 28. Ladd, furthermore, was no Pollyanna in his ETV columns. His
credentials as a television critic were never withheld as he wrote about ETV programming, and while he
could appreciate the benefits of classroom instruction programs during the day, he would also criticize ETV
producers’ evening programs for their apparent erudition. In one column (May 2, 1965) he quoted
comedian Stan Freberg, saying “there is hope for the great mass of viewers on ETV channels, if ‘there is
something between ‘I’m Dickens—He’s Fenster’ [an ABC sitcom] and ‘An Explanation of the Nervous
System’ in the way of programming.’”
39 Ladd, “TV Almanac: ETV Fund Loss Is Disappointing; Plan Right.”
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affiliated station in Knoxville. “Modern Math” referred to a program produced by
Marshall University’s local station that was incorporated into the curriculum of schools in
nearby Ashland, Kentucky. A National Defense Education Act-sponsored grant had
covered the cost of TV equipment in Harlan’s classrooms, but the newsletter found that
the signal received in the mountains from faraway Knoxville was less than ideal. Still,
the article concluded, “they do feel that the University of Tennessee Metropolitan
Council sponsored programs are giving their children many experiences that they would
not otherwise have had.”40 This kind of appeal was a well-worn but effective trope for
benevolent organizations working in the mountains. What kind of genuine, educationminded reader could refuse such a plea?
The studies collected and printed in the Authority’s newsletter were put to use in
orientations and seminars held across the state in 1964 and 1965, as was a promotional
booklet titled “Kentucky Educational Television” and circulated statewide. Press and
other members took any opportunity to drive across the state and deliver their
presentation on how Kentucky could best implement ETV and why the commonwealth
needed to do so as soon as possible. Much like MPATI had done a few years earlier with
its local conventions, the Authority organized 13 “Area ETV Councils” that served as
workshops and open fora for concerned families, teachers, school administrators, and
anyone else that might want to take part. The presentations at the area councils primarily
expanded on the basic information found in the “Kentucky Educational Television”

40 “Harlan County Schools Using ETV,” Kentucky Authority for Educational Television Newsletter, No. 3
(Winter, 1964), 1; “TV Modern Math Serving Eastern Kentucky,” Kentucky Authority for Educational
Television Newsletter, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), 1, both articles available folder “September-December 1965,”
box 3, KET Records 1960-1976.
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pamphlet, which briefly outlined the many benefits the network could offer. These
included: “enriched and extended” primary and secondary educational services; inservice education for teachers; remedial services for high-school dropouts; technical
training for the unemployed; anti-illiteracy programming; arts and education for adults;
and a supplement to the extension information programs.41
Some of the response and criticism to promotional materials and presentations at
area councils seemed fairly intuitive and expected, while other voices raised issues the
Authority members were all too happy to explain or rectify. Richard Van Hoose’s
personal papers include a list of FAQs and some suggested responses. When asked about
the expense local schools could expect with a network, the Van Hoose’s notes stressed
that the network would operate only on the state budget’s expense, and that
supplementary course materials would be provided free of charge. “The only cost to the
schools,” the notes emphasized, “would be for receiver installations.” Another more
audacious challenge to the network came from an editorial segment on the CBS radio
affiliate, WOMI in Owensboro, in July of 1965. There the speaker observed that
Owensboro, along the Ohio River in western Kentucky, had been “by-passed” by the
planned network just like so many other state-sponsored projects had apparently done in
previous decades. The original transmitter layout, the Authority was quick to admit in its
response, had left Owensboro on a peripheral edge of more central stations in the

41 “Kentucky Educational Television” pamphlet, undated, p. 13, folder “May-August 1967,” box 3, KET
Records 1960-1976.
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network. They pledged to make sure the blind spot would be corrected, even if it meant
installing a new transmitter site directly adjacent to Owensboro.42
For the most part though, responses to the Authority’s promotion campaign came
mainly from teachers attending area council meetings, who, one council convener noted,
“had no exposure to any kind of television in the classroom…and needed to be told over
and over again that their jobs were not in danger.”43 Press recalled that attendance at the
meetings was surprisingly robust, and the exchange clearly yielded a firm support base
within the rank and file of the state’s education sector. The Kentucky Education
Association, the catch-all interest group for both teachers and administrators, had
endorsed the network by 1964, and Press notes in his memoir that the Authority’s
campaign galvanized the many in Parent Teacher Association circles who had expressed
interest in ETV previously. The central PTA office, the Kentucky Congress of Parents
and Teachers, made it a point to emphasize their endorsement of the network to
legislators and the governor, and in the fall of 1965 they concerted their grassroots energy
into a Kentucky Educational Television Week. A bulletin distributed to all PTA groups
in Kentucky announced that the week would require a “massive publicity campaign…to
explain ETV and its benefits to the people of Kentucky through television, radio,
newspapers, etc.” During the campaign, the bulletin continued, PTA-affiliated “citizens
and organizations will be encouraged to write the Governor, and their Legislators, and to
call or visit, to urge that the necessary appropriation be made to activate the Kentucky

42 “Questions and Answers,” undated, folder titled “May-August 1964,” box 2, KET Records 1960-1976;
“Radio Station Presents an Editorial of the Air on ‘A Familiar Pattern,’” July 24, 1965, folder titled “MayAugust 1965,” box 3, KET Records 1960-1976.
43 Press, The KET Story, 71. Press paraphrases Marvin O. Wrather, an administrator at Murray State
College (later Murray State University), who served as convener for the session.
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Educational Television Network.” Calls and letters sent to Frankfort notwithstanding, the
PTA campaign also submitted op-eds and letters to the editor in local papers all across
Kentucky.44
Governor Breathitt may have quietly impeded the network’s progress as he took
office, but his speeches and public comments gave the impression that he had been
behind it all the way. He would later say that his administration was acutely mindful of
its campaign promise of “no new taxes,” and meant to keep it if possible.45 He lent his
imprimatur to the 1964 promotional booklet that the Authority distributed widely during
their two-year campaign. The first page of the booklet featured a quote with his praises
for the proposed network, how “Kentucky is making all possible progress toward the goal
of a quality education for every child in the Commonwealth” and how the ETV network
“will hasten this progress by making outstanding educational support available to every
school in the state, rural and urban.” Curiously, Breathitt’s endorsement draws attention
away from the use of ETV in the classrooms, preferring to highlight the network’s
benefits for “out-of-school Kentuckians,” for whom the network could either provide
continuing-ed programs for the currently employed, or “basic education skills…to satisfy
the employment requirements of an automated age.”46 Other messages in the booklet
attested to the need for adult education, but Breathitt gave the clearest vision for how

44 List of resolutions and endorsements by various organizations, folder titled “January-April 1964,” box 2,
KET Records 1960-1976; “A Program to Persuade the Governor and the Legislature to Make An
Appropriation to Activate the Kentucky ETV Network During the 1966-1968 Biennium,” transcript of
bulletin included in Press, The KET Story, 262-263. The Kentucky Education Association, it should be
noted, did not then consider itself a teachers’ union. A few years later, in the Nunn administration,
Kentucky teachers would
45 Edward Breathitt, oral history conducted by Jerry Paul Perry, undated, 2003 OH 360, Kentucky
Educational Television Oral History Project.
46 “Kentucky Educational Television” pamphlet, undated, 1, folder titled “May-August 1967,” box 3, KET
Records 1960-1976.
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ETV could specifically contribute to personal educational attainment as a component of
economic development, as his campaign had emphasized so strongly.
The combination of grassroots and gubernatorial support signaled that the
network would likely have a favorable hearing in the upcoming meeting of the
legislature, but Press and the Authority still had to secure crucial external funds for the
construction of transmitters. Since no state had ever planned for such comprehensive
network coverage, leaving that expense entirely to Kentucky taxpayers would have been
viewed as a needless extravagance. As discussed previously with WUNC-TV, states
could rely on matching-fund support from the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) of up to one million dollars through the ETV Facilities Act of 1962, and
the Authority would certainly count on that support. The Appalachian Regional
Commission, another federal agency, has also been discussed for its efforts and
perspective toward ETV. However, while the ARC’s plans in 1966 for a regional
communications system through public radio and television were dismissed, they would
still contribute significantly to ETV operations in Appalachian states.
In the course of his early years of speaking and dealing with the inner circles of
Kentucky state government, Press had developed a friendship with John Whisman, who
had also climbed the ranks of an influential state agency. Since his beginnings with the
Junior Chamber of Commerce in the early 1950s, Whisman had been a steadfast advocate
for economic aid and development in eastern Kentucky and Appalachia in general,
authoring the reports that would eventually lay the foundations for the ARC’s “total
development” strategy. He had seen his efforts grow from a state commission under
acting Kentucky governor Harry Lee Waterfield in 1957, to a summit of all Appalachian
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states’ governors and President John F. Kennedy, to the establishment in 1965 of the
monumental ARC, for which he would serve as states’ co-chair.47 He would entertain
offers from MPATI and Westinghouse for a potential airborne network in Appalachia,
and would oversee the study and proposal for a ground-based, interconnected,
“Appalachian Communications System;” but Press recalls that Whisman was no less
interested in smaller ETV operations and their effects on mountain communities.
Press did not mince words in this regard. “Educational television was anything
but an ARC priority,” Press declared in his memoir, “until John Whisman decided that it
should be.” Whisman’s colleagues at the ARC’s Washington headquarters stipulated,
however, that no funds could be disbursed to stations outside the Commission’s
boundaries. These were welcome terms for Press and the Authority regardless, since
nearly half of their transmitters would be located within those boundaries.48 For each of
these, Whisman managed to secure matching funds from the ARC, which together would
amount roughly to a third of the total startup cost for KET. The ARC would later
highlight the grant given to Pikeville, Kentucky, for the city’s installation of a KET
transmitter as a success story in the Commission’s overall progress report. Other states in
the region would receive ARC support for network installation and expansion. These
included stations in Binghamton, New York, and Scranton, Pennsylvania, where the
Scranton Times-Tribune reported in 1968 that an “educational television ‘booster’
system” was needed to connect the mountain city to the state’s network and to “extend

47 Eller, Uneven Ground, 46-49.
48 Press, The KET Story, 108.
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reception to areas not now served.”49 The next chapter will turn to the ARC’s second and
more fruitful attempt at a region-wide system, but even in the absence of such a unified
network the Commission valued ETV as a genuine resource in its educational mission
enough to remain an instrumental supporter to smaller operations in and around its
boundaries.
Proposed matching funds for the network in general, however, did not resolve the
Kentucky Authority for Educational Television’s more immediate issue of purchasing
land for transmitters. Though the price tag for each site vetted by Ronald Stewart was
relatively small compared to the state’s other proposed network-related expenses, the
acquisition of land for this purpose had to be done with the meager operating budget
granted to the Authority in early 1964. Furthermore, the bureaucratic process of a state
agency purchasing parcels of land, no matter how small, in order to sell them back to a
different state agency, proved to be more frustrating and time-consuming than originally
anticipated. One private Kentucky company stepped in to aid Press and his colleagues by
purchasing most of the sites themselves and donating them to the state. It was a
seemingly small sum for one company to give compared to what major philanthropic
interests had disbursed over the previous two decades, but Press considered the land
donation by the charitable wing of the Ashland Oil Company as perhaps the most
decisive step in their campaign for a network.50

49 “Progress Report of the Appalachian Region Development Program,” (March 9, 1965-March 9, 1971),
p. 3, box 612, folder 9, Papers of the Appalachian Regional Commission, University of Kentucky Special
Collections Library; “Planners OK Financing for WSKG Stations,” Binghamton Press and Sun Bulletin,
September 25, 1978, 5; “Sentiment Grows That Area Cities Should Be Rated as Single Market,” Scranton
Times-Tribune, December 8, 1968, 26.
50 Press, The KET Story, 112-114. In a public groundbreaking ceremony for construction on the first
transmitter site, Press was quoted by the Courier Journal reporter as crediting the Blazer family as the
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Paul G. Blazer, chairman of Ashland Oil’s finance committee, and his niece
Lucile were fervent supporters of education and schools. Ashland Oil was headquartered
in the eastern Kentucky city of the same name, and there Lucile served, among many
other philanthropic endeavors, as chair of the eastern Kentucky Area ETV Council.
Though the Blazers generally supported the creation of a statewide network in Kentucky,
their special involvement resulted from the cancellation of Patterns in Arithmetic, the
same televised math program the Authority had highlighted in their state reports as
evidence of ETV’s effectiveness in the state’s schools. Lucile Blazer voiced the
frustration of the dozens of school systems that had signed on to the program, as her
foundation had helped equip schools to receive it. The Blazers approached the Authority
asking how to establish an independent ETV station in Ashland and, finding the cost to
be much more than the Oil Company’s charitable wing could commit, were persuaded
instead to donate the $30,000 or so needed to secure transmitter sites.51 In late 1965, Paul
Blazer notified Governor Breathitt of the plan, recognizing that the ETV network plan
had “tremendous potentialities” in his opinion: “especially in the grade schools of eastern
Kentucky, [which] are not adequately equipped and need as much aid as possible.” He
requested that Ashland’s proposal be given “no publicity,” but local newspapers covering
the purchase of the various sites and construction of transmitters precluded that
possibility.52

“vanguard” of the network. “TV Dream Comes Alive on Cold Ashland Hill,” Louisville Courier Journal,
November 20, 1967.
51 Press, The KET Story, 94.
52 Paul G. Blazer to Edward T. Breathitt, November 29, 1965, folder titled “September-December 1965,”
box 3, KET Records 1960-1976; “Blazer Foundation Donates Tract for Educational TV,” The AdvocateMessenger (Danville, Ky.), April 21, 1966, 3; “Blazer Foundation Gives Land for ETV Tower,” Louisville
Courier-Journal, Feb. 10, 1964, 18.
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In spite of the Blazer’s beneficence toward the state, it is regrettable that a part of
KET’s saving grace in the region came from a fossil fuel company. Though oil
extraction and refinement did not have the same painful legacy as that left by coal
operators, it still bespoke eastern Kentucky’s long history as an energy colony. The ETV
network’s survival depended, like so many other public television operations, on
philanthropic agencies extended from major corporations, with interests that range from
questionable to downright unjust. The Ford Foundation could at least point to some
degrees of administrative separation from the impact their parent industrial firm was
having on the societies the philanthropists were then trying to help, but fossil fuel
companies decrying the poor state of education in eastern Kentucky made for a
remarkable level of irony. This certainly occurred to Press in his memoir, as he also
noted that the transmitter site in the eastern city of Hazard was partially owned by the
Kentucky River Coal Company. Possibly to save some face amid the concurrent protests
over the company’s strip mining in eastern Kentucky, Kentucky River Coal also
supported the creation of one of the first Montessori schools in the state. Press felt that
KET had the last laugh in their liaison with the coal company however, since KET’s
support of independent filmmakers (mainly those residing at Appalshop in Whitesburg,
Kentucky) would figure into the downfall of the broad form deed, one of the coal
industry’s most harmful tools. That case will be addressed further in chapter five.53

53 Press, The KET Story, 111; Joan Kay, “Auction Will Aid New School,” Lousiville Courier-Journal,
May 10, 1966. For more on the mid-1960s protests against strip mining in eastern Kentucky, see Chad
Montrie, To Save The Land And People: A History of Opposition to Surface Mining in Appalachia (Chapel
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
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Activation
Going into the new budget session, ETV, as with any year, vied for support and
attention among thousands of issues facing Kentuckians. Education issues, however,
carried heightened focus in 1966, as the most publicized revenue issue dogging the
governor in 1965 involved property tax assessments—the critical figure for how schools
in general were funded across the state. A decision by a state appellate court that year
had ruled that any property tax assessment at less than 100 percent of the property value
(as one state revenue commissioner had been found doing) was unconstitutional. The
Kentucky Education Association looked on with a fervent hope that their respective
districts could look forward to an unexpected windfall in their budgets. However,
Breathitt intervened by calling a special session of the legislature that summer, and in a
masterstroke of his “no new taxes” ethos, oversaw the passage of a new law offsetting
any increased property tax payments with a roll-back of the maximum percentages
districts could levy.
Public hearings around the special session were contentious. KEA made an
earnest plea that Kentucky schools deserved greater contributions from their
communities, since the state paid well below the national average property tax rate. In
his testimony, KEA Executive Secretary J.M. Dobson charged, “to have good schools
someone must pay the bill,” and in his opinion, “property taxes are not bearing their fair
share of the load.”54 William Ellis shows in History of Education in Kentucky that despite
Breathitt’s plan to off-set any major tax increases, the measure ultimately yielded a slight
increase in revenue. KEA did not receive the windfall of school funding it had expected,

54 Robert Deitz, “School Tax Boost Urged,” Louisville Courier-Journal, August 27, 1965.
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but the Association was grateful at least to have the former corrupt system on its way to
being rooted out.55
The property tax issue was front-page material for much of August and September
in 1965, bringing heightened awareness among Kentuckians for how Breathitt would
direct education spending in the second half of his administration. As for ETV, the
Authority was well-positioned in this discussion, in part because of the successful
publicity campaign orchestrated throughout the Commonwealth, but also because
Richard Van Hoose had been named president of KEA. The group had made
establishment of a network one of its top platform issues in advance of the legislature,
and after his previous budget had resulted in a teacher walk-out, Breathitt was determined
to tread lightly around their demands. Among calls for salary increases and building
improvements, however, ETV seemingly became less of a fringe issue by the day. Press
recalls that business interests had also come around to the campaign and were planning to
include ETV as part of their lobbying priorities. Full-page advertisements for the
network taken out in newspapers were read alongside favorable op-eds by members of
Area ETV councils—all of which made support for the network seem pervasive and
firm.56
The network was included in Breathitt’s budget proposal for 1966-1968, and
Press, Stewart, Taylor, Van Hoose, Ladd, and all other members of the Kentucky

55 Ellis, A History of Education in Kentucky, 304. Breathitt was cognizant, as were many officials within
KEA, that even with the underhanded property tax assessments, many rural districts in the state had
difficulty operating with small tax bases. Schemes for undervaluing property assessments continued to
plague the state, especially in eastern Kentucky, as a 2015 series (February 12 – March 1, 2015) from the
Lexington Herald Leader would show.
56 Press, The KET Story, 98-100.
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Authority for Educational Television could look forward to Fall 1968 as the firm date for
activation of Kentucky’s educational television network. In the meantime, the Authority
set themselves about the tasks of building transmitter sites and the central network
studios in Lexington, and also preparing staff to produce the programs for use in schools.
Press’s memoir from these years details dozens of small miscellaneous issues and tasks
his team faced, such as identifying the site for the network studios, approving the designs
of production studios at the regional universities, keeping tabs on federal funding
applications, etc.—generally putting out little fires that might have jeopardized the
network as they were sparked. As an associate of the National Association of
Educational Broadcasters, Press, along with other ETV producers in the region, was
likely consulting on the proposed Appalachian Regional Communications System that
would be rejected months later by the ARC.
Breathitt touted his administration’s approval of the network in a speech to
educators and state personnel as part of the “Governor’s Conference on ETV,” held in a
Frankfort high school gymnasium in May of 1966. Using an admirable but unwieldy
reference to Julius Caesar, Breathitt praised Kentuckians for rising to the challenge when
evidence for ETV’s benefits could be seen in states all around them. Doing so, while
carefully observing how Kentucky could learn from and build on other states’ successes
and failures, meant that Kentuckians had heeded Brutus’s warning to “take the current
when it serves” or else lose their ventures.
While Breathitt affirmed to the conference the benefits children could expect from
their schools, his speech continued to steer the focus on ETV’s benefits to viewers at
home through forthcoming “adult and vocational education” programs. He also
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reinforced the connection between the network’s construction and the dire situation in
eastern Kentucky, noting that ETV would be an “integral part” of the state’s “attack on
educational problems in Appalachia.” Rural counties such as those in eastern Kentucky
had, he said, become accustomed to poor television signals from faraway urban areas—in
television parlance “they can count on ‘snow’ all year round,” he quipped—but the
comprehensive coverage pursued by the state Authority meant that “the ETV station” in
these areas “will provide the first and only good picture the people have had.” Press
recalled that the Governor’s conference was at that point a mere case of preaching to the
choir, but he felt satisfied that Breathitt had finally come around to belief in ETV’s
potential.57
State ownership of all the network’s facilities and equipment, rather than leasing
facilities from major telecommunications firms, had from the public’s view been a fait
accompli for the Authority all throughout their campaign for network activation. This
would add to the impressive scale of Kentucky’s network once it was completed, since no
other network in the United States, commercial or otherwise, could claim singular
authority over so many television stations. It stands to reason though, that this decision
was not made lightly. As seen with North Carolina’s network expansion, states with ETV
services ventured into uncharted territory with interconnection, not knowing whether it
was best to keep control of that service in house or depend on the expertise and resources
of telecommunications companies. North Carolina’s experience also showed that ETV

57 “Governor’s Conference on ETV, May 17, 1966,” in Harrell, ed. The Public Papers of Governor
Edward T. Breathitt, 359-361; Press, The KET Story, 119.
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operators stood the risk of being labeled anti-business or even un-American if they kept
their operations entirely state-owned.
Van Hoose and his Authority colleague Kenneth Thompson, a Dean at Berea
College, considered the matter back in 1960 when observing South Carolina’s closedcircuit network, which leased its infrastructure from the Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company. Weighing the pros and cons of such an arrangement, they admitted
that South Carolina ETV had activated its network with “low capital outlay, avoidance of
responsibility for maintenance, and shifting of the problem of replacing obsolescing
equipment into private hands.” Considering all the stress Kentucky ETV supporters
would encounter in the coming years trying to convince the state to make such an
investment, one might be led to believe that Kentucky had missed an opportunity by
declining to enter into a private partnership. However, Van Hoose and Thompson’s
report on South Carolina also noted their own personal belief that in matters of public
education, such as ETV, private control to any degree was inherently risky. The contract
would presumably require updates or renewals down the road, and the private firm might
exact higher charges if the partnership had not proven to be profitable. If ETV was
successfully implemented in Kentucky’s schools, as they hoped it would, any amount of
dependency the schools might form on ETV would “prove difficult in a future year,” if
that service was contingent on a telecommunications firm’s profit margins.58
KET’s network operations would not be entirely public—the microwave links
between the 12 stations were latched on to Southern Bell towers—but the cost of this

58 Richard Van Hoose and Kenneth Thompson, “South Carolina ETV Operation (A Report to the Advisory
Committee on Educational Television),” folder titled “1960,” box 2, KET Records 1960-1976.
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transaction was relatively minor compared to South Carolina’s agreements.59 Far more
impressive were the bids the state received for the fixed asset purchases of transmitter
equipment. In the end, RCA beat out General Electric with an offer of four million
dollars for all state transmitter facilities, and RCA would herald the sale in Broadcasting
News as “the largest single purchase of RCA broadcast equipment” in the company’s
near 50-year history. Press would lament that one of his colleagues’ original ideas for the
network was not included: that all schools wishing to receive programs would have the
cost of receivers and antennae covered by the state. They would take this up again a
decade later, and have it passed under Governor Julian Carroll.60 For the initial network
rollout, however, Ronald Stewart and Field Services Supervisor Paul Smith distributed
guidelines for districts on behalf of the Authority which estimated that most schools
could install necessary equipment for less than $2,000. Presumably, any interested
classroom could use a standard home receiver, but it was recommended by the state
bulletin that schools install “a master antenna system and cabling to the viewing rooms,”
for which they should “seek guidance and consultation from an individual or firm with
experience in this type of installation.” The Authority also pledged itself to assist in
reviewing any construction bids to make sure districts weren’t taken advantage of, and to
inspect any home or school that wasn’t receiving a satisfactory signal.61

59 “Southern Bell Construction To Set Record,” The Lexington Herald, February 7, 1968. The “record” set
by Southern Bell refers to the expense the company put toward upgrading telephone infrastructure, which
used the same towers KET would lease.
60 “Kentucky ETV Network Orders 12 Transmitter Plants,” Broadcast News (October, 1967); Press, The
KET Story, 34.
61 Ronald Stewart and Paul Smith, eds. Receiving ETV In Your School: Guidelines for Equipment, undated,
folder titled “September-December 1968,” box 3, KET Records 1960-1976.
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For all the wheeling and dealing Press’s memoir vividly and assiduously
describes of the years leading up to 1966, when the state finally consented to fund the
activation of KET, Press is surprisingly nonchalant and succinct with regard to Breathitt’s
successor, Louis B. Nunn. He was “a novelty for our times,” Press wrote of the incoming
governor, since Nunn was a Republican. Though Press might have feared the worst for
the network he and his colleagues had worked so hard to build, all it took to save it in late
1967 when Nunn took office, was one simple meeting with the Governor. Nunn was
prodded to take the meeting by Jim Host, the state’s new Commissioner of Public
Information and a former broadcasting student under Press at the University of Kentucky.
The governor was perturbed to hear from Press that until KET could get a few years’
experience producing its own programs, much of their early material would come from
National Educational Television (NET) in New York, a bastion of liberal values that
rankled Nunn and many other rural, conservative Kentuckians. Still, Press and Host were
able to convince the new executive that ETV was a program worth preserving, and
though Nunn’s first budget shaved off a few hundred-thousands from the 2.6 million the
Authority had requested, activation would proceed as planned.62
The more cynical observer to Kentucky politics might explain that Nunn was
merely content to take credit for a project that his predecessor and opposing political
party labored to create but could not see to fruition. Press remembers him, however, as a
true believer in the network, evidenced by his determined defense of the network in the
face of its detractors. Activated on September 23, 1968, KET started out at roughly the
same time as the national public broadcasting structures, the Corporation for Public

62 Press, The KET Story, 133-135.
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Broadcasting and the Public Broadcasting Service. As Nunn had intuited in his first
meeting with Press, programs produced by those services and circulated nationwide
began to generate controversy and outrage among Republicans, most notably within the
Nixon administration. Press praised Nunn for his unwavering support of KET “in the
face of not a few protests he heard from the private sector, from banks to coal mining to
tobacco, just a few of the industries that felt they were under unreasonable attack from
public broadcasting—read KET.”63 Other state and local PBS affiliates in addition to
KET, would continue to serve as scapegoats for any upsetting program or series produced
by the national headquarters.
Nunn saw KET as a true component of education, an altogether uncontroversial
service the state must provide. He would even cite KET as a visual example of a “fixed
obligation” for his two-percent increase of the sales tax. “Should we use these TV
antennas as lightning rods?” he would quip at a news conference in February, 1968,
making light of his critics’ objections, but also affirming that taxpayers had started this
investment in 1960, and it was not his place to take it away from them. An editorial on
the tax increase in the Lexington Herald-Leader emphasized to detractors that the
proposal had garnered support from Republicans and Democrats, and that Nunn, with
“courage and vision,” planned “to use the state’s money to provide the quality services
our state has needed so long.” Press looked back in his memoir on Nunn with gratitude
for his defense of the network at a crucial moment, though he had seen that the sales tax
increase “killed Nunn’s candidacy in succeeding elections.”64

63 Press, The KET Story, 137.
64 William Bradford, “Nunn Tells Why He Asked Tax Increase,” and “Gov. Nunn’s Fair and Sound
Budget, Lexington Herald-Leader, February 17, 1968; Press, The KET Story, 140.
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Not all of the expected benefits of KET touted by supporters would come to
fruition. One particularly ambitious component Press and his colleagues were excited to
incorporate into the network was college and university-produced programming. Much
of the attention surrounding the network focused on its benefits to primary and secondary
education, continuing education and training for adults, and more edifying generalinterest programming than what was offered by commercial networks. Plans for
instructional television at the higher-ed level were ingrained in the plan almost from the
beginning though, as the state hoped to develop television production capabilities at each
of its major universities and connect their operations into a sort of ETV consortium.
Eastern Kentucky University, Morehead State College, Murray State University, Western
Kentucky University would all receive, as part of the construction funds for the network’s
activation, on-campus television studio facilities, as UK created had years ago. Once
course programs were produced, they could be shared interchangeably.65
Any of the connected institutions could have pursued television production
programs on their own, and there were ample data and evidence on implementing such
programs at colleges around the nation. The focus of this part of the network was
engendering some level of cooperation and coordination between the schools’ general
course offerings, as well as an invitation to highlight the regional differences within the
state and bring that study to the attention of all Kentuckians. Robert Martin, president of
Eastern Kentucky University in Richmond and committee member within the ETV
Authority, was the most outspoken proponent of this idea. In his address to Governor

65 Ronald Stewart, Kentucky Educational Television Oral History Project. Stewart notes that the
University of Louisville and Kentucky State College (later University) also received funding for television
course production, though they were not part of the original rollout.
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Breathitt’s ETV Conference in 1966, Martin praised the spirit of competition between the
regional institutions, which he felt had sharpened their offerings and produced better
graduates overall. But he did feel that “competition can be carried to extremes,” and that
colleges ought to “explore means by which they can cooperate in providing programs that
would be too expensive to provide on a given campus.” By this he referred particularly to
upper-division courses where students at one school might seek advanced coursework
that would require investments from their own college that administrators could not
immediately justify. What seemed to Martin a logical extension of the ETV model from
primary and secondary levels to higher education would have radically altered the options
for students at any of the connected regional Kentucky colleges.66
Funding and control of the consortium system were placed in the hands of the
colleges and universities themselves and the state higher education committee, not KET,
and these institutions balked at the idea after a few years. “Each institution,” Press
recalled, “was prepared, even eager, to make its professors available to other campuses
via television. But all were loath to accept another institution’s teachers on their own
campuses.” Adron Doran, president of Morehead College (now University) in eastern
Kentucky, said in a later interview that the University of Louisville and the University of
Kentucky, the most well-endowed members of the consortium, were the least enthused
about participating.67 Parts of the proposed system were used, however. Colleges
happily made use of their television production facilities to train students and design

66 Ronald Stewart, Kentucky Educational Television Oral History Project; Robert Martin, “Potential for
Inter-Institutional Exchange of Curriculum and Other Resources,” May 17, 1966, transcript in Press, The
KET Story, 129.
67 Adron Doran, oral history conducted 1976 by Jerry Paul Perry, 1981 OH 090, Kentucky Educational
Television Oral History Project.
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telecourses. The closed-circuit cables laid out to connect the schools would later be used
by state hospitals to share training modules in mental health and other areas, and the
University of Kentucky used CCTV to transmit courses to the state’s community
colleges, which the University oversaw until 1997. Ronald Stewart noted in a 1976
interview, just a few years after the program had come and gone, that many university
administrators were quietly remorseful about the abandoned program, having only known
“how useful it was after it had been taken away.”68

Conclusion
Kentucky Educational Television would prove to be an immeasurably
multifaceted resource to the state’s education system, lauded regularly by national
organizations of education and journalism throughout its first 50 years of operation.
More will be said of these exploits in the fifth chapter of this dissertation, but the years of
its development prior to activation are no less noteworthy. The unjust state of education
in the Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky and other rural parts of the state, observed
firsthand by newcomers to the state like Leonard and Lillian Press and known intuitively
by native Kentuckians, was brought to the foreground in significant ways by the
campaign for educational television. A better and more widespread example of just and
equitable educational technology cannot easily be found.
The ties connecting KET’s formation to eastern Kentucky and Appalachia, while
not explicitly stated in its charter, are undeniable. Through the present day, appeals to
improve the state education system in Kentucky have pointed to the situation in eastern

68 Press, The KET Story, 130; Ronald Stewart, Kentucky Educational Television Oral History Project.
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Kentucky, but the architecture of KET stands as testament to a program that achieved real
results. UK’s listening center program, from which Press and others drew inspiration for
a statewide television network, offered an ad hoc solution to one particular disparity in
the region. By the 1960s though, calls had emerged for more ambitious, holistic
improvements to eastern Kentucky’s education system. Important conversations took
place in this decade regarding equitable funding for schools and dismantling racial
segregation, and ETV became for many states an essential component of their new
progressive state education systems.
Eastern Kentucky’s terrain posed a unique and expensive challenge to the goal of
providing signals to every school and home in the state, but advocates for the network
sought out all possible resources to make the network a reality. Many of these advocates
were born and raised in eastern Kentucky, and could personally attest to how the region
had so often been neglected or overlooked by the state’s education system. Some of
these supporters, unfortunately, had interests in the fossil fuel companies that contributed
to eastern Kentucky’s economic woes. Others had little qualm about trading on base
stereotypes of Appalachian folk to drum up support for a network. Still, support for an
ambitious public education system meant that, once completed and in operation, KET
would have the ability to transcend its early ties to these commercial interests and provide
a genuine service to the region, which it would do for many decades.
Of course, KET would go on to serve all Kentuckians, not simply those in the
eastern mountains or urban areas; and in the years when “the bloom was off” ETV and
doubts arose as to how effective and useful the medium would be, Kentucky’s ETV
advocates acquitted themselves before the public admirably. A number of key grants and
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federal subsidies would make construction of the network more palatable to taxpayers,
but Press and other members of the Authority for Educational Television worked for
many years to convince governors, legislators, district superintendents, teachers, and any
other interested Kentuckian that their program was worthy of continued support, and no
mere flash in the pan. Teachers were satisfied to learn that schools could acquire
television capabilities in classrooms, but mainly they appreciated that the “television
teacher” would be used strictly as an aide to the classroom teacher, never as a
replacement. Furthermore, the benefits of home education Kentuckians were told they
could expect, either as formal training and continuing education programs for adults or
informal learning programs for people of all ages, meant that KET deserved a role in state
government independent of public instruction or higher education.
Public television is rarely considered a “radical” institution, but its establishment
in Kentucky deserved that qualifier for the two major principles laid in its foundation.
The first of these was the historical argument made by its proponents. Authority
members’ oft-repeated phrase “those who need it most are often the last to get it,”
bespoke the long injustice of educational inequality endured by communities in eastern
Kentucky and other disadvantaged areas in the state. KET’s founders knew that the
technology of educational television offered certifiable benefits to education in society,
and while they knew it was not fully capable of reversing the effects of a history of
educational inequality, applying that technology equitably to all members of society was
the only earnest choice they felt any true educator could make.
The other principle, expressed by Press in his memoir as he reflected on the years
campaigning for an ETV network, was that the resistance of state legislatures and
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bureaucracies to enacting ambitious proposals within an education system, whether it be
outright opposition or simple inertia, can be overcome. Kentucky had been decried for
decades for its substandard system of public education, and even in years like those after
World War II, where faith in the ability of the state to overcome social inequalities was
relatively high, the prevailing philosophy within Kentucky’s government was to keep
belts tight as possible. In an era when the very concept of a state sales tax stoked
controversy and outrage, Press and his colleagues convinced the state to undertake a
program that many viewed as an extravagance. They did so only by mounting a
laborious public relations campaign, where they endeavored to convince everyone in the
state of the need for a network. Press knew how recalcitrant Kentucky could be in
embracing drastic changes, but looking back on the campaign he remarked, “when the
state really wanted to move, I discovered to my great surprise, it really could.”69

69 Press, The KET Story, 107.
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CHAPTER 5. “SIGNALS TO EVERY DIP AND HOLLOW:” THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE APPALACHIAN EDUCATIONAL SATELLITE PROGRAM AND THE
APPALACHIAN COMMUNITY SERVICE NETWORK
One technological apparatus emerging in public conversation roughly at the same
time as KET’s long march toward full state coverage was satellite communications.
After network designs submitted by Edward Schten’s Legislative Research Report to the
Kentucky Legislature were accepted in 1962, the state did not waver in its commitment to
the essential design of that technological plan, in spite of rising awareness of satellite
capability. Blanketing the state with an array of individual transmitters was indeed an
expensive option, but in the face of many other less costly or less comprehensive options
for transmitting signals and interconnecting studios, Leonard Press and his colleagues in
the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television remained committed to their
ambitious plan. Kentucky had elected to operate primarily with ground-based or
“terrestrial” machinery, wherein each local transmitter was connected via a microwave
link to adjacent transmitters, and by extension, all production facilities. Communications
satellites orbiting the earth’s surface could, however, offer the same interconnection
functionality and, as this chapter will show, many other opportunities for interaction and
communication between different sites.
The capability of satellite transmitters and speculation as to their possible use had
at that point been discussed for well over a decade, but by 1966 their application in mass
communication was sufficiently manifest to merit serious consideration for use in
educational television. That year saw one of the first major proposals for their use in
noncommercial television—at the same time Congress was considering how to establish
an interconnected system of educational broadcasters. Ultimately, on the

recommendation of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Congress
would create the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the Public Broadcasting
Service, both of which operated mainly as a terrestrial network. The Ford Foundation
had proposed in 1966 however that a satellite could be commissioned to carry signal for
all major television producers, commercial and noncommercial, with profits from the
former going directly to support the latter. Bill Ladd, columnist for the Louisville
Courier Journal and member of the Kentucky Authority, acknowledged in his column
the potential benefits to interconnection satellite would provide, but moreover implied
that Ford’s idea presented a host of side considerations that Congress was not likely to
broach. A later oral history interview with Hartford Gunn, manager of Boston’s
educational station WGBH and first president of PBS, confirmed this suspicion, recalling
that the Senate Subcommittee on Communications gravitated to the Carnegie
Commission plan partly due to the simple fact that it appeared much less controversial by
comparison.1 Relay and interconnection systems based on satellite and cable technology
would, of course, go on to fundamentally alter the landscape of broadcast television in a
few years’ time, but this was not something most viewers and lawmakers were willing to
entertain in the mid-1960s.
This chapter will examine a major initiative to use satellite and cable television
distribution systems to provide useful educational programming to schools and
households in the Appalachian region. In spite of the Midwest Program on Airborne
Television Instruction’s demise, communities of educational broadcasters maintained a

1
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belief that noncommercial public media would be a useful tool in targeting and
combatting systemic educational inequality on a regional basis within the United States.
As the architects of MPATI had done a few years earlier, a new cohort of media experts
took to the sky and embraced an unconventional technology as a means of building new
educational institutions across their region and expanding opportunities for individuals
and communities within that region. An earlier proposal of this magnitude had been
issued in Appalachia, as seen in a previous chapter, but that proposed project and MPATI
both foundered in the mid-1960s amid accusations that their systems simply did not
cohere with accepted wisdom, both in public education and broadcasting. The rise of
satellite technology in the 1970s, however, gave new life to these ambitions, and
provided remarkable results to the system of education in Appalachia.
It is worth observing how prior to the launch of new attempts at a regional
network, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the networks’ main sponsor, had
continued investment and development in ETV in the region, albeit on a smaller and
more targeted scale. Research into the general state of education in Appalachia,
regardless of the availability of ETV, revealed specific and urgent needs across the
region. The ARC provided valuable grant support to organizations that met these needs,
and a number of these organizations employed ETV as a useful tool. Their programs
expanded the range of ETV well beyond the conventional schoolroom materials and mass
interest documentary filmmaking that had defined noncommercial television to that point.
Instead, the new cohort of Appalachian ETV programs targeted more specific issues,
such as the GED program, early childhood education, and local government affairs. Each
of these new programs coincided with research into existent educational opportunity
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within the region, rather than an imposition of what educational broadcasters who were
unfamiliar with the region might have suggested for it.
These minor grant programs provided the groundwork for the new attempts at a
region-wide ETV network. Of the two major programs considered in this chapter, only
the first, the Appalachian Educational Satellite Project (AESP) would be based solely in
satellite technology. Appalachia was one of a few disadvantaged regions identified by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as ideal candidates for new
applications of the satellite technology developed by NASA scientists. Though the
satellite program only lasted a few years, its functions were adopted and favored by
educators in Appalachia. Local partnerships between school districts incorporated
satellite technology as a means of sharing resources among schools that could not offer
them individually, and higher education programs throughout the region developed
interactive programs with the satellite that resembled present-day Internet platforms more
than conventional television.
Technical considerations would cause the satellite program to be dismantled, but
many of the programs and staff energies within AESP were redirected toward the
creation of the Appalachian Community Service Network, a nonprofit, governmentchartered network available as an educational alternative on the burgeoning cable
television (CATV) industry. Cable television could not offer the same opportunities for
interaction between a program’s distributor and viewers at home or school, but it did
entail much greater reach, both to homes within Appalachia and throughout the rest of the
country. As with its predecessor, ACSN generated considerable media attention and
popularity, but would quickly see its government support dry up. Despite many efforts to
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preserve the network as a public and noncommercial resource for Appalachia, ACSN
ultimately had to be sold to private investors. It would be rechristened as “The Learning
Channel,” and it has operated privately ever since, though today it is commonly known
by the abbreviation TLC.
These efforts were spaced across the 1970s and early 1980s, though each shared
roughly the same institutional home in the Appalachian Regional Commission. Boyd
Fellows had concluded in 1966 that plans for a regional communications system in
Appalachia proposed by educational broadcasters were unfeasible, but the ARC’s hefty
bureaucracy proceeded apace toward educational improvement in the years following
Fellows’ report. Educational television reemerged in the ARC in such a way as to
address many of the issues the National Association of Educational Broadcasters had
raised in their original proposal, but it was also used in such a way as to allay concerns
Fellows and others had raised about a singular ETV authority looming over the entire
Appalachian region. To an outsider, AESP and ACSN might resemble this kind of
authoritative service, but close examination of the ARC’s activities in television reveals a
complex and muscular array of smaller projects and grants across the region. The cable
and satellite services may have been the most prominent service in the eyes of the public,
but they stood atop a diverse and collegial bounty of television offerings.
Noncommercial broadcast media in the present day is known almost exclusively
as “public television,” defined by a reporter at the CPB’s inception as a nonprofit channel
“directed in principle to all [television] set owners.”2 The term gained credence
throughout the 1970s, but the design of regional services like AESP and ACSN make it

2 Stephen White, “Carnegie, Ford, and Public Television,” The Public Interest 9 (Fall 1967), 12.
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difficult and somewhat inaccurate to consider their programs as “public television.”
Although the descriptor “educational television” would be used less and less after PBS
took off, the programs offered through AESP and ACSN are more accurately considered
ETV, since they were often targeted at very specific groups and settings, and as with the
previous networks examined in this dissertation, their primary intended function was to
serve as an aide to formal classroom instruction rather than general viewing. The case of
ACSN strikes a particularly unusual balance in this regard, as it existed nominally to
serve communities in Appalachia, but as a cable network it appeared alongside ESPN and
CNN and was available nationally. Though ACSN did not profit from advertising
revenue, most viewers would need to pay for cable subscriptions to view it. Yet while the
network remained a government-sponsored corporation, its directors insisted on finding
ways by which its resources could be available free of charge in Appalachia. AESP and
ACSN were publicly owned enterprises, but their mission was explicitly educational, so
in spite of their public appeal, it makes better sense to label them “ETV networks.”

The Potential Use of Satellites in Educational Television: Carnegie and Ford
Like most of its investigations into television technology and how it could best be
applied in an educational setting, Ford’s foray into satellite in 1966 was accompanied by
assiduous and detailed reports for the FCC and interested television specialists to pore
over. Their satellite plan, however, was directed more toward the political consideration
of how the federal government should support the various noncommercial stations
throughout the U.S., which were perennially short-staffed and underfunded. The
Carnegie Corporation had by that time established its own research commission into the
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issue, and the latter’s findings and recommendations would ultimately form the
ideological basis for the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. Stephen White, assistant to the
commission’s chairman James R. Killian, would admit in a piece for The Public Interest,
published in Fall of 1967, that the Ford Foundation was consulted from the beginning of
the commission for its expertise in ETV. “Ford, after all,” in White’s observation, “was
the patron saint of noncommercial television.” The understanding at the time was that
Ford could not produce the study of a potential national network, as they could not be
considered impartial and objective in the matter. In any case, White recalls, “it seemed to
Carnegie that the goodwill of Ford was essential” in their proposed system.3
According to White however, the research period for the Carnegie Commission
coincided with high-level personnel changes at the Ford Foundation that would briefly
jeopardize that goodwill and shake the ideology of noncommercial broadcasting to its
core. Henry T. Heald, who had presided over the Ford Foundation for 9 years, turned the
organization over to President Johnson’s outgoing National Security Advisor, McGeorge
Bundy, who, on taking office felt Ford should exercise a more involved role in the
process. Bundy was encouraged in this thinking by a new broadcast consultant at Ford,
Fred Friendly, a recent expatriate of CBS News who had been acrimoniously ousted after
a distinguished career of heavy-hitting and trenchant journalism with the network.
Together the two Ford neophytes pressed for a more ambitious proposal than what
Carnegie had been pursuing to that point. Ordinarily, this sort of institutional rivalry
would not have gained much notice outside their respective circles of the federal
bureaucracy, but Ford’s proposal raised eyebrows across the nation (evident in Bill

3 White, “Carnegie, Ford, and Public Television,”10.
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Ladd’s column in the Courier Journal) because it rehashed the notion of a “fourth
network,” a public educational option for broadcast television equivalent in stature and
power to NBC, CBS, and ABC. With satellites in play, Bundy and Friendly wanted
nothing less than a revolution in television.4
The commercial networks had achieved nationwide presence via a patchwork
series of terrestrial links, most of which were procured through partnerships with
telephone companies. Satellite, Ford contended, would allow a tidier arrangement of
interconnection, one shared by the three major networks with a simple excise tax that
would fund a noncommercial “fourth” network also using the satellite. “To the
commercial broadcast community,” one technical report of the proposed Ford system
noted, “the current land facilities and their cost have significantly influenced their
distribution techniques and services.” Those networks could reap the financial benefits of
a streamlined system, while “the educational television community” could also look
forward to use of this same system, which would in turn “make possible real-time
nationwide viewing of programs and expedite the economies and technical benefits of
pooled [educational] program generation facilities and revenues for the first time.”
Under the satellite arrangement, local educational stations and state networks would no
longer be forced to operate in a perpetual state of isolation and poverty.5

4 White, “Carnegie, Ford, and Public Television,”16. White elicits Friendly’s frustration with the
established power structures in television, but it is worth noting that Bundy was also feeling aggrieved by
his former employer. Though he did not oppose the war in Vietnam entirely, he had become openly critical
of the strategy employed by Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.
5 “Broadcasters Nonprofit Satellite System Study: Prepared for the Ford Foundation,” November 7, 1966,
2-1, Virtual Vault Report No.008314, Rockefeller Archive Center.
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Ford’s plan was rejected mainly due to an unreceptive audience in the FCC and
Congress. In their search for a more stable and equitable system of noncommercial
television in the U.S., lawmakers simply weren’t interested in giving such a radical
proposal a full hearing. Pursuit of Ford’s proposal would have engendered a cataclysm
within the national communications industry, and likely earned Ford very formidable and
irate foes in A.T.&T. and COMSAT, the company first awarded a concession by
Congress for commercial satellite television. Hartford Gunn recalled that the commercial
networks and telecommunications companies were “absolutely scared out of their minds
with Fred Friendly’s scheme,” and before their representatives had the chance to fume at
the Senate Subcommittee, the latter essentially said to the Carnegie team, “Go…get this
fellow Friendly off our backs.”6
Ford’s proposal also gave little attention to the state and needs of educational
television at the time. Their ETV production studio, NET, did supply a tremendous
amount of programming to stations that would otherwise have serious difficulty in filling
an hourly schedule, but in preparing the satellite plan they overlooked the popularity of
locally-produced programs. Ford assumed, though, that all schools using ETV could use
roughly the same programming, with five to-be-determined schools serving as model (or,
in their words, “fishbowl”) schools for all others using the network. This was essentially
a rehash of the logic behind MPATI, although the MPATI board had gone to great
lengths to include local teachers and school administrators in the development of their
curriculum.7

6 Robertson, ed., Televisionaries, 247.
7 “Broadcasters Nonprofit Satellite System Study,” 2-3.
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By contrast, the Carnegie report upheld the diverse offerings of local stations as a
prominent virtue of the existing system. The document’s first recommendation called for
“concerted efforts at the federal, state, and local levels” toward “adequate support of the
individual educational television stations and to increase their number.” Though the
eventual design in the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 did not allow for the level of
interconnection between member stations that Ford had seen as necessary, it did
recognize the bonds local stations had been forming with the communities around them.
Calling to mind the appeal toward localism rather than uniformity in education, Stephen
White praised the Carnegie design he had helped to establish. That model, “persistently
erected on the base of the local station…anticipates complete local control of program
scheduling, substantial local production, and a broad reliance on local talent.” Describing
the forthcoming Public Broadcasting Service, White insisted: “it enthusiastically supports
electronic interconnection among the stations, but looks upon it as a distribution device,”
by which any station could access high-quality programs, but “without prescribing for
any station the manner in which those programs are to be used.”
Satellite technology would remain a promising tool in spite of its rejection under
Bundy and Friendly’s utopian vision: commercial broadcasters would continue to
gravitate toward its benefits, and, as this chapter will show, so did noncommercial
broadcasters. White acknowledged that Ford’s satellite plan would have solved many of
the burdens facing noncommercial broadcasters, but their mistake, in his view, was
believing “that there is no room in television for programs intermediate between the
purely local and the purely national.”8 Using satellite, AESP would create a model for

8 White, “Carnegie, Ford, and Public Television,” 16.
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regional broadcast, and strike a balance in the exact area that Ford had overlooked. In so
doing, it would expand the ethos of a local station to a range of areas experiencing similar
educational disparities, and in the mold of PBS and CPB, it would allow local
communities to share program resources and collaborate where they felt pressing need for
such attention.

Television and Education in The Early ARC
The previous chapters illustrate the widespread acceptance of ETV as a viable
educational tool among states and school districts in and around Appalachia by the mid1960s. As mentioned earlier, the concept of a unifying, Appalachia-specific network
foundered at this point, in spite of the available precedent of a Midwest-specific network
in adjacent states. In rejecting the proposal on behalf of the Appalachian Regional
Commission, Boyd Fellows affirmed ETV’s potential uses in the struggling region, but
the concept challenged Fellows’ understanding of the bedrock principle of localism in
educational policy in the U.S. He was especially wary that a federally-supported network
(at least in its use as a classroom instructional aid) would pose a threat to the autonomy of
local teachers and administrators. Federal aid to local schools had always been a thorny
issue in American politics, even though its popularity had relatively risen during the
Great Society era. In spite of educational broadcasters’ preference to see the medium as
ancillary or supplemental to existing curricula, doubt remained as to how accepting local
teachers would be toward programming produced with little or no understanding of the
schools or students where they would be used. Whether or not rural schools in
Appalachia would accept and incorporate ETV broadcasts would, in Fellows’ view,
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“require a local judgment,” and he simply did not feel confident that such a program
would have the necessary support.9
While the first chance for an Appalachia-specific regional network may not have
aligned with the agency’s priorities for education, federally supported ETV took off
spectacularly around the nation in the years following the Carnegie Commission’s report.
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s aid for public education was a foundational component of
his Great Society program, and the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which created PBS
and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, was linked to that greater initiative in the
President’s remarks. In his message to Congress supporting the bill, Johnson reported that
“practically all noncommercial stations have serious shortages of the facilities,
equipment, money, and staff which they need to present programs of high quality,” and
that a federal partnership in the production and distribution of “a vital and self-sufficient
noncommercial television system will not only instruct, but inspire and uplift our
people.” In that message, Johnson also announced that the executive Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare would explore areas where public television could do the
most service and support projects in those areas. HEW would later serve as a
foundational supporter of the satellite and cable television experiments in Appalachia.10

9 Fellows, “Educational Broadcasting as a Tool for Appalachian Development,” p. 2, ARC, UK Special
Collections. Prior to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, heated debates over the issue of
federal aid to local schools, and the perceived threat it posed to local districts’ autonomy, played out
throughout the postwar era. Certainly the most heated element within this debate was the issue of
desegregation. For the standard treatment of this history at the national level, see Diane Ravitch, The
Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945–1980 (New York, 1983). For an excellent Appalachian case
study, see Carol Mason, Reading from Left to Right: Conservatives and the 1974 Kanawha County
Textbook Controversy (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009).
10 Lyndon B. Johnson, “President Johnson’s Message to Congress, H. R. Doc. 68, 90th Congress, 1st
Session, February 28, 1967,” in Documents of American Broadcasting, ed. Frank J. Kahn, 3rd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978), 358.
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As public television proceeded into the 1970s, however, it is worth noting that
Johnson’s successor did not share in the enthusiasm for most Great Society initiatives.
Richard Nixon’s animus against public television fits very well with popular narratives of
his administration’s suspicion of popular media.11 Nixon made several public gripes
about the influence and content of public television, most notably in his protests over
PBS’s comprehensive coverage of the Watergate hearings. In spite of the administration’s
protests, PBS did survive in some fashion and ambitious endeavors like the Appalachian
Educational Satellite Project were made during the Nixon administration. Historian
Gareth Davies argued that while Nixon “believed that the Great Society had
demonstrably failed, he considered that the wisest response would be a redirected activist
reform agenda with a Nixonian stamp.” Nixon’s approach to restructuring the new
programs he inherited, in Davies’ estimation, “was less to reduce the size of the
government than to make it work.”12 PBS may not have been dramatically altered in the
early 1970s, but public and educational television projects would evolve under the Nixon
administration.
The ARC chose not to pursue a region-wide ETV network, but its larger efforts
toward improving education in the region proceeded to be one of the agency’s integral

11 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of A President and the Fracturing of America (New York, 2008),
596. PBS aired the Watergate hearings in their entirety without commercial interruption, and the network
hired news anchors Nixon had long viewed as dangerous liberals and unfairly biased against his policies.
The anchor in question was Sander Vacour. When Nixon heard of his new role at PBS, the president
immediately ordered that funds for public broadcasting be reduced.
12 Gareth Davies, “The Great Society After Johnson: The Case of Bilingual Education,” Journal of
American History 88 (March 2002): 1408 (quotation). Support for bilingual education, one of Davies’ first
illustrations of this transition, was an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act that
Nixon endorsed, believing that it was an important local issue his predecessor had overlooked. See also
Gareth Davies, See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan (Lawrence, Kans.,
2007).

187

goals. In 1967, the ARC’s Educational Advisory Council was formed with the express
purpose of “advis[ing] the Commission of the status of education in the Appalachian
Region and to suggest ways whereby the ARC could most effectively invest its funds to
correct any deficiencies found.” The educational program initiated by the ARC that has
since been widely recognized by historians—the need for more vocational training and
learning opportunities—did appear as one of the Council’s highest priorities, but there
were a host of other issues called to attention by the report. That group’s research found
that, even taking into consideration the states in northern Appalachia that budgeted far
more funds for education, the mean for state expenditures for education in Appalachia
averaged $100 less per pupil, per year, than the national figure. Amid other issues facing
the region’s schools, such as outdated and inadequate facilities, high dropout rates, and
comparatively low teacher salaries, per-student funding from state government was, in
the Advisory Council’s view, the area most in need of improvement in Appalachian
schools.13
The ARC did however support studies on the issues teachers in Appalachia faced,
evidenced in their authorized survey—conducted by the Arthur D. Little Corporation—of
over 32,000 teachers in the region. The Little report found that more basic issues beset
students in Appalachian schools than per-student funding disparities. Teachers in the
region, the study found, were for the most part well-qualified, and content in teaching in
their communities. The mean annual salary for teachers nationally for the 1968-1969
school year was $7,900. The average for teachers in the Appalachian region was lower

13 “The Education Program of the Appalachian Regional Commission,” no author, 1970, folder 7, box 612,
ARC, UK Special Collections. Viewing disparities among schools as the result of unequal spending on
pupils was the orthodox view in postwar debates over educational policy.
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than that figure (by approximately one thousand dollars), but not so much as to seriously
affect overall job satisfaction among Appalachian teachers.
In keeping with general population trends, the region was seeing younger teachers
with recent training steadily leave the region for better opportunities outside Appalachia.
The report observed however that new generations of qualified teachers eager to teach in
their hometowns—women especially—could reliably be counted upon to stay in the
region. Teachers in the region commonly worked in older facilities with maintenance
issues and inadequate space, but on the whole this did not appear to be a particularly
pressing matter in the minds of most teachers in Appalachia. The study found rather that
they were more concerned with the infrequency of their own in-service training, as well
accounting for the unfamiliar and unexpected challenges younger teachers frequently
experienced in working with students in disadvantaged rural areas.14
As schools were being asked to do more with steadily declining resources, ARC
directors were attentive to the concerns of both teachers and administrators. Eugene
Hoyt, director of the ARC’s Education Activities Staff, voiced these concerns in a
congressional hearing on the problems faced by educators in rural America. In addition to
the obvious issue of rural districts’ isolation, Hoyt noted that schools in Appalachia were
also negatively affected by “low value of taxable property, tradition . . . inefficient
administrative units and sparse population.” In spite of these obstacles, however, Hoyt
told the committee that his impression of rural teachers and administrators was that
further federal oversight and reform were not the desired solution in Appalachian locales.

14 “Research Report No. 12: Teachers in Appalachia, Prepared for the Appalachian Regional Commission
by Arthur D. Little, Inc.,” August 1970, folder 3, box 556, ARC, UK Special Collections.
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“When I talk to a person from that school system,” Hoyt remarked, “I find that he is very
proud of his schools. I don’t believe any reform that tends to tamper with that pride and
independence will be as successful as a reform which builds on it.”15
That impression reinforced Hoyt’s policy for schools in his tenure as director.
Under his leadership, ARC coordinated the creation of cooperative initiatives between
neighboring school districts in certain portions of Appalachia. He explained to the Senate
committee that “promoting the voluntary establishment of school cooperatives” would
allow interested areas to directly target more pressing issues and identify specific needs—
“so that each local community can use its own strength and combine with other
communities to provide the kinds of things that children need.”16 This approach aligned
more or less with Nixon’s domestic policy of “New Federalism,” which moved generally
toward the downsizing of centralized reform efforts in favor of targeted support for local
initiatives. This approach redounded in public hearings during the Nixon administration
on both Appalachian education and public television.17
The effort to organize such cooperative organizations between school districts
prefaced the development of the Appalachian ETV satellite program. The eventual

15 Hearings before the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity of the United States Senate,
92nd Congress, First Session on Equal Educational Opportunity, Part 15: Education in Rural America,
September 1–3, 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), 6429-6433.
16 Hearings before the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity (1971), 6433.
17 Clay T. Whitehead, Nixon’s appointed director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (later
known as the National Telecommunications and Information Administration), offered his interpretation of
the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 before the Senate Subcommittee on Communications. Federal funding
of public broadcasting, in Whitehead’s view, created a dilemma. “One the one hand,” he argued “there is a
need for the Government to support public broadcasting. On the other hand, it should be insulated from
Government interference.” The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 attempted to deal with this dilemma by
creating a system based upon the ‘bedrock localism’ and, by creating an institution—the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting—to serve the needs of the local stations. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Communications of the Committee on Commerce, Overview of Office of Telecommunications Policy
Hearing, 92nd Congress, First Session, March 28–30, 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973), 86.
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expectation of the satellite program was that it would specifically aid these cooperatives.
In autumn of 1972, Appalachia: The Journal of the Appalachian Regional Commission
reported on the new school cooperative programs, known as Regional Education Service
Agencies (RESAs). Under the program, school districts that were sorely lacking in tax
base, or were especially isolated, could partner with nearby school districts and higher
education institutions to coordinate teaching methods and share effective resources for
teaching rural students. Educational policy decision making within the region, the
Appalachia piece noted, demanded close attention to the different policies of specific
states, and different arrangements existed among the RESAs owing to varying state laws.
The report was not intended as an advertisement for school districts who might consider
joining a RESA or some similar arrangement—rather, it served as a signal to state
legislators who needed to pass laws permitting such cooperatives before RESAs could be
implemented. 18
The article on RESAs made it plain by the second paragraph: “A RESA is not a
superstructure imposed on its constituent school districts; it is not a consolidation of
school districts. It is a creation of the participating school districts.” These cooperatives
would make it possible, Appalachia noted, for struggling districts to “provide the services
and programs that are required to prepare students for meaningful careers in a rapidly
changing society”—services and programs that “individually those same districts would
find it too cumbersome and expensive to provide.” Also, rather than simply offering
under-resourced schools the opportunity to catch up with their peers, the article

18 “The Rise of the RESA,” Appalachia: The Journal of the Appalachian Regional Commission
(hereinafter Appalachia) 6 (October/November 1972): 2–3.
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forecasted how the pooled resources of a RESA would make member schools more
eligible for taking part in “programs which might be considered of an experimental, pilot
or demonstration nature.” Taking advantage of such opportunities, or even simply
remaining aware of their existence, required time and funds that individual school
districts in Appalachia could not easily expend unless they found ways to share
resources.19

The Medium and the Message in the Region
And while solutions were being developed within the ARC for issues plaguing the
region’s conventional classrooms, the agency also explored new applications for
educational television. One year after the profile on RESAs, a special issue of Appalachia
titled “The Medium and the Message in the Region” (1974) touted practical uses of ETV
then being explored by the ARC. Borrowing for its title the famous maxim (“medium is
the message”) of popular media theorist Marshall McLuhan, the issue opened with an
emphatic affirmation of the good ETV could continue to offer in the region. “Cultural
isolation, long a characteristic of many parts of Appalachia, is diminishing daily,” the
issue’s introduction reported, “and the family TV set is one major reason why.” This
overarching argument certainly rested on an outdated notion of Appalachia as an isolated
cultural backwater, but it assured readers that the local ETV initiatives presented in the
issue were more effective because they emerged as self-determined solutions by locals to
meet specific needs.20

19 “The Rise of the RESA,” 3.
20 “The Medium and the Message in the Region,” Appalachia 7 (February–March, 1974): 30.
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One such article highlighted a new home General Education Development (GED)
program being offered by Alabama Public Television, from both the northern,
Appalachia-adjacent local transmitter and throughout the state network. Residents could
tune in to regularly scheduled course programs throughout the week to prepare them
(along with a ten-dollar mail order study guide) for the GED exam. Students enrolled in
the program also had the option of visiting offices designated as learning centers in their
home county, or requesting home visits from tutors for additional help in preparing for
the test. The program’s director, Dr. Kyo Jhin, noted in the article that adult education
programs often alienated enrollees due to their inability or unwillingness to provide
communal learning environments to participants, and also because of a dull, clinical
presentation of course material. “They were bored by what they were being taught,” he
told the report’s author, “and they had no sense of getting individual attention to their
problems. We’ve tried to remedy both of those defects.” Other specialists involved in the
project also indicated their desire to use television to expand opportunities to working
adults, but not at the risk of sacrificing personal bonds between teacher and student.21
Another article in the issue reported on the Appalachian Field Services Office of
the Children’s Television Workshop in southwestern Virginia. Children’s Television
Workshop was responsible for such programs as “The Electric Company” and the most
famous of all public television shows, “Sesame Street.” Like the GED course, the

21 “Go-GEDers Use Video: Alabama Adults Work for High School Equivalency Diplomas,” Appalachia 7
(February–March, 1974): 32-33. Program coordinators reported that, within a few weeks of the program’s
airing, over 300 adults had purchased study guides for the GED program, while another 250 or so had
requested loan copies from their counties’ learning centers. Dr. Jhin also noted gleefully that the program
included an optional graduation ceremony in Huntsville. Kentucky would develop its own GED via
television program in the mid-1970s to great acclaim, a project which will be considered in the next
chapter.
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Children’s Television Workshop offered learning aids and secondary activities for
parents whose children regularly watched Sesame Street and The Electric Company.
These programs, the report found, had been a godsend to working class homes in central
Appalachia, particularly those in districts that could not yet offer kindergarten or
preschool facilities, which the ARC had determined to be quite common. The profile of
the Sesame Street and Electric Company programs was buoyed by effusive praise from
participants. Rosa Lee Hooper, a mother of nine in southwest Virginia, participated in
the program and remarked to the magazine how her preschool-age daughter could now
read mail and the newspaper. “Betty Sue, she’s doin’ real good,” Hooper said. “We work
together and she can print real clear and she hasn’t even gone to Head Start yet.”22
Other programs the ARC highlighted in the issue expanded beyond the reach of a
single program or target demographic, and also beyond the conventional understanding of
educational television as an aide to schooling. Additionally, the two other programs
profiled in Appalachia also presented new technological components to ETV, with an eye
for how the medium of broadcast television could retain a spirit of localism and visible
ties to the region, even as the national public television service was proliferating all
around the country at that point.

22 Jane Dwyre Garton, “Sesame Street at Home: Parents in Southwest Virginia Learn With Their
Children,” Appalachia 7 (February–March, 1974): 36, 40 (second quotation). The Appalachian field office
of the Children’s Television Workshop served all of Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
West Virginia, and the southeastern portion of Ohio. For more on the application of Sesame Street and The
Electric Company as home educational resources, see Victoria Cain, “From Sesame Street to Prime Time
School Television: Educational Media in the Wake of the Coleman Report,” History of Education
Quarterly 57 (November 2017): 590–601.
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One of these profiles, titled “Town Meeting on the Tube: People Planning in
Southwestern Virginia,” offered a clear vision of what program directors were hoping to
obtain through ETV
“For a nation awash in nostalgia, the New England town meeting has special
appeal. It began in an earlier and simpler time, when adult citizens could gather
once a year to hear about the local issues, express their opinions, pass laws, elect
officials and generally be sure that everything was shipshape on the local scene.
In the words of the World Book [Encyclopedia], the town meeting is ‘the purest
form of democratic government known, because it is government by the people
rather than by their elected representatives.’”23
Rather than simply use ETV as a medium for educational curricula, the Fifth Planning
District Commission of southwestern Virginia endeavored to use television to facilitate a
town hall meeting. The program would thus not only educate viewers about the inner
workings of district politics and decision making, but it would also invite local people to
participate in that process in ways that might not have been available to them previously.
The journal noted that most televised news coverage that reached local areas like
southwestern Virginia was predominantly national, and as a result “most of us know far
more about the energy crisis and hostilities in the Middle East than we do about what’s
going on in our own city hall.” Local issues and policy were no less important, the issue
argued, but most households had become alienated from them. The televised town
meeting would reintroduce information on local politics to those households, particularly
among people who “just don’t have time to dig out the facts, or to do a lot of heavy
thinking about what the facts mean.”24

23 Paul Champion, “Town Meeting on the Tube: People Planning in Southwestern Virginia,” Appalachia 7
(April–May, 1974), 2.
24 Champion, “Town Meeting on the Tube: People Planning in Southwestern Virginia,” 2.

195

More of a polling exercise than an actual town hall meeting, the “People
Planning” program created by the Virginia planners adapted similar programs they had
seen aired in Dallas and New York City, which were intended mainly for gathering
policy opinions in advance of the 1976 election. In the Virginia program, a select group
of community members from across the district met in a conference to determine which
particular local issues were the most pressing to their respective communities. Each
major topic area they suggested would then serve as the subject for a televised
documentary, filmed in and around the district, on the various considerations and
interested parties related to the issue. The documentaries were aired “on all of the
commercial and educational TV stations in the district area—“an unprecedented display
of cooperation,” the report’s author noted—at various times throughout the week, and
were promoted by those stations and local newspapers and radio stations. Viewers were
asked to reply to printed questionnaires that were distributed in advance and mail them to
Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, where they would be compiled by a
consulting sociologist. Program directors saw only modest return percentages for their
surveys, but overall they were confident, the article noted, that such public affairs
programming would “become a model for improving the democratic process by giving
citizens a voice…not just in Appalachia, but throughout the country.”25
The final piece in Appalachia dedicated to new ARC initiatives in ETV, titled
“Homegrown is Fresher: Broadside TV Pioneers in Regional Video Programming,”
delivered the most explicit statement on the virtues of local and regional specialization in

25 Champion, “Town Meeting on the Tube: People Planning in Southwestern Virginia,” 6-10. Issues
selected for documentary production included “Healthcare, Aging, Education, Land Use, Consolidation of
local governments, Recreation, Criminal Justice, Housing, Day Care, Water, [and] Transportation.”
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ETV production. In 1973, a wholly new public television operation was started in
Johnson City, Tennessee, called “Broadside TV,” dedicated specifically to documenting
the Appalachian region and showcasing it to a local television audience. A Canadian
documentarian named Ted Carpenter conceived the idea for Broadside after a stint in the
VISTA program and his studies in “new regionalism” at the Highlander Center in east
Tennessee. Broadside TV was, in Carpenter’s words, created to address the “tremendous
lack of authentic information on living in the Appalachian Mountains,” which resulted in
“widespread misunderstanding of life there.” Interviewed by the Kingsport News (Tenn.)
at the station’s rollout, Carpenter said Broadside would program “topics such as strip
mining and how it affects the farmer, the tradition of real mountain music, local public
hearings and constituency reports from area congressmen”—anything that might, as he
put it “instill self-consciousness and pride in the residents of the Appalachian region.”26

26 “Broadside Television,” subject header available through webpage for Archives of Appalachia, East
Tennessee State University, https://archives.etsu.edu/agents/corporate_entities/98 (accessed July 28, 2018);
Mary Richmond, “Local Programming Seeks To Raise Consciousness, Pride In Mountains,” Kingsport
News, October 25, 1973. Broadside was one of a number of small-scale, do-it-yourself style television
operations across the United States at that point. For more on this phenomenon, see Deidre Boyle, Subject
to Change: Guerrilla Television Revisited (Oxford University Press, 1998).
“Homegrown is Fresher: Broadside TV Pioneers in Regional Video Programming,” and 1 (quotation), 2,
12.
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Figure 5: "Bampy:" An On-Screen Character on East Tennessee's Broadside TV Network
The profile of Broadside TV in Appalachia emphasized how the small scale of the
organization—fewer than a dozen staff—allowed the operation to remain more collegial
and connected to the local community. The piece also devoted significant space to the
means by which Broadside was aired, the relatively unfamiliar domain of cable
television. A recent policy issued by the FCC, the article noted, required cable
companies serving over 3,500 subscribers to include locally-produced “access” channels
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to subscribers in those respective areas. This requirement to provide “public access
television” (the name by which it is more commonly remembered) would be overturned
in the coming years as a result of challenges by major cable providers, yet the 1974
article in Appalachia gave the impression that cable companies operating in eastern
Tennessee and southwestern Virginia were favorable to the stipulation, at least at first.
Broadside partnered with area school districts to provide instructional programs, and its
early general audience programs included a live music festival in Bristol, a profile of a
community school in nearby Blackey, Kentucky, and “TV Foxfire.” By the end of the
decade though, the cable companies had won their case against the FCC, and support they
were formerly required to pay Broadside dried up, leaving the local access network to an
eventual bankruptcy.27
In light of Broadside TV’s short lifespan, the hopeful tone in its profile in
Appalachia is seen today with a certain irony. The important point to consider, however,
is the breadth of programs presented by the journal in 1974. Taken together, the different
programs profiled in the “Medium and the Message” issue demonstrate the ARC’s
earnest faith in the potential for new communications technology to connect and edify
people in Appalachian society, as well as a desire to innovate within the television
medium and expand its potential use. Though the specifics of the “cultural isolation” that
necessitated these programs—as the series’ introduction stated—was never addressed in

27 “Homegrown is Fresher: Broadside TV Pioneers in Regional Video Programming,” Appalachia 7
(April–May, 1974), 13-16; “Broadside Television,” subject header available through webpage for Archives
of Appalachia. In spite of the loss of mandated payments and support from cable companies, Broadside TV
continued through the end of the decade with support from the ARC and other grant sources.
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any of the articles, it was clear from the issue that the ARC was investing wholeheartedly
in television’s ability to educate people within the region.

The Satellite
Records kept by the Appalachian Regional Commission show that the agency had
been apprised of the potential uses of satellite television in the region as early as 1967. A
data and research-based consulting firm called Communications & Systems, Inc.
delivered a presentation to the ARC in December of that year on their computer facilities
and subsequent ability to process educational data. Were the ARC to consider launching
an ETV network through the use of satellite technology, as the Ford Foundation had
recently proposed for the entire country, Communications & Systems would be able to
aid the ARC through “operations research, systems analysis and design…advanced
mathematical and physical analysis, and management sciences.” They could not offer
satellites to the ARC, but merely suggested their helpful services if Appalachia should
ever acquire one for educational purposes.28 This may have sounded well and nice for
such an arrangement, but in 1967, employees of the Appalachian Regional Commission
were not rocket scientists and had no means of constructing or otherwise acquiring their
own system.
By the early 1970s, however, the agency’s education division would be in
partnership with some of the most famous rocket scientists in the world. As recounted in
“The Reshaping of an Innovation,” a summary memorandum of both the AESP and

28 “Presentation to the Appalachian Regional Commission on Potential Applications of Educational
Television,” December, 1967, folder 2, box 612, ARC, UK Special Collections.
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ACSN projects issued in 1982, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) was, by the late 1960s, under pressure to shift the benefits of some of its
scientific discoveries to the public. “This was a departure,” the report noted, from
NASA’s “former policy of developing space technology but leaving its applications to
the private sector.” Rather than prepare the latest satellite models to deliver to the hands
of commercial industry experts or reserve them for use by scientists within the federal
government, NASA chose to pursue “user experiments” with their new craft: “to test the
feasibility of utilizing the satellites to help communities in need of assistance in
education, health, economic, social, and cultural improvements.” To solicit partners in
this new undertaking, NASA sought out the help of other federal agencies in identifying
participants.29
NASA partnered with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which
tasked the Office of Education and later the National Institute of Education (est. 1972)
with finding ideal applicants for the program. Naming the project the “Educational
Satellite Communication Demonstration,” NIE’s official goals included, among other
objectives, evaluating “the feasibility of a satellite based distribution system for providing
needed educational services to several isolated rural areas” with the use of “a variety of
instructional materials, processes, and techniques.” More critically though, they would
remain attentive to the costs a potential satellite program might impose on recipients, how
the educational programs could best be arranged within existing local systems, and most

29 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,
1970–1982,” 22, June 30, 1982, folder 5, box 163, ARC, UK Special Collections. The ATS series reflects
on what historian Neil M. Maher has described as NASA’s campaign to “reorient some of its technology
away from outer space toward our bright blue planet” in light of charges that the agency was out of touch
with contemporary social and environmental issues. See Neil M. Maher, Apollo in the Age of Aquarius
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2017).
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importantly “the degree to which the service is accepted,” by recipients.30 At this point,
the application of satellite technology was a provisional experiment—the benefits it
might offer to interested regions were merely the hypothesis at this stage.
Appalachia was chosen as an area that could likely benefit from the introduction
of satellite technology, and in 1972 the ARC commissioned a report through Washington
University in St. Louis to identify where and how such technology could be implemented
most effectively. The new technological possibilities inherent in satellite transmissions
certainly erased many of the barriers that had worried previous ETV network designers.
In creating Kentucky’s network for instance, technical director Ronald Stewart had spent
months calculating interference and signal range in the hills of eastern Kentucky to
determine the best possible locations for transmitters. In the apt description of
“Reshaping of an Innovation,” satellite allowed the ARC “to carry television signals to
every dip and hollow of the earth’s surface and open a way to provide channels even
beyond the number contained on a dial of a TV set.”31 The 1972 study also revealed new
dimensions of broadcasting for ARC administrators to consider, such as the capacity to
coordinate different programs simultaneously to all participating receivers, and also the
ability for receiver sites to respond to the program originator in real time.32
The Washington University study recognized that, with the amount of funding
and equipment Appalachia could expect to receive for an experiment in satellite, the ARC

30 Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,
1970–1982,” 23.
31 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,
1970–1982” 41.
32 Jai P. Singh and Robert P. Morgan, “Identification of Fixed/Broadcast Satellite-Based Educational and
Health Telecommunications Services for the Appalachian Region,” June 1, 1972, p. 40, folder 3, box 560,
ARC, UK Special Collections.
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could not provide this signal to every home in the region. They would be prepared
however to supply receiver equipment to a large number of schools, public meeting
spaces, and health-care centers. Descriptions of how satellite could help the latter
resemble present-day calls for telehealth capabilities. “In spite of the substantial
development of roads and highways in the Appalachian region,” the report’s authors
observed, “access to health-care centers is still a problem for quite a substantial portion of
the Appalachian population.” Satellite communication, they intimated, could potentially
provide “broad geographical use of the services of a limited number of specialists,”
including “remote interpretation of vital signs such as EEG, EKG, X-rays…and
specialized consultation, as well as access to specialized medical data banks.”33 Given the
possibility of two-way communication, the new ETV technology could now expand
beyond schooling and into public health.
Harold E. Morse, director for the satellite project, came to the research team from
the education branch of the ARC, and thus tended to think primarily of how the region’s
education system specifically could benefit from the satellite. He often cited the Arthur
D. Little survey of Appalachian teachers as the main impetus for the operation. At first,
his main goal was to provide teachers in participating school districts the latest in-service
training and pedagogical tools for teaching in an underserved region, both of which, the
Little study concluded, were sorely lacking in the region’s schools. The initial program
could not incorporate every school district in the region, and so Morse and his colleagues
turned to the RESAs as ideal early test subjects. 16 such cooperatives had been

33 Singh and Morgan, “Identification of Fixed/Broadcast Satellite-Based Educational and Health
Telecommunications Services for the Appalachian Region,” 43.
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established by the time the satellite project was underway, but ultimately 5 were chosen
as initial recipients of the satellite programs—one each from New York, Maryland,
Virginia, Tennessee, and Alabama. All of the RESAs to that point had significantly
demonstrated, in the words of program administrators, “participation by all the schools,
colleges, and allied organizations in the area being served.” After the satellite’s first year
of operation, each of the original RESAs would expand to two ancillary locations,
meaning that 15 sites would eventually be served by AESP.34
Once accepted, the ARC dubbed the experiment the Appalachian Education
Satellite Project. As an organization, AESP took pains to avoid the appearance of a
centralized, government media service. The ARC’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.
administered the project, but it placed the onus of curricular development and program
production on participating RESAs and area higher-ed. institutions, as well as the
“Resource Coordinating Center,” (RCC) the general production studio for all programs
distributed through AESP. Located on the campus of the University of Kentucky, the
RCC was housed in a converted gymnasium in the College of Education in Dickey Hall,
the same space designated previously as a regional production center for Kentucky
Educational Television. Outside of participation in productions for KET, UK’s television
department had demonstrated effectiveness in creating high-quality educational
programming, and its application to serve as the RCC was chosen over several other
institutions.

34 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,
1970–1982” 27, 31.

204

Beginning in May of 1973, RESAs would initiate the process by outlining the
types of professional development programs or course material they wanted the RCC to
produce. NASA had provided two units from the “Applications Technology Satellite”
series, the ATS-3 and the ATS-6 (designed to transmit video and audio), and also the use
of their satellite uplink facility in Rosman, North Carolina. After a year of development at
the RCC, the finished programs would in 1974 be sent via cable to the NASA satellite
uplink in Rosman and, ATS-6 would transmit them to the RESAs and participating
colleges. During the hours in which courses were transmitted, personnel were on site at
the RCC in Lexington to troubleshoot and respond to questions phoned in by any of the
participants.35
Teachers working with AESP experienced pressure to produce lively,
informative, and engaging content, much like the creators of the Alabama GED program
and distance educators of the present day. The main objectives laid out by the
Chautauqua-based RESA in New York, for example, were to better equip teachers in
improving children’s reading skills, and to encourage more high school graduates in the
region to pursue post-secondary study. The programs produced at the RCC were by no
means conventional and dull training videos—rather, they were components of
interactive training seminars and exercises that different schools could engage in
simultaneously. Live video feeds of course instructors were transmitted to participating
sites and text and audio responses given by teachers in one location were circulated midsession with other sites. The data from responses were collected by staff at the Lexington

35 “AESP Policies and Procedures Manual,” 7, (March 1978), folder 1, box 162, ARC, UK Special
Collections.
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facility and by site coordinators stationed at each location to assist with the technical
process.36
A follow-up study of one interactive seminar course on elementary school reading
instruction observed some confusion and unease among participants as to the role of
these site coordinators, who were not teachers and had no expertise in the course
material. In spite of the remoteness and the unconventional format, course participants, in
the follow-up study’s conclusion, “reported overwhelmingly that they were using the
strategies and materials presented in the [satellite] DPRI course in their own classrooms.”
Furthermore, the report observed that participants “did not view the course format as
impersonal,” and that “when participants were asked to rate the learning activities
included in the DPRI course in comparison to their typical campus counterparts, the
DPRI activities were all rated as superior to campus versions.”37
Profiles of AESP in Appalachia: The Journal of the Appalachian Regional
Commission lauded the ingenuity of the project and its potential for effecting dramatic
changes in the region’s education system. Well aware of the persistent fear that televised
instruction programs had lost their sheen from previous decades, Appalachia’s survey of
participating students found that “student satisfaction with the courses is certainly
evident,” and that the interactive components of the RCC-produced courses actually
made the satellite courses more attractive than the conventional lecture hall or seminar.

36 Stephanie B. Bennett, “Appalachian Education Satellite Project, Phase I Final Report, Chautauqua
(N.Y.) RESA Triangle,” August, 1973, folder 1, box 704, ARC, UK Special Collections; “AESP Overview,
Technical Report No. 2/RCC Evaluation Component at the University of Kentucky,” March, 1974, folder
2, box 613, ARC, UK Special Collections, 4, 9–10.
37 “AESP Overview, Technical Report No. 8/Student Achievement: Diagnostic and Prescriptive Reading
Instruction, Summer 1974” August, 1975, folder 12, box 791, ARC, UK Special Collections, 51–52.
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Teachers taking graduate-level courses through one of the partnering colleges were
expressly favorable to the relative cost of the satellite courses. Appalachia reported that
course enrollment at each site was restricted to twenty students, with some institutions
offering the course for $350, a far better deal than the $1,694 price of comparable threehour graduate courses at the University of Kentucky.38 As the experiment progressed,
project administrators also found that satellite delivery of courses could be applied in a
number of other areas—over time the AESP expanded its offerings to include regular
courses at the region’s colleges and universities and also training for healthcare staff in
rural hospitals and clinics.39
Like any modern technology AESP had its share of “bugs” and malfunctions. The
ARC’s report on “Equipment Reliability” during the first few months noted that problems
with the audio component for instruction and responses had not been resolved until the
second semester of courses. During interactive seminar sessions, “approximately 8
percent of the seminar question relays were hindered by malfunctions that rendered one
or both delivery modes inoperative,” and that “on two out of 31 transmission days,
malfunctions in the delivery system caused system-wide failures.” Still, the evaluation of
the satellite equipment maintained that technical failures were an expected part of
exploring the new medium and they should not deter any further development of ATS-6
or the AESP network.40

38 William J. Bramble, Claudine Ausness, and Dennis F. Goldstein, “On the Beam: The Appalachian
Education Satellite Project,” Appalachia 9 (April–May 1976), 14, 16.
39 “AESP Policies and Procedures Manual,” 6.
40 “AESP Overview, Technical Report No. 5/Equipment Reliability,” July, 1975, Folder 11, Box 791,
ARC, UK Special Collections, 52–53.
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AESP was not the only experimental use of NASA’s applied technology satellite.
The ATS-6 had the capacity to route dozens of similar programs, with a general focus on
exploring the use of telecommunications in rural areas. Historians Tess Lanzarotta and
Jeremy Greene profiled a contemporary experimental program which used ATS-6 to
promote “telehealth” in rural Alaska. As Appalachian teachers and students had difficulty
accessing adequate postsecondary and graduate education in their communities, Native
American populations in Alaska also struggled with sorely lacking (or nonexistent)
public health infrastructure.41 The initial rollout of AESP and other programs from 1974
to 1976 was the experimental phase, and in September of 1975 the ATS-6 was
repositioned for another experiment in transmitting health, education, and cultural
programs, this time in India. Following this, the project administrators evaluated the trial
run and concluded that AESP merited a renewal. Courses resumed in late 1976, with an
additional provision for UK from NASA of a satellite uplink facility to prevent issues
with course transmission. By 1977 the experiment had seemingly gained institutional
status, as the “P” in AESP was changed from “Project” to “Program.”42
Harold Morse had faith in AESP’s potential benefits to education in the region
from the start, but it was also apparent he considered AESP’s progress merely as a first
step in further possible experimental uses of television in the region. In the first report on
AESP in Appalachia, Morse noted that while satellite could do a great deal to improve

41 Tess Lanzarotta and Jeremy Greene, “Communications Technologies as Community Technologies:
Alaska Native Villages and the NASA Satellite Health Trials of the 1970s,” Technology’s Stories, May 2,
2017, available online via, http://www.technologystories.org/communications-technologies-as-communitytechnologies-alaska-native-villages-and-the-nasa-satellite-health-trials-of-the-1970s/#_ftn2 (accessed June
8, 2019).
42 “AESP Overview, Technical Report No. 5/Equipment Reliability,” July, 1975, folder 11, box 791, ARC,
UK Special Collections, 52–53 (quotation); “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of
Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,” 22, 31.
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communications within the region, the preliminary studies of that medium’s benefits to
the region revealed that “communications facilities (land lines, telephone connections,
and television signals) were not operating at the level of efficiency which they were
presumed to have.” In a remark that foreshadowed part of the eventual plans for ACSN,
Morse expressed his desire to extend the benefits of AESP to the average television
household and he envisioned that AESP could pave the way for use of the satellite as an
“Open Appalachian University, which would provide higher education to Appalachian
people scattered over large geographical areas.” 43
Though Morse may have held a special fondness for the work done by AESP, he
also bore no illusions of the satellite—or educational media in general—as a panacea for
the region’s educational issues. In an article he coauthored in 1977 with Patrick W.
Carlton, a professor of education at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityReston, Morse and his co-author lavished praise on the technological achievements of
AESP. Still, they recognized that deeper educational inequalities lingered in the region.
Property tax revenues still ensured inequitable funding for school districts and Morse and
Carlton cited research that reported “drop-out rates in Appalachia are 20 to 25 percent
higher than those of the rest of the nation,” and the percentage of adults in Appalachia
who completed high school in 1970 was still significantly lower than the national
average. AESP was a sterling example in their article of the region’s educational
institutions’ “long-standing tradition of providing technical assistance to local groups and
communities” through research, organizing seminars, and “consultative assistance.”44 But

43 “Appalachian Teachers Study via ATS-6,” Appalachia 7 (June–July 1974): 9.
44 Patrick W. Carlton and Harold E. Morse, “The Challenge to Education in Appalachia,” Appalachia 10
(February–March 1977): 31.
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in spite of this tradition and its evident benefits, such as AESP, Morse and Carlton still
argued that there was much collective work yet needed to help the region’s educators.

The Cable Network
Morse’s wish for a publicly-broadcast network would be granted much sooner
than he expected—or may have wanted, for that matter. In October of 1978, NASA
announced that the ATS-6 had too many maintenance issues to justify its continued use,
and thus the satellite would be decommissioned in June of the next year. With its primary
instrument soon to be withdrawn, 1978 became the year for the ARC to look for
alternatives. The “Reshaping” report recounts a search by AESP staff for similar satellite
options, only to find that “no public satellite capable of carrying the AESP program was
available,” and that “NASA had announced no plans for a replacement for ATS-6.” It
appeared that the era of NASA returning the benefits of its research and redevelopment
so directly to the general public had dwindled.45
For the immediate issue of interrupted satellite transmission, the Commission
leased eighty-four hours of weekly airtime for one year on the private network satellite,
RCA’s Satcom 1, the primary carrier for the rapidly developing commercial cable
television industry. By the time the ARC was ready to make use of that service, AESP
had ceased to exist. In the ARC’s proposal to the NIE for continued funding in 1979,
Morse announced that the satellite project had “renamed and reshaped itself into the
Appalachian Community Service Network, a non-profit corporation established under the

45 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,
1970–1982” 50.
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corporate laws of the District of Columbia,” and that the decision to do so had been
approved by the full ARC at a meeting on September 10, 1979.46 Archive documents do
not give a clear motive for switching to the nonprofit model—perhaps the leasing fee for
a commercial satellite proved greater than what the ARC was prepared to give on a
sustained basis, or perhaps Morse and the other AESP directors desired more flexibility
in deciding what courses and programs to distribute.
At any rate, the process of becoming the Appalachian Community Service
Network necessitated some dramatic changes in the organization. For one, as a 501(c)3,
the network would no longer be governed directly by the ARC and would instead elect a
board of directors. However, as the primary benefactor of the new non-profit network, the
by-laws stipulated that the ARC (with consultation from the National Institute of
Education) would decide who should serve on the board. Terry Sanford, former governor
of North Carolina and president of Duke University, became chairman. Morse served as
the Network’s president.47 The partnership with the University of Kentucky also ended as
a result of the new structure. The Network concluded that, while UK faculty, staff, and
students performed admirably in producing content for the AESP network, ACSN’s
leadership structure dictated that they have greater control in what programs would be
either be produced or syndicated for broadcast. ACSN still maintained a presence in
Lexington, though they initiated a process by which they would own and maintain their
own production facilities. From January 1, 1981 through March 31, 1982, ACSN leased

46 Harold E. Morse, “ACSN Proposal to NIE for Funding, 1979–1980,” September, 1979, folder 5, box
794, ARC, UK Special Collections, 6.
47 Morse, “ACSN Proposal to NIE for Funding, 7.
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production facilities from Kentucky Educational Television while the Network
constructed its own facilities at Coldstream Farm on the north side of Lexington.48
With the use of a publicly-owned satellite, AESP had the capability of
transmitting clearly to any particular point within the Appalachian region, but the
constraints of the program limited those transmissions mainly to the educational
institutions that had signed on to the program. The “Reshaping of an Institution” report
observed that, by contrast, “the addition of cable TV systems to the ACSN,” would not
only defer the issue of equipment maintenance to RCA and the cable network operators
(a factor which had unexpectedly sunk the AESP), it would also present “opportunities to
participate in expanding markets.”49 The array of channels then available under cable
television was very small compared to the leviathan the industry would accrue over the
next three decades, but ACSN would enter the market alongside many of the formative
cable networks (e.g. CNN, TBS, ESPN) that carried cable television from its infancy. On
cable, they could not reasonably be thought of as a “fourth network,” but ACSN had the
potential of staking a claim as the premier noncommercial alternative in the nascent
medium.
Another important trade-off surrounding the transition to a cable network was the
issue of scheduling. Filling the hours of a weekly schedule would prove to be a challenge
alongside other networks that boasted of their capacity to broadcast 24 hours a day. Even

48 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,”
177–79. In the facility transition, ACSN offered positions in the new network to all UK employees who had
previously served as production staff. The report on the transition also noted that, professionally, “the KET
agreement was a vast improvement over previous arrangements.”
49 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,”
174.

212

if the network had retained its production studio at the University in Lexington, the
program output of that one facility could never have hoped to meet the demand of a cable
schedule. As a result, staff within ACSN shifted their stance from that of course design
and data evaluation, to that of a conduit for any organization producing ETV
programming that fit the network’s general mission. The bulk of programs produced
under AESP, in spite of their original design as training courses for teachers and other
public professionals, would be repurposed as general programming. Some of the latter
AESP courses, such as “Small Farm Marketing,” and “Developing Rape Crisis Centers in
Rural Communities,” had started to gravitate toward a more general audience. At any
rate, the industry standard for most cable and regular broadcast networks at that point was
to draw most of their programs from various production companies, so ACSN was not
unprecedented in this new task.50
Beyond the question of who would produce programming and how it would be
linked to the RCA satellite, there remained the issue of how the “Open Appalachian
University” network would be distributed equitably to viewers. Though the network
entered into a new, semi-autonomous organizational structure, Morse and his colleagues
were evidently still very much bound to the public service commitment they began with
AESP. As a result, they considered a number of options for how the region could best be
served. AESP enjoyed the arrangement whereby community satellite antennas were
provided by the various participating government agencies. As the satellite program
progressed, new receiver sites opened across the region, and these were still available to

50 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,”
188.
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ACSN, but there were still many communities in Appalachia that had neither a receiver
site nor connection to cable television service.
If Morse had his way, rural communities interested in receiving ACSN could
obtain satellite equipment as other communities had during AESP, but that option, as
with many of the loftiest goals in distance education, proved to be too costly under the
new corporate organization. Alternatively, ACSN considered partnering with PBS, which
recently arranged its own system of coast-to-coast satellite transmission. That option was
also untenable, given that ACSN was still committed to producing programs specifically
tailored for educational needs in Appalachia. ACSN would have to essentially contest
with other PBS programs for airtime. Eventually, ACSN decided to remain in the mix of
commercial cable networks as an educational alternative to ESPN, HBO, and other
entertainment networks. Viewers outside the cable service network could travel to the
remaining receiver sites if they were interested in ACSN, but they were otherwise
without access.51
Programming for the ACSN still resembled the early initiative behind AESP.
Though the specific need for teacher in-service training through television no longer drew
the most attention from the network, the network still offered continuing education
“telecourses,” accredited by participating higher education institutions. Programs not
affiliated with any specific institution (known as “community service” programs) could
potentially be adopted as telecourses by interested institutions, but were otherwise
designated for promoting “personal enrichment” of viewers. ACSN also broadcast

51 Morse, “ACSN Proposal to NIE for Funding, 1979–1980,” 4–5, 7.
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meetings of government committees and proceedings known as “teleconferences,” much
like Virginia’s Fifth Planning District had experimented with in the previous decade.52
At the outset, the list of institutions partnering with ACSN in telecourses was not
as extensive as what AESP had overseen, but there were still dozens of participating
higher education institutions and educational cooperatives throughout the region, and
additional institutions signed on as the new cable station took root. These included Floyd
Junior College in Rome, Georgia, Morehead State University in Kentucky, and the
University of Tennessee Continuing Education Center in Chattanooga.53 Telecourses
usually combined the purchase of course materials and viewing of recorded instructional
segments at home. Aside from a few programs that incorporated viewers’ telephone callins, the new network did not the real-time interactive component that had been the
cornerstone of AESP. Viewers and students could count on a regular, weekly airtime for
programs that interested them. Telecourses also required a few scheduled meetings at a
central location, usually the institution granting credit for the course. ARC did its part to
promote telecourses in Appalachia, highlighting available courses including “Teaching
the Young Handicapped Child,” “Contemporary Health Issues,” and a continuing
education course for viewers in the legal profession titled “Legal Issues in the Eastern
Coal Industry.”54 Examples of “community service” programs included “Keep It
Running: Auto Repair for Dummies,” a 20-week course on basic repairs and

52 “ACSN Site Locations,” Appalachian Community Service Network 1 (1979), 3.
53 “ACSN Site Locations,” Appalachian Community Service Network 1 (1979), 4.
54 “ACSN Telecourse Utilization Guide, Summer Semester, 1981,” folder 1, “ACSN Programming,” box
163, ARC, UK Special Collections; Judith K. Ballangee, “ACSN Takes Off,” Appalachia 14 (January–
February, 1981), 6.
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maintenance, and “Bluegrass Banjo Level One,” a beginner’s music course the ACSN
acquired for distribution from a production company in Knoxville.55
One might expect effusive praise for ACSN from Appalachia, the journal of the
federal agency that held the key interest in the network, but in “ACSN Takes Off,” author
Judith K. Ballangee framed ACSN as exactly the type of program the Appalachian
Regional Commission ought to have been carrying out since its inception. Amid the
“open marketplace” of cable television that was “spawning new program services almost
daily,” as Ballangee describes, ACSN had developed a unique and visionary use of the
medium that was gaining national attention. “A far cry from the first attempts at
‘instructional’ TV,” in Ballangee’s description, the article at one point described ACSN
with a quote from Newsweek art critic Douglas Davis. In his general observation of the
satellite and cable landscape, Davis had heralded ACSN as a hopeful sign for what cable
could offer the average viewer, as it was committed “directly to the worlds of education,
labor, medicine and science, as well as the arts,” and could “reach small specific
audiences as well as large.”56 Though Ballangee noted that ACSN was not acting in
competition to PBS or its member stations, she found that its regional focus yielded clear
advantages over the established channels in public media. ACSN had “a clearly defined
primary audience that shares a common cultural and socioeconomic identity, an
established method for exchanging ideas with its audience on a regular basis, and a

55 “ACSN Continuing Education and Community Service Programming, Fall 1981,” folder 1, “ACSN
Programming,” box 163, ARC, UK Special Collections.
56 Douglas Davis, cited in Ballangee, “ACSN Takes Off,” 5.
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singular commitment to meeting the broad educational needs expressed by that
audience.”57
A most unfortunate parallel between the ACSN and the current distance education
environment is that, in both cases, educators find themselves having to do more and more
with diminishing state support. ACSN, as a non-profit corporation, began its operations
in the red, as the ARC agreed to essentially advance the network $2.1 million dollars for
the shortfall the company expected as a result of losing much of its operational structure
in the wake of AESP’s implosion. The hope for Harold Morse and the Board of Directors
was that promotion of the telecourses and the revenue gained from course fees and
material costs would eventually balance the network’s ledger. Though the network touted
the fact in successive reports to the NIE and the ARC that revenues were increasing, they
never reached the amount of money ARC initially advanced.58
Telecourse enrollment was the main source of revenue for the network, but ACSN
actively sought new partnerships and ways of generating support for their channel.
Hoping to entice their commercial broadcaster colleagues in the cable industry, ACSN
proposed a tuition share plan, whereby $3 of every course enrollment fee would go to
cable provider companies that agreed to carry ACSN. Effectively, this would create a
collective effort between ACSN and the local provider toward promoting ACSN courses
to viewers, but also to colleges and universities that might sign on to the network as
ACSN expanded to new markets. In pitching the plan to cable providers, the ACSN

57 Ballangee, “ACSN Takes Off,” 8.
58 “Final Report of the ACSN to the National Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,”
189; “A Report to the Appalachian Regional Commission from the Appalachian Community Service
Network,” June 29, 1982, folder 8, box 794, ARC, UK Special Collections, 15–18.
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announcement for tuition said the plan would offer “a double opportunity to impact your
bottom line,” but also “the long-term benefits of the quality programming ACSN
provides” in the communities served by prospective cable providers.59 In admitting in the
plan that ACSN programming could potentially be altered according to the new regions
and communities it reached, the network seemed to slowly be shedding its “Appalachian”
identity.
Beginning in 1982, ACSN added the moniker “The Learning Channel”—taking
the full name “ACSN: The Learning Channel”—as a gesture to the national cable
audience that the benefits of their educational alternative were not limited to
Appalachia.60 Fundamental changes like these reflected the deficit flood waters that were
rising around the network, but it is worth noting that, in a number of ways, ACSN
maintained its commitment to offering a public, noncommercial experiment within the
corporate landscape of cable television. In the 1982 reorganization, the network did not
accept any of the advertisement revenue generated by the for-profit networks, though it
was offered to them. Even as it was clear the relatively slim subscriber fee ACSN
received for its services from cable providers would not sustain them, Harold Morse still

59 “ACSN: Tuition Share Plan,” 1981, included as appendix to “Final Report of the ACSN to the National
Institute of Education: The Reshaping of an Innovation,” 315.
60 “The Reshaping of an Innovation—ACSN: The Learning Channel, 1974–1982,” October, 1982, Folder
2, Box 163, ARC, UK Special Collections, 9. The brochure, “Reshaping of an Innovation” included a letter
from Morse giving further (though not entirely satisfying) explanation for the name change. There is an
evident disconnect in the records of the ACSN between Morse’s newer role as a cable television executive
and his earlier role with the strictly governmental agency, AESP. Aside from the “A” in the acronym, the
letter gives no mention of Appalachia. Rather, the new network’s “programming philosophy” was to “help
adults enjoy the rewards and pleasures of lifelong learning.” (emphasis added)
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put forth proposals that the subscriber fee be waived in the counties within the
Appalachian region identified by the ARC as economically “distressed.”61
Aside from the tenuous ground beneath the feet of Morse and his colleagues as
they attempted to expand ACSN services while also securing the lifeblood of future
growth in course enrollment revenue, larger external factors threatened their entire
operation. The election of Ronald Reagan, a staunch disciple of the conservative
movement, had placed the future of the Appalachian Regional Commission in jeopardy,
as the ARC fit the administration’s definition of an expendable government agency that
needed to be dissolved.62 While ACSN was steadily cropping up in cable offerings across
the United States, the governors of the states that comprised the federally-defined
Appalachian region were entreating Reagan and Congress to reconsider this drastic cut.
By the time Reagan took office, the supposed extravagance of spending under Great
Society programs such as the ARC had made them a political liability, and the resolution
submitted by the governors (many of whom were Democrats) “support[ed] the
President’s determination to limit federal spending and agree[d] that the Appalachian
Regional Commission should take its fair share of the cuts.” Each governor defended the
renewal of the ARC vociferously, arguing that genuine strides had been made by the
agency toward alleviating poverty in their states.63

61 Harold E. Morse, “Proposal for Providing ACSN–The Learning Channel Free to Cable Systems in
Distressed Appalachian Counties,” 1981, folder 7, box 794, ARC, UK Special Collections. Morse
expressed dissatisfaction that while ACSN performed well in national markets outside Appalachia,
subscribership in the region was below what he really hoped for.
62 See Eller, Uneven Ground, 200-205.
63 “Governors Urge No Cuts for ARC in 1981, Fair Share in 1982,” Appalachia 14 (March-April, 1981),
2-5.
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Al Smith, a journalist from Kentucky (and host of Kentucky Educational
Television’s news and public affairs program, “Comment on Kentucky”) was then
serving as federal co-chair for the ARC. His vocal defense for the vital necessity of the
ARC likely led to his ouster after the first year of Reagan’s presidency concluded. For
most of the 1980s, Smith notes in his memoir, the agency was “on life support:”
repeatedly left off Reagan’s budget, but kept alive by remonstrances from both the states’
governors and congressional delegates. Before his dismissal, Smith and the ARC’s
executive director, Henry Krevor, pared down the agency’s budget to a bare,
uncontroversial minimum that could easily pass through Congress and over Reagan’s
objections. This included money for continuation of highway projects and, as Smith
summarizes, direct aid to “sixty particularly distressed ARC counties that needed
additional monies for health and education.” Smith’s successor, Winifred Pizzano, a
health services administrator by training, maintained this level of funding throughout the
Reagan presidency, until President George H.W. Bush broke with Reagan’s approach and
included the ARC in his budget requests.64
ACSN’s status as an experimental self-sustaining educational nonprofit was dire
enough, but following the cuts to the ARC made under the Reagan administration, it was
clear that the network could no longer survive as a government enterprise. Though the
network offered an educational service, it was not one of the most urgently needed
services the ARC was allowed to retain. A feasibility study by the Network’s legal
representatives on the possibility of reorganizing as a for-profit network concluded that
doing so would jeopardize all the grants and partnerships ACSN relied upon, but

64 Al Smith, Wordsmith: My Life in Journalism (Louisville, Ky.: Plied Type Press, 2011), 380-382.
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continuing to exist “as a publicly-supported organization or a private foundation would
depend on the extent of any other funding received from the general public and the
government.” Under the new administration, that support simply would not exist.65
ACSN was sold to private investors and by 1985 the network dropped Appalachia
from its name and became known only as The Learning Channel. As a privately owned
cable network, TLC did not generate the same voluminous public records as a non-profit
network supported by a variety of government bureaucracies. Still, evidence suggests that
for a time TLC retained the appearance of a noncommercial, education and public service
network within its programming, producing, for instance, programs that taught adults
basic computer skills, high school students useful tips for the SAT and ACT exams, and
junior high level applied mathematics.66 Morse stayed on with the network, and for his
part he seemed unfazed by the transition, giving the impression to a reporter for the
Lexington Herald-Leader that private ownership had always been a part of the plan (“It
gives us the working capital we need to expand,” he remarked). Employees of The
Learning Channel, the Herald Leader found, owned 5 percent of the network’s stock, so
Morse certainly benefitted from the sale.67
The Learning Channel would continue to offer formal instructional and informal
educational programming through the remainder of the 1980s, and sparingly throughout

65 Anthony S. Harrington, “Memorandum for the Appalachian Community Service Network, RE:
Reorganization into a For-Profit Corporation,” September 7, 1982, folder 9, “Feasibility Study: ACSN
Reorganizing,” box 793, ARC, UK Special Collections; Eller, Uneven Ground, 205–07.
66 Kathy Fridge, “New Fall Series Slated for The Learning Channel,” Del Rio News Herald. September 21,
1986.
67 Paul Prather, “Network to Expand Local Operations,” Lexington Herald-Leader. June 9, 1986. The
“local” in the title here refers to ACSN’s satellite uplink facilities in Lexington, which were still operational
and would, the article reported, begin serving as a relay station for PBS and other commercial networks.

221

the following decade. It was resold to a telecommunications conglomerate in 1991 when
its first purchaser declared bankruptcy, and the new buyer had at that point already
offered an educational channel called “Discovery.” Sources told reporters for the Los
Angeles Times that The Learning Channel had then been sold for $31.5 million dollars.
Certainly the network had appreciated in value since it had first subsisted on a 2 milliondollar loan from the ARC, but this was still small compared to the approximately $13
billion budget the ARC commanded around the same time. In 1992, the New York Times
praised the network for continuing to offer educational programming for children, even
when the network had yet to turn a profit for its parent company, but by the 2000s the
network had begun to, as education writer Audrey Watters notes in her blog piece on the
commercial transition, “steadily…distance itself from ‘learning,’ promoting itself instead
as ‘TLC.’”68

Conclusion
What then, can we learn from the story of this failed network? Was it merely
another slick, technological promise to “modernize” the Appalachian region, akin to
railroads in the late-nineteenth century, or automobiles and highways in the midtwentieth? David Whisnant, historian of Appalachia and preeminent critic of such efforts,
reached this conclusion regarding AESP in Modernizing the Mountaineer: People,
Power, and Planning in Appalachia (1980). In the book he associates the satellite project

68 John Lippman, “Discovery Will Buy Learning Channel Unit,” Los Angeles Times. February 15, 1991;
Geraldine Fabrikant, “Learning Channel’s Ad-Free Strategy,” New York Times, October 12, 1992; Audrey
Watters, “What Happened to Educational Television: The Story of ‘The Learning Channel,’” Hack
Education, May 30, 2015.

222

with a long historical list of “relics or curiosities,” which “leaving little behind . . . are
soon forgotten.” Whisnant rightfully identifies the more dubious aspects of the satellite
program’s genesis, such as the obvious condescension in Morse’s assertion that AESP
would be “the forerunner of more ambitious satellite projects to help crack the cultural
isolation of Appalachia,” or the suspicious fact that stock for Fairchild Industries, the
private firm that built the ATS-6 for NASA, quadrupled after the satellite was launched.69
In light of Whisnant’s criticisms, it is difficult to see AESP as anything other than “out of
touch” with the region’s needs.
Yet the educational television projects undertaken by the ARC in the 1970s and
1980s are worth remembering, even in light of the fact that these projects’ most faithful
proponents would scoff at the idea public broadcasting alone could “fix” the region as a
whole. AESP, though not a particularly large project in terms of what the ARC funded at
the time, directed its energies to address a specific need identified by teachers and
students living in the region. As AESP was dismantled, that effort was transformed into a
cable network with a less specialized program, but a far broader reach. At the height of
its brief period as a government-supported enterprise, ACSN reached an estimated
145,916 homes in the Appalachian region, and publicized the needs of the region to many
more homes outside it.70
With a collective lifespan of roughly 10 years, neither the AESP nor ACSN
operated long enough to radically transform and uplift the region’s education system, as

69 David Whisnant, Modernizing the Mountaineer: People, Power, and Planning in Appalachia
(Knoxville, Tenn, 1994), 164.
70 “A Report to the Appalachian Regional Commission from the Appalachian Community Service
Network,” 10.
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Whisnant may have expected of them, but even so their creators had never staked such
high hopes to either project. In the article Morse co-authored with Patrick Carlton, “The
Challenge to Education in Appalachia,” the scale of the many challenges facing anyone
dedicated to the task of improving education in Appalachia were neither minimized nor
underestimated. Furthermore, Morse and Carlton suffered no illusions about their
positions as ARC staff and consultants. “These are disturbing shortcomings, to say the
least, and it would be easy,” they noted, “to capitalize upon them through the use of facile
explanations designed with the flick of a bureaucratic Bic to cure all Appalachian
problems.” They knew that such an approach—whereby programs like AESP and ACSN
would be pitched as a cure-all—would “contribute to a cruel and totally unjustifiable
deception.”71 An ETV network would certainly be useful, but in the final goal of
improving education in Appalachia, it could only be one out of many genuinely needed
responses Morse, Carlton, and their colleagues could provide.
Within the realm of distance education technology, it can also seem especially
daunting to take a stab at developing new ideas and solutions for students in Appalachia,
as the Internet economy shows with its constant (and often disorienting) production of
new tools, solutions, and subsequent challenges for the user. However the history of
AESP and ACSN—two bygone projects provided within earlier technological media—
sheds light on essential elements for further innovation in distance education: attention to
specific needs identified by local educators within the region rather than sweeping,
nationwide educational trends; partnership between a wide variety of agencies and
specialties; and an unwavering enthusiasm and imagination for making education

71 Carlton and Morse, “The Challenge to Education in Appalachia,” 31.
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accessible to as many students as possible. The issue of adequate funding, which the
ACSN lost, will also remain an issue, but as educators and institutions are endowed with
financial opportunities for new experiments in distance education, hope remains that new
generations of innovators will not lose sight of this earlier experiment and its guiding
principles.
Students who benefitted from AESP and ACSN, either through formal
courseware or general interest programming, would still have the option of doing so
through The Learning Channel, at least for a few years. That the underlying private,
commercial interests of that channel eventually revealed themselves through the complete
makeover of TLC’s programming, shows the value of keeping educational media under
public control. The ARC would not attempt to provide a unified, region-specific source
of educational technology again, but public media sources throughout the region would
continue their services in the decades after ACSN’s dissolution. The next chapter will
return to the two state-level cases examined previously—Kentucky Educational
Television and North Carolina’s WUNC-TV—to provide a brief sampling of some of the
programs those sources have offered since their activation. Readers like Whisnant, who
might be looking to these programs for signs of radical transformation in Kentucky and
North Carolina’s education system will likely be just as disappointed. As with AESP and
ACSN, they appear modest in scope, but they provide important seeds for that
transformation, as well as helpful models for how others can best implement public and
educational media in regions that need it.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
In June of 1977, the Carnegie Corporation announced the forthcoming release of a
new report the philanthropy giant had commissioned on public broadcasting, the first it
had conducted since the release of the landmark Public Television: A Program for Action
a decade prior. New developments in media technology, Carnegie found, had called into
question whether the structures of noncommercial television and radio as envisioned and
codified in 1967 were still applicable and worthwhile as these new media environments
came into being. Together, cable and satellite television formed one such technological
development, and as seen in the previous chapter, their distribution capabilities had cast
doubt on the reach and relevance of the conventional broadcast stations Carnegie had
considered previously. The other emerging device was video reproduction of educational
programs, either onto cassette tapes or video disks. Copying programs and distributing
them directly to schools and other stations had been possible in the late 1960s, but in the
following decade the mass production of these new formats had reduced the cost of
reproductions considerably. This had called into question whether or not schools even
needed an over-the-air source of programs when copies were so readily available, or if
home viewers would still support their local public media when they could pick and
choose their favorite programs as they would books for their own personal library.1
Moreover the new commission sought to evaluate the progress of public
broadcasting as a federal institution, which it had become following the Public
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Les Brown, “New Panel to Study Future of Public TV,” New York Times, June 14, 1977, p. 1. Another
new development Carnegie meant to analyze was the growth of National Public Radio. Radio had not
garnered the attention of the earlier Commission as much as television, but NPR had grown to be a valued
and respectable sister agency alongside PBS following its creation in 1970.

Broadcasting Act of 1967. The establishment of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
and the Public Broadcasting Service had been accompanied by hopeful speeches and
ambitious promises for how public television could affect society in general. The
Carnegie Corporation was interested to know how well the medium had acquitted itself.
How well had it performed as the massive social “laboratory for creative
experimentation” its creators purportedly meant to offer? Furthermore, while the earlier
Commission and the resulting legislation intended to stitch together the various isolated
and incongruous noncommercial broadcast operations into a sinuous whole, the 1977
Commission recognized that the national system still resembled “a patchwork of
institutions…organizations, consortia and affinity groups, some of which are cooperative
and some competitive.” As with the earlier Carnegie report, the new Commission
members had the ear of the current White House occupant, and they recognized how their
report could drastically alter the course of public media policy.2
In The Public Trust the Commission wholeheartedly reaffirmed two conclusions
from the previous Commission. First, the report’s closing chapter, “The Social Dividend
of the Electronic Media,” stressed that, regardless of its expansions into new domains and
means of consumption, broadcast media, properly programmed, still possessed a
remarkable capacity to “teach, heal, and inspire.” Second, the Commission rejected the
idea, as had many other educational broadcasters in previous decades, that the
educational properties of television and radio could be entrusted to commercial interests.
Though commercial broadcasters had at various times insisted that their offerings were
produced and distributed with the public’s interests in mind, the “social tools of

2
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revolutionary importance”—as the Commission considered them—could not be
“permitted to assume a wholly commercial character.” If public programs were
withdrawn from the broadcast media diet which had become preeminent in so many
Americans’ lives, the result would be, as the Commission described it, a “ruthless pursuit
of the lowest common denominator,” and an unrestrained “merchandising of
consciousness.”3
The authors of Public Trust understood that public media in the United States
would continue to be evaluated largely as an educational and thoughtful alternative to
commercial stations within the domain of entertainment, but they maintained that
noncommercial stations across the country were still vitally important resources in
learning and teaching. In a section titled “Telecommunications and Learning,” their
findings provided an earnest appraisal of the successes and missteps of instructional
broadcast media over the previous two decades. Naturally, they attested to the continued
popularity and acclaim for Sesame Street and The Electric Company, noting that these
offerings by the Children’s Television Workshop had struck the ideal balance between
formal instruction and entertainment within any given program. Many educators, the
report noted, remained skeptical of the true compatibility of broadcast programs and
formal learning, but the popularity of Sesame Street and the launch of new programs
attempting to emulate their approach showed that general support for broadcast media, at
least for children, had visibly grown in the last decade.4
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To those who looked askance at telecommunication’s role in learning, whether
they were teachers unconvinced of improved learning outcomes among students who
supplemented their education with broadcast media, or the “adolescents and adults” at
home “still waiting for a Sesame Street-type breakthrough” in program development,
Public Trust had an answer. The main issue had been the capacity for interaction:
students or other viewers could receive generous offerings from the educators who
designed the programs and the stations that delivered them, but there had to be some
meaningful way for viewers to communicate feedback, directly or indirectly, to the
programs’ producers. Certainly the media’s technical aspects could make for an alluring
and often exciting transmission of visual and auditory information, especially as
educators were mastering “close-ups, magnification, time sequencing, juxtaposition of
sight and sound, and other sophisticated forms of editing.” But to provide such technical
masterworks without any space for interaction and dialogue between student and teacher,
the Commission found, was altogether unproductive.5
These “passive forms of learning” from earlier applications of educational media
had, the Commission noted, been overcome in the previous decade in a number of ways.
For one, technical developments in telecommunications had allowed for digital
communication between program recipients in remote locations. The introduction of
satellite and cable systems, they acknowledged, was embraced primarily for the ways
those media could spread programs across a wider range and offer more channels than
conventional radio frequencies. Less recognized though, was the development inherent
in the new media “of new technologies such as two-way cable television,” which

5
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provided “the feedback essential to all forms of learning.”6 Echoes of the Appalachian
Educational Satellite Program, as well as the other experimental ETV programs
supported by the ARC in the 1970s, can be heard in this point. Regardless of how well
funded or skillfully produced an ETV program may be, the Carnegie Commission knew
that the education offered by those programs required some means by which the learner
could respond to the teacher.
Two-way communication technology in ETV, the Commission argued, would
strengthen learning among viewers if it remained a focal point in public media. But in
response to the fundamental question “how can radio and television teach best,” Public
Trust stressed that the most important point educational broadcasters had learned was that
their programs could only be supplemental resources and aides to teachers, produced in
consultation with those teachers. As MPATI and KET had learned in preparing their
networks, teachers were predominantly concerned that ETV programs might be used to
replace their positions or preclude the hiring of new teachers going forward. In response
to such fears, those networks had designed systems under which teachers within the
network’s reach could voice their concerns and influence the content of educational
programming. MPATI and KET’s recommendations for using programs stressed that
teachers could build curriculum with those resources, but that they should not be relied
on exclusively when planning lessons.
The Carnegie Commission reiterated these points in Public Trust. “[N]either a
radio or televised program,” they argued, echoing the MPATI and KET conclusions,
“could be fully effective in isolation.” Instead, “each program must be carefully

6
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researched and produced as part of an integrated learning system.” In such a system,
teachers would “use the program to stimulate, provoke, and motivate the student, and to
illuminate ancillary reading materials,” much as KET and MPATI had recommended.
“Television and radio,” the Public Trust authors concluded, “can never be more than
invited guests in the classroom.”7
In considering how educators could make the best use of public media, the
Commission also reaffirmed the philosophy of localism that had been shared so
commonly in designs for educational television networks. The Public Broadcasting Act
of 1967 had created a national structure for public, educational television and radio, but it
stopped short of instituting a uniform national network like the major commercial
networks. Local stations could access and implement programs produced at costs that
most local stations individually could not otherwise afford, but under the provisions of
the Act those stations had the final say in what programs they would or would not use.
“We harbor, in this country,” the 1977 Carnegie Commission observed, “an acute
sensitivity about local control of education. Educational and instructional needs vary
greatly and are often unique from community to community and state to state.”8 As seen
in previous chapters, this predominant sensitivity pervaded the work of educators
attempting to establish networks that reached beyond the range of one single television
transmitter. MPATI and KET had to attest regularly to skeptics that their networks
would not upset this established order, and concerns over an upended localism had
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prevented educators from using ARC resources to create a region-wide
telecommunications network in the 1960s.
A crucial point related to this failed Appalachian network, however, separated A
Public Trust from earlier discussions of educational broadcasting and localism. While
the Commission insisted that decisions for the use of media should remain with local
teachers and administrators, they now recognized an important new corollary. Where
individual local communities were either unable historically to procure the same high
quality educational resources for their students, schools, or households, or where more
well-endowed local communities partook in high quality educational resources and
neglected neighboring communities that lacked those resources, regional networks could
ameliorate those disparities. Such networks should be established where necessary.
Essentially, the Commission held, it was the duty of regional networks to provide the
distance learning service these outlier communities needed.
Though the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and other federal programs had
alleviated many of the financial burdens associated with starting and operating ETV
stations, these did not fully account for the poverty in communities in regions across the
nation that could benefit from additional educational resources. Individual stations
should have “prime responsibility” for their own local programs and services, the
Commission argued, but by “pooling funds for regional and national activities,” a
regional cooperation “between stations and educators at the local and regional levels”
could ensure “responsiveness to local educational needs and local control over
curricula.”9 As satellites and other new technology in telecommunications were
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developed and implemented, the Commission suggested, “consortiums of stations” could
“join together to form ad hoc networks for specialized programming needs.” Though they
did not mention Appalachia as a site for such a network, many knew that disadvantaged
regions like Appalachia, and the people living there who had been subjected to
inequitable educational circumstances, could benefit the most from such regional
partnerships.
The state of North Carolina, as seen in an earlier chapter, was slower to appreciate
this regional need. Their first ETV station was, like so many of the U.S.’s early ETV
operations, prescribed by the FCC in such a way as to reserve the benefits of the new
medium for major urban areas and “educational centers” like Chapel Hill, where the
state’s network originated. Though the station was under the auspices of the relatively
new Consolidated University of North Carolina, its benefits were still available only in a
more prosperous area that had much less difficulty in serving equitable education to its
population than did the peripheral regions of eastern and western North Carolina. In
time, and after the objections of citizens in these regions who protested the minimal reach
of the “state” network, WUNC-TV would be extended to the peripheral communities.
After ETV’s first decade the need to provide truly inclusive networks would become a
common understanding among educational broadcasters, and the medium subsequently
started calling itself “public television” as a way of reflecting that change.
Yet in spite of the fact that no national “fourth network” was ever instituted, and
no region-specific network lasted more than a few years, it was state networks like those
in North Carolina, Kentucky, and many other states that carried the torch of public,
educational television through to the present day. Public Trust recognized this fact.
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Though the Commission’s main goal was to reconsider the national policy effected by the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and whether or not Congress or the President should
consider additional funds or endowments, they praised state networks for identifying
local educational needs and banding support together to provide an appropriate response.
“Telecommunications configurations such as those developed in South Carolina,
Nebraska, and others,” they found, had built the strongest foundations for public media
by providing “not only hardware but also resources for programming.” In establishing
such systems, state-level operations had provided “vehicles through which important
educational and instructional services—in-school instruction, continuing education, athome learning—can be delivered.”10 Though the Commission did recommend continued
financial support of public media by the federal government, they held up states as
appropriately-situated mechanisms for designing coordinated responses to educational
needs while remaining attentive to local needs and customs within their diverse
populations.
Hundreds of examples from the voluminous number of programs produced by
state-level public television stations could be called upon to illustrate the positive effects
these organizations have had on their communities, but the two states explored in this
dissertation have some particularly noteworthy accomplishments to mention. Recall that
in 1974, the journal of the Appalachian Regional Commission, Appalachia, reported on
Alabama’s two-way use of its state ETV network to provide expanded access to the GED
testing program. KET would at roughly the same time, however, develop its own
televised GED prep series, and their version of the program would emerge as the first
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choice among public television stations nationwide seeking to offer free prep materials
for the test. Public Trust singled out KET’s program as significant evidence for public
television’s capacity to aid adult education, finding that after less than five years, the
KET equivalency test services were used by ETV stations in 40 states.11
In writing about the success of KET’s equivalency programs for his memoir,
Leonard Press cites the high production value invested into the Kentucky network’s
attempt at a series. Though the directors of the Alabama program found that their
televised GED courses made prepping for the test far more engaging than studying
correspondence materials in private and alone, they still relied to a great extent on GED
television programs produced by outside agencies before the Alabama initiative started.
These programs, one produced by Manpower Development Institute (primarily for active
labor union members) and another by a community college in Seattle, still left much to be
desired in the way of visual appeal, Press felt. KET started brainstorming adult education
services in 1969, which as Press notes was also the year Sesame Street debuted and
“changed the way we all thought about how educational television should, or at least
could, look.” Along with state funding, KET secured a grant from the ARC to produce
the GED prep program, which together gave them a little over $500,000 to put toward
actors, writers, and color-TV ready set design. “We wanted this instruction to be a
pleasure, not a pill,” Press recalled, “especially given that we were appealing to adults
who had already dropped out of school once. This had to be good.”12
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Reaching Kentuckians who lacked a high school degree—an estimated 1.5
million adults out of a total state population of 3.3 million—was certainly one of the
more widely publicized examples of a significant state ETV network service. Most of the
activities of KET and WUNC-TV (now known as PBS North Carolina) have emerged
with less public acclaim, though they are by no means less important. One especially
important category in this sense is the offering of public affairs programming and
coverage of state legislatures. Local affiliates of the major commercial networks became
increasingly attentive to either news at the national level or more sensationalized local
news stories. Television generally overlooked the inner workings of state government,
and the Carnegie Commission and public broadcasters realized that noncommercial
stations could step in to fill that gap. Leonard Press was grateful for PBS’s public affairs
program Washington Week in Review when KET was first starting out, but he lamented
that the show was “hosted and paneled by hired guns from the ranks of professional
journalists whose regular jobs were with the commercial news media—mainly the major
newspapers—in the D.C. area.”13 State and local politics have a significant bearing on
local communities, one more serious than most realize.
Both Kentucky and North Carolina’s networks have remedied this oversight with
a number of programs. The legislative and capitol reporting programs of PBS North
Carolina have gone by many names over the years, including Stateline, which featured
coverage of the legislature and public comment on issues facing North Carolinians, from

Kentuckians into the program as possible. She would appear in an Uncle Sam-style promotional campaign
known as “Martha’s GED Army,” which had in its ranks the multi-platinum selling country music artist
Waylon Jennings, who used the KET program to obtain an equivalency degree.
13 Press, The KET Story, 176.
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1981-1991. In a given week viewers could see general summaries of legislative action,
reporting on issues such as “Waterfront Restoration in N.C. Coastal Towns,” “Downtown
Revitalization in Asheville,” and “Public Opinion: Should the Government Do More for
Vietnam Veterans?”14 Other North Carolina public affairs programs offered interview
programs similar to Washington Week in Review or Firing Line, though with local
journalists and political figures. Likewise, Leonard Press and his colleague Al Smith
launched the state public affairs program Comment on Kentucky in 1974, and it has run
ever since.
In reporting on state public affairs, Kentucky and North Carolina’s stations have
managed to stay clear, for the most part, of any political controversies or entanglements.
While it has become an occasional sport among conservative Congressmen and Senators
to decry biased reporting and editorializing from PBS’s nationally distributed programs,
local and state level stations have generally been able to avoid such charges.
Furthermore, while the FCC policy laid out in In the Matter of Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees (also known as the “Fairness Doctrine”) was repealed in 1987, KET
and PBS North Carolina make it a point to give equal, unbiased attention to multiple
viewpoints on any given public issue. Press noted that some lawmakers over the years
have objected to say, the studio anchor’s summaries of their speeches or certain parts of
speeches being left on the cutting room floor, but KET has been vindicated numerous
times over the years by the entire legislature for its nonpartisan approach.15 Both
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Kentucky and North Carolina observed the “Statement of Principles of Editorial
Integrity” drafting at a conference of public broadcasters in 1985, stating clearly that the
aim of their organizations was to offer educational resources, not prod viewers one way
or the other on a political spectrum.16
Yet it would be misleading to say that these networks have remained completely
neutral on the most serious matters facing residents of their states. As Allison Perlman
notes in Public Interests, media advocates have long observed how “seemingly neutral
decisions” within broadcast policy making “are imbricated within existing forms of
inequality and injustice.” Conversely, Kentucky and North Carolina’s networks have
made use of their own “veneer of neutrality” to make open and important statements
about the inequalities and injustices facing local residents, usually in the form of their
documentary programs. Any number of these documentaries could be used to
demonstrate this fact, but the best example may be KET’s Fund for Independent
Productions, a state grant program passed in 1990 and administered by KET to aspiring
documentary filmmakers.17
KET has bolstered the careers of countless documentarians through this program,
but many of them have gone to young students at Appalshop, the documentary and arts
collective center in the eastern Kentucky mountain town of Whitesburg, and a place that
no one could call neutral with regard to serious issues facing Kentuckians. Press might
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have earned the ire of Appalshop filmmakers when he accepted donations from coal
companies to help pay for activation of the state network, but his steadfast fondness and
support for the young minds his network supported there truly gave him the last laugh
over the coal barons, as he describes here:
“I had reason to be grateful for [Kentucky River Coal owner] Catesby [Clay]’s
steadfast support again some years later when KET angered the coal owners by
scheduling an Appalshop program in support of a referendum to overturn the
broad form deed. Worse, it aired just before Election Day. Catesby called, very
unhappy with us…”18
And angry as Clay might have been over such a tremendous threat to the coal companies’
ability to destroy eastern Kentucky’s mountains and the people that lived on them, the
veneer of neutrality held by KET was something that he could not violate. “[H]e did not
withdraw his support of KET,” Press remembers, “even when the referendum passed.”
Close attention to state and regional ETV networks, their formation, and the
decisions made by their founders, reveals a much more textured broadcast landscape than
national-level studies can produce. These smaller operations did a great deal to educate
citizens, both formally and informally. Those who search today for solutions and
guidance in how to best offer distance education resources would do well to observe ETV
networks as part of the story of distance education. Their experiments, in different forms
and expressions, sought ways to actively attend to and provide for the have-nots in an
education system, and studying these experiments will yield a broader, more thoughtful,
and just endeavor toward equitable distance education in the present day.
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